Explaining the emergence of Boko Haram: state failure and relative deprivation by Mavhura, Bathromeu
Explaining the Emergence of Boko Haram: State Failure and Relative Deprivation 
 By 
Bathromeu Mavhura 
Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Political 
Science) in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University 
Supervisors: Dr Guy Lamb and Ms. Christiane Struckmann 
December 2020 
DECLARATION 
By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is 
my own work, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly 
otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not 
infringe third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for 
obtaining any qualification. 
Bathromeu Mavhura 
December 2020  
Copyright © 2020 Stellenbosch University 




For more than a decade, Boko Haram terror attacks, although not regular occurrences, have 
remained the greatest security threats in Nigeria, mostly in the north-east and in neighbouring 
countries in the Lake Chad Basin. The group has threatened social, economic and political 
stability, which in turn impedes economic development. Corruption, poverty, unemployment, and 
inequality remain acute in Nigeria, specifically in the north-east region in which Boko Haram 
attacks have been dominant and recurring. The study utilises desktop research and employs state 
failure and relative deprivation theory as the methodology and analytical framework to help 
explain the emergence and the rise of Boko Haram. The study examines how inequality, 
corruption, unemployment, and poverty have created fertile grounds for resentment and anger in 
Nigeria. It also examines the ways in which these factors have made it difficult to curb the terror 
attacks. The connection between state failure and relative deprivation and its links to terrorism 
are explored by linking the theory and the empirical evidence of bad governance, poverty, 
unemployment and human security inequalities in north-east Nigeria. The study contends that 
Nigeria as a whole should not be called a failed or a failing state. However, the north-east region 
falls under the umbrella of failed or failing state because of available evidence of the 
characteristics of a failed or failing state. There the extent of poverty and underdevelopment is 
relatively higher than other states in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
The study argues that the state's response to the Boko Haram problem has been the use of a 
heavy-handed military approach, with severe human rights violations and limited efforts to 
address the main causes of the crisis. This approach is combined with an absence of non-violent 
conflict resolution approaches such as negotiations. Regional and continental bodies have also 
made use of military interventions, while there have been fewer efforts to address the root causes. 
On a state level, the study argues that corruption, lack of political will, poor security mechanisms, 
and human rights abuses have worsened the situation and have made intervention efforts less 
effective. The regional and continental bodies also lacked the capacity and the common will to 
intervene timeously to resolve the crisis. The thesis concludes by recommending that the state 
and all parties involved embrace a ‘soft’ approach that aims to address the root causes of the 
problem in the north-eastern region, which Boko Haram has capitalised on, in order to garner 




Boko Haram se terreuraanvalle, alhoewel nie gereelde voorvalle nie, skep al vir meer as ’n dekade 
die grootste veiligheidsbedreigings in Nigerië, meestal in die noordooste en in die buurlande in 
die Tsjadmeer bekken. Die groep bedreig sosiale, ekonomiese en politieke stabiliteit, wat weer 
ekonomiese ontwikkeling belemmer. Korrupsie, armoede, werkloosheid en ongelykheid bly 
ernstig in Nigerië, veral in die noordoostelike streek waar die Boko Haram aanvalle hoofsaaklik 
en herhalend voorkom. Die studie gebruik rekenaarnavorsing en teorieë in verband met 
staatsmislukking en relatiewe deprivasie as die metodologie en die ontledingsraamwerk om die 
opkoms en uitbreiding van Boko Haram te help verklaar. Die studie ondersoek hoe ongelykheid, 
korrupsie, werkloosheid en armoede vrugbare gronde vir wrokkigheid en woede in Nigerië skep. 
Dit ondersoek ook die maniere waarop hierdie faktore dit moeilik maak om die terreuraanvalle in 
bedwang te bring. Die verband tussen staatsmislukking en relatiewe deprivasie, en hoe dit by 
terrorisme aansluit, word ondersoek deur die teorie en die empiriese bewyse van swak regering, 
armoede, werkloosheid en ongelykhede betreffende menslike veiligheid in die noordooste van 
Nigerië, met mekaar in verband te bring. Die studie voer aan dat Nigerië in sy geheel nie ’n 
mislukte of mislukkende staat genoem behoort te word nie. Die noordoostelike streek val egter 
onder die sambreel van ’n mislukte of mislukkende staat vanweë beskikbare bewyse van 
kenmerke van ’n mislukte of mislukkende staat. Die omvang van die armoede en 
onderontwikkeling is daar relatief hoër as in ander state in die Federale Republiek van Nigerië.  
Die studie voer verder aan dat die staat se reaksie op die Boko Haram probleem die gebruik van 
’n hardhandige militaristiese benadering was, met ernstige menseregteskendings en beperkte 
pogings om die hoofoorsake van die krisis aan te spreek. Hierdie benadering word gekombineer 
met ’n afwesigheid van niegewelddadige benaderings tot konflikoplossing, byvoorbeeld 
onderhandelings. Streeks en kontinentale liggame het ook militêre ingryping gebruik, terwyl daar 
minder pogings aangewend is om die grondoorsake daarvan aan te spreek. Op staatsvlak voer 
die studie aan dat korrupsie, ’n gebrek aan politieke wil, swak veiligheidsmeganismes en 
menseregteskendings die situasie vererger en pogings tot ingryping minder effektief maak. Die 
streeks en kontinentale liggame het ook nie die kapasiteit en die gemeenskaplike wil om betyds 
in te gryp om die krisis op te los nie. Die referaat sluit af deur aan te beveel dat die staat en alle 
betrokkenes ’n “sagte” benadering aanvaar, gemik op die oplossing van die grondoorsake van 
die noordoostelike streek se probleme waaruit Boko Haram munt slaan, ten einde die steun van 
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This study is dedicated to all who have fallen and those who are still falling victim to Boko 
Haram terror attacks in Nigeria and neighbouring countries, mostly the innocent civilians 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
 
To this day, Boko Haram’s insurgency is one of the greatest security threats in Nigeria, the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region, and the African continent at 
large. Boko Haram is generally translated to mean ‘Western education is forbidden’. However, 
Boko Haram has a wider meaning since ‘Boko’ can also be interpreted as ‘Western deception’. 
The name was given to the insurgents by outsiders, not by the Islamist insurgency militants 
themselves but Nigerian authorities and the news media houses continue to call them Boko 
Haram (Smith, 2015:212). The rise of terrorist attacks has negatively affected the socio-political 
economy of Nigeria and has spilled over to neighbouring countries such as Niger, Chad, and 
Cameroon. Looking at the extent of the terror attacks, ruthlessness and killings, family 
disintegration and high levels of human rights violations in Nigeria, the research uses relative 
deprivation theory and state failure theory to critically analyse how inequality, poverty, 
unemployment, and corruption relate to the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. 
This chapter provides a background and rationale for the study. It also comprises a discussion of 
the problem statement, research questions, the aims of the study, and the theoretical framework. 
After that, the research methodology, research design, limitations and delimitations of the study, 
as well as the means to remedy these limitations are described. The final section sets out the 
structure of the study by outlining the topics and spotlighting what is analysed in each chapter.  
1.2. Background and rationale 
 
Nigeria is located in West Africa. According to the World Bank (2019), Nigeria’s population is 
approximately 202 million people and has one of the largest youth populations in the world. It is 
a key regional player in West Africa. Nigeria is multi-ethnic, and is a culturally diverse federation 
which consists of 36 autonomous states and the Federal Capital Territory (FTC). Nigeria is 
resource abundant; it is the biggest oil exporter in Africa, with large natural gas reserves on the 
continent (World Bank, 2019). Nigerians are deeply religious people, both Christianity and Islam 
are popular, and each religion has a strong following. In 2002, an Islamic group called Boko 
Haram emerged under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, a radical Islamic cleric in Maiduguri, 
in the Borno State in North-Eastern Nigeria. The term Boko Haram is a revealing window to an 




forbidden”, but according to several experts, the term goes beyond simply secular schooling and 
means a denial of Western civilisation and institutions (United States House of Representative 
Committee on Homeland Security, 2013). The reasons for the formation of the group, according 
to the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2014) are that they want to create a strict Islamic Caliphate 
in the north of Nigeria, which they believe will address poor governance and corruption. Felter 
(2018), argues that Nigeria’s record of corruption and inequality have contributed to the group’s 
rise, hence the use of state failure theory and relative deprivation theory to explain the emergence 
of Boko Haram.  
Like many other Salafi organisations, the group believes that the full implementation of Sharia law 
requires a change of political regime because the democratic and secular constitution is an affront 
to the law of God. Initially, the group existed peacefully, with the locals being involved in some 
community programs, but the group later erupted into a fanatically violent terrorist movement due 
to mishandled responses by the government and its security apparatus (Montclos, 2014a). 
Bintube (2015) has argued that the group became violent when Yusuf adopted a radical approach 
to preaching. Preaching that was directed at attacking not only the state and its operatives but 
also some Islamic scholars, organisations, and groups who seemed to have compromised the 
teachings of Islam in relation to injustice and corruption, which was occasioned by leadership 
deficits in Nigeria. It appears that the Nigerian government’s aggressive response to Boko Haram 
resulted in the death of Yusuf in 2009, which angered the group and acted as the catalyst to the 
outbreak of violent attacks by Boko Haram. Pichette (2015:3) contends that Boko Haram seeks 
to completely displace extant law and install strict Sharia law in Nigeria, and he asserts that such 
a goal necessitates a complete overthrow of the state at all levels of government, making Boko 
Haram a threat to national security as well as the lives of endangered Nigerians. 
Duke, Agbaji and Bassey, (2017) argue that various forms of deviant or unethical behaviour, 
malfeasance, and any illegal use of power in both public and private domains alters the ethos and 
conditions of legal systems and thus also government legitimacy. The International Crisis Group 
(2014) claimed that poverty is a product of bad governance, including bloated administration, and 
that corruption leads to poverty. In support of the above, Uzoh (2016:2832) contends that Nigeria 
is characterised by high levels of poverty, spanning from poor leadership, which breeds 
corruption. He asserts that Nigeria is plagued by security challenges caused by Boko Haram, 
which, he argues, owes to political, economic and social instability that is often caused by bad 




Duke et al. (2017:5) also argues that corruption within Nigerian armed forces has made the fight 
against Boko Haram insurgency more ineffective and has led Nigeria to be characterised by the 
insecurity of lives and property, fear, and anxiety. This thesis seeks to determine how corruption, 
poverty, and inequality has resulted in the rise of Boko Haram. Brinkel and Aithida (2012) share 
the same view, arguing that oil revenues are not being used to invest in communities but are 
divided amongst the political elites. By doing so, elites have intensified the rate of unemployment, 
and this has made many youths desperate, so that many have opted to join the Boko Haram 
insurgency. Although Nigeria is rich in natural resources, most of its population lives under the 
most appalling conditions. In Maiduguri for instance, many of the residents survive off less than 
two US dollars a day (USHR, 2013). Shuaibu and Salleh (2015) further argue that 70% of the 
population is poor with 35% living in absolute poverty.  
Duke et al. (2017:5) note that:  
Boko Haram’s fatal activities have caused dangers to the nation and its citizens by causing 
massive mortality and casualty rates, national disintegration, displacement of north-
eastern citizens, destabilized and crippled political and economic activity and worsened 
insecurity and fear as well as affecting the global image.  
The rationale for choosing the topic of the Boko Haram insurgency is that the group’s attacks 
have negatively affected the economic, political, and social conditions in Nigeria. The attacks also 
threaten peace and stability in Nigeria and neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad Basin. The 
effects of Boko Haram's attacks have been reported as among the most dangerous in the world. 
According to Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2019:16), Boko Haram has been ranked as the fourth 
deadliest terrorist group in 2018 and remains the deadliest in Sub-Saharan Africa. The recurrence 
of the attacks indicates that there is a gap that needs to be addressed. In the first eight months of 
2019, Boko Haram was responsible for about 615 combat-related deaths (GTI, 2019:16). This 
indicates the continued security threats caused by Boko Haram.  
There is a power struggle between the Christians and the Muslims, both seeking dominance, and 
political conflict remains a significant factor in the ongoing unrest. Blanchard and Husted (2019) 
pointed out that the country has been faced with political turmoil and economic crisis since 1960 
when it attained independence from the United Kingdom, and that political life has been marred 
by conflict along ethnic, geographic and religious lines, and that corruption and misrule has 
undermined the state’s authority and legitimacy. According to Campbell and Harwood (2018), the 




2011 to June 2018, in which 37,530 people were killed. This finding has nearly doubled the 
conventional cited estimates of 20,000, while during the same period the Armed Conflict Location 
and Event Data Project (ACLED) indicated 3,346 incidents, noting that 34,261 fatalities were 
accounted for (Campbell & Harwood, 2018). The extent of the fatalities induced by the Islamist 
insurgency has triggered a humanitarian crisis, impeded economic development and has also 
created a refugee crisis (Ali, Adamu & Gana, 2019:1). Because of the above, the research aims 
to ascertain the birth of Boko Haram and its attacks. See Figure1.1 for some fatalities posed by 
the Boko Haram insurgency reported from 2011 to 2018.  
 
  
Figure 1.1 Total deaths in incidents involving Boko Haram 
(Source: Campbell & Harwood, 2018) 
The reason there were fewer attacks in 2011 is because Boko Haram had been focusing on 
individuals and small groups, while the upsurge in 2014 has been due to the massive attack 
method directed to less defended targets and massacring the target population (Cook, 2014:9). 
Most suicidal attacks are by women. In April 2014, over 5,000 people were killed in Boko Haram-
related violence, as the group used new and more deadly tactics to maximise casualties (Heim & 
McQuaid, 2015). There were high death rates in 2015 because the state failed to stop the 2015 




efforts to disrupt the 2015 presidential election. The counterterrorism offensive actions taken by 
the Multinational Joint Task Forces (MNJTF) between 2015 and 2016, which saw the MNJTF 
reclaiming the territory from Boko Haram, has significantly weakened the group (GTI, 2019:16). 
There have also been more cases of “hit and run” guerrilla-style tactics and fewer instances of 
high-profile targets (Olojo, 2013:11).  
According to UNHCR (2019:1), as of 31 January 2019 there were 2,498,927 million Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and north-east Nigeria due to insurgency. 
In addition, as of 31 January 2019, there were 232,378 thousand Nigerian refugees in Cameroon, 
Chad, and Niger due to insurgency (UNHCR, 2019:1). The recurrence of attacks and high levels 
of human rights violations show that Nigeria seems to have failed to deal with the threats of Boko 
Haram and its effects up to the present day. Thus, there is a need to identify current challenges 
being faced and possibly provide new insights. Regional responses have varied between military 
and non-military aspects. Combined with the devastating humanitarian crisis and the destruction 
that has been wrought, the situation remains dire, especially as the insurgency continues to affect 
parts of the Lake Chad basin region (Ani & Mahmood, 2018:23).  
There has been an increase in violence in north-east Nigeria. In January 2019 Boko Haram 
caused more than 80,000 civilians to seek refuge in overcrowded camps or towns in Bono State, 
where they have been living beyond the poverty line and in difficult conditions (UNHCR, 2019). 
It has also been reported that about 35,000 people fled from the City of Ran to Cameroon, while 
seeking refuge from the Boko Haram attacks on the last weekend of January 2019 (UNHCR, 
2019:1). This implies that Boko Haram remains a threat and there is a need for long-term 
solutions. Amnesty International (2019b) also reported that about 60 people were killed by Boko 
Haram attacks in Ran in January 2019. Although not as frequent as before, the continued attacks 
– combined with the extent of the refugee influx and the displacement of thousands of people – 
are of great concern. There is a need for longer term solutions and coordination to be initiated 
and implemented to address the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency and prevent further 
attacks, family disintegration and human rights abuses. In this regard, the study will provide 
recommendations that are favourable to all parties involved, in order to mitigate the crisis and 
to bring peace and stability. 
1.3. Problem statement 
The continued existence of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria, although not a regular occurrence, 




have argued that corruption, inequality, unemployment, and poverty are key causes of concern, 
the study aims to examine the rise of Boko Haram through the lens of relative deprivation theory 
and state failure theory. This is undertaken to ascertain how this problem has been and is being 
dealt with on a state level, and assess how regional organisations have reacted to mitigate the 
crisis. 
1.3.1. Research question and aims of the study 
 
The study has one major research question followed by five supportive questions that relate to 
the main question. The main research question that the study addresses is: 
How does sate failure theory and relative deprivation theory explain the emergence of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria? 
To respond to the main research question, five supportive questions are addressed: 
i. What is state failure theory and how can it explain the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria? 
ii. What is relative deprivation theory, and how can it explain Boko Haram’s rise? 
iii. What is the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria’s neighbouring countries? 
iv. How has the Boko Haram insurgency been dealt with on a state level and how have 
the regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) acted to mitigate the crisis?  
v. Has this regional response been effective, and, if not, what are possible alternative 
means of countering Boko Haram’s impact? 
The study aims to analyse the origins of Boko Haram and assess its expansion from a small group 
to becoming the most dangerous terrorist organisation in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin. It also 
aims to assess whether the actions taken by the Nigerian state and regional organisations have 
been effective, and, if not, to provide recommendations for possible alternatives in dealing with 
the recurring terror attacks.  
1.4. Theoretical framework  
1.4.1. State failure 
Rotberg (2003:5) posits that failed states are characterised by tense, conflictual, dangerous, and 
bitter contestations between warring factions. He further indicates that officials in failed states can 




discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and groups within the state. Thus, the 
concept of state failure will be utilised in the study because Nigeria has many of the characteristics 
of a failed state. According to Rotberg (2003:9) failed states provide no safety nets, and the 
homeless and destitute depend on anyone who can offer food and a cause to join. It has been 
possible for the unemployed and the deprived to join Boko Haram because the state has failed to 
provide or cater to the basic needs of its citizens and the youth, whether they are educated or 
uneducated. As a result, it is probable that state failure has contributed significantly to insecurity 
and the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Howard (2014:25) posits that without the presence of 
government and security forces, non-state actors such as rebel groups, terrorist cells, paramilitary 
units, and insurgents can organise themselves in these spaces and engage in illegal activities 
without having to contend with the presence of a central government. In Nigeria, the state has 
lost control to some parts of its territory, mostly in North-east Nigeria. 
For instance, Agiboa (2013b) stresses that in July 2013, Boko Haram had taken control of Marte, 
Mobbar, Gubio, Guzama, Abadam, Kukawa, Kala- Balge and the Gamboru local government 
areas in northern Borno, by chasing out local government officials and imposing Sharia Law. This 
explains the state's failure to prevent Boko Haram's activities, a clear sign of a lack of security 
and the incapability of the state to act on its responsibility to provide security to its citizens from 
internal or external threats. There is a link between state failure and relative deprivation. 
 
According to Ogbonna and Jimenez (2017:16), relative deprivation is a contrary feeling held by a 
person, which emanates from a perceived dichotomy between the deserved and actual 
entitlement of social provisions such as education, or political freedoms, or economic 
opportunities. It is a feeling of frustration emerging from the difference between what one 
perceives one deserves and what one actually gets. For example, one might believe he or she 
deserves access to education, but might not have such access. The authors argue that the failure 
of Nigerian leaders to enhance economic policies to secure the wellbeing and the living standard 
of Nigerians by creating jobs has resulted in unemployment, poverty and illiteracy among youths, 
which has in turn contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram (Ogbonna & Jimenez, 2017:17). 
Eveslage (2013:49) contends that another source of discontent which Boko Haram precipitated 
from is the disparity between Nigeria’s resource-rich environment and the disturbingly high 
poverty rates caused by corruption and poor management of the country’s resources. The 
recurrence of Boko Haram attacks and the continued human rights violations in Nigeria indicate 




1.4.2. Relative deprivation theory 
 
To respond to the research question and to address the problem statement, relative deprivation 
theory and state failure theory has been used in this study. Richardson (2011:83) notes that 
relative deprivation as the term used to “denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy 
between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes a man to 
violence”. This means that when people do not get what they expect to get while seeing that 
others have it, they get angry and frustrated. Howard (2014), argues that individual frustration 
about perceived deprivation fosters aggression within that person, which can then manifest itself 
in the form of acts of political violence such as rebellions, riots, revolutions, and terrorism. This 
view is supported by Utibe (2016:83), who argues that relative deprivation and or inequality, serve 
as basic conditions for participation in violence.  
As frustration is prolonged and feelings of deprivation of what is expected increases, there is a 
greater probability that the individual or people resort to illegitimate activities in order to actualise 
their expectations (Onyepuemu, 2015:126). Onyepuemu (2015) contends further that structured 
inequalities within countries are the basis for violent political movements in general and 
specifically for terrorism. Relative deprivation theory will form the basis of understanding the 
factors that have promoted the emergence of Boko Haram. According to the Human Development 
Report (2018), the north-east region is the most deprived part of the Nigerian federation. This 
level of frustration and extreme poverty among youths has laid fertile grounds for Boko Haram 
insurgencies. Furthermore, there is a strong consensus among scholars that relative deprivation 
theory explains the emergence of insurgency in Nigeria (Kiikpoye, 2015:2). The above review of 
relative deprivation theory offers context for using the theory for this study.  
Smith and Pettigrew (2015:3) show that researchers have invoked relative deprivation theory to 
explain phenomena including poor physical health, participation in collective protest, and 
proneness to terrorist recruitment. According to Pichette (2015:5), the Nigerian government has 
done little to resolve the issue of poverty in the north, nor has it displayed much interest in doing 
so, and this apparent indifference, according to relative deprivation theory, suggests that the root 
causes of Boko Haram activity are the poor economic conditions in Nigeria coupled with the 
state's failure to rectify these conditions (Pichette, 2015:5). In line with these perspectives, the 
study employs this theory because it appears that issues of inequality, poverty, corruption and 




a framework comprising relative deprivation theory paired with state failure theory, the study 
responds to the research question and its problem statement. 
1.5. Research methodology 
 
A qualitative desktop study research method is utilised in this dissertation. A desktop study 
provides background information on Boko Haram, Nigeria, the West African region and is useful 
for acquiring a general overview of and relevant prior research on the group's attacks. Qualitative 
research offers the opportunity to investigate a given phenomenon in many ways, to obtain data 
that is rich and diverse, and produce results that cohere with the study’s aims (Ogionwo, 2016:21) 
Thus, the research makes use of secondary data, critically engages scholarly works like books, 
journal articles, reports from various government departments such as Nigerian Bureau of 
Statistics and the Nigerian Security Tracker, while reports from intergovernmental organisations 
like the United Nations Security Council are consulted so that sufficient information on Boko 
Haram is gathered.  
Boko Haram insurgency activities are also widely reported on in the media. Recent, up to date 
information on attacks was not always been published in scholarly articles. But because they are 
useful for this study, the researcher consulted major Nigerian Newspapers such as the Nigerian, 
Tribune, as well as major international media broadcasts such as CNN, France24, and the BBC. 
Information from the Center for Security and Terrorism Studies, the Institute of Security Studies 
(ISS) and reports from credible scholarly reviews on Boko Haram’s terror attacks were also 
utilised. The study is complex and diverse, and it required extensive use of empirical materials. 
1.5.1. Research design 
 
A case study has been utilised as part of the research design in this paper. Babie (2011:6) notes 
that a researcher who carefully chronicles events as they occurred satisfies a descriptive purpose. 
Case studies are suitable for qualitative research because they focus in on phenomena. The 
phenomena in this study are Boko Haram insurgencies in Nigeria. This research uses a case 
study approach to examine the emergence and causes of Boko Haram. The research examines 
Boko Haram from its emergence in 2002 until the present. Rahman (2016:104) suggests that that 
the advantage of qualitative design is that it is interactive and iterative, in that it has a flexible 





Because the study is complex and diverse and there is a lot of existing literature about the 
phenomena, qualitative research is the best because it has the goal of generating new ways of 
seeing existing data and thus deriving new findings. Maiangwa (2012:7) suggests that unlike other 
methods, the case study method examines the relationships between variables to provide a 
thorough understanding of a situation and avoids biases accompanying overgeneralisations. 
1.6. Limitations and delimitations 
 
The first limitation of this study is that there are many theories that explain the emergence of Boko 
Haram. For instance, the study employs relative deprivation and state failure theory to explain the 
emergence of Boko Haram. But the interpretive framework of Islamic radicalism also explains the 
rise of Boko Haram (Cook, 2014:6). This is a big limitation that needs to be acknowledged as it 
limits some significant analysis relevant to the study of Boko Haram. To override this limitation, 
relative deprivation and state failure theory have been utilised because their definitions are 
diverse and can include other factors that fall under religious fundamentalism. These two theories 
have been selected to present a viable explanation for the emergence of Boko Haram. 
 
Another limitation of the study is the challenge of accessing primary data. Boko Haram's activities 
are violent in nature, its members are extremists, and the group denounces education, which it 
believes is sinful. This hinders the researcher from conducting direct interviews with the members 
because it poses a threat to the personal safety of the researcher. Also, the group is known for 
conducting raids, planting bombs, and employing suicidal attacks. Thus, the researcher did not 
take the risk of identifying and interviewing Boko Haram members. These limitations, including a 
lack of funding for travel expenses and accommodation to conduct field research are 
acknowledged.  
However, these limitations are remedied by utilising a wide range of existing sources such as 
video clips, public records data, and documentaries of Boko Haram previously generated by 
researchers. In addition, the scope and time for completing the study is a limitation. The topic of 
the Boko Haram insurgency is complex and diverse in that it involves many actors who were 
engaged in dealing with its terror attacks. For instance, efforts made by the international 
community have been omitted in this study and that has to be acknowledged. However, this 
limitation will be remedied by the fact that the study is looking at understanding the rise of Boko 




on state-level analysis and the efforts made by regional organisations such as the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU.  
1.7. Outline of the study 
 
Chapter one has provided a short introduction and established the significance of the research 
being conducted. It introduced background information to the reader and offered a rationale for 
the study. The chapter introduced the problem statement, the research questions, and aims of 
the study. It also described, contextualised, and motivated the theoretical framework. It then 
described its research methodology and research design. It also identified limitations and 
delimitations of the study. Below, chapter one provides an outline of the whole study.  
Chapter two contextualises and reviews in more detail the relevant literature about the emergence 
of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Chapter two reviews the literature about terrorism and 
explores the phenomenon of Boko Haram. It offers key concepts that are used in the study. It also 
indicates links between state failure and relative deprivation theory, and reviews the connection 
between corruption and terrorism. Further, it reviews levels of corruption, poverty, and 
unemployment to indicate how they relate to one another, and explain the emergence of Boko 
Haram. 
Chapter three further defines the theoretical framework comprising state failure and relative 
deprivation theory. The meaning and understanding of these theoretical frameworks are used to 
analyse the case study of Boko Haram in chapter four. In other words, the chapter provides an 
in-depth analysis of these two theories and outlines their relevance for analysing the rise of Boko 
Haram.  
Chapter four responds to the research questions by employing the theoretical framework 
described in chapter three. This chapter studies drivers of the conflict by using relative deprivation 
and state failure theory. This chapter links the theories with empirical evidence about Boko 
Haram's terror attacks. Through the lens of the theoretical framework elaborated on in chapter 
three, the chapter examines how inequality, poverty, dire economic conditions, and political 
imbalances created fertile grounds for resentment and anger which enabled and fostered the 
terror attacks in Nigeria. 
Chapter five is about counter-terrorism efforts. Chapter five examines how the State has acted 




offensive retaliation via military expeditions are critically engaged. Weaknesses within the 
Nigerian judiciary and the influence of elites on justice are also examined. After that, the chapter 
evaluates efforts by continental and regional organisations, specifically African Union (AU) and 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to mitigate the crisis. 
Chapter six responds to the main research question and the supportive research questions. This 
is done to explicitly ensure that the problem statement is addressed and the main aims of the 
study are fulfilled. Chapter six suggests alternatives and practical actions that need to be taken 
and monitored regularly to counter the impact of Boko Haram. After that, the chapter summarises 


















Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1. Introduction 
 
There is a wide range of existing literature about the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria. To 
respond to the aims of the study, this chapter reviews the literature on the emergence of Boko 
Haram. In so doing, gaps within the literature are identified and new insights are developed and 
or integrated into the extant literature. This chapter begins by conceptualising terrorism, by 
discussing the notion of domestic terrorism to understand the ideological roots of the Boko Haram 
insurgency. After that, it discusses the evolution of Boko Haram, its leadership, recruitment, and 
sources of income. It then discusses the biggest events orchestrated by the group, and indicates 
the group’s impact on neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. The chapter 
briefly explores the theoretical framework of the study to determine the links between these 
relative deprivation and state failure and their relations to corruption and terrorism in Nigeria. 
2.2. Terrorism: what is terrorism? 
 
As Mahathir Bin Mohammed (2003, quoted in Duruji & Oviasogie, 2013:21) has said: 
 The world now lives in fear, we are afraid of everything, we are afraid of flying, 
afraid of certain countries, afraid of Asian bearded man, afraid of shoes airline 
passengers wear, of letters and parcels of white powder. The countries 
allegedly harbouring terrorists, their people, innocent or otherwise, are afraid 
too. 
Since September 2001, there has been panic and insecurity due to the rise of terror attacks 
globally. The Western world increasingly became concerned with ‘failed states’ in the global 
South, and this concern raised significant implications for African as well as international 
responses to armed insurgency groups on the African continent (Botha & Okumu, 2007:7). Strides 
made by the International community, regional organisations, and continental bodies have not 
always been fruitful. Oluwadare (2016:41) argues that Africa and particularly Nigeria has in the 
past decade been plagued by an increase in incidences of insurgencies, with high levels of the 
devastation to lives and property. He contends that the security situation in the Lake Chad region 
has not been stable since the emergence of Boko Haram (Oluwadare, 2016:41). However, for 
one to delve into the emergence of the Boko Haram terror attacks, it is necessary to first explore 




There is no commonly agreed definition of terrorism and the term has been defined in 
differentiated ways. According to Wojciechowski (2009:2), this is because the notion of terrorism 
is frequently applied to describe highly varied attitudes and behaviours, that range from anarchist 
or revolutionary acts to criminal acts. He argues, for example, that the same situation can be 
interpreted as an act of terrorism or a struggle for national independence, depending on one’s 
political, religious, or ethnic views (Wojciechowski, 2009:3). For instance, the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) operations, or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna actions, for some Irish or Basque nationalists, 
are regarded as fighters for independence, while others describe them as terrorist organisations 
(Wojciechowski, 2009:3).  
Also, states have different views. For instance, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic 
of China, hold the view that every act of violence carried out by irregular fighters against the state 
must be called terrorist (Brett, 2006). Elements of proposed definitions have been rejected by 
various nations whose interests were not served by those definitions. For instance, some nations 
emphasised the need to exclude freedom fighting, anticolonial uprisings, or other related violence 
from the definition of terrorism (Setty, 2011:9). In addition, Rababa’a (2012) argues that there is 
no international agreement about how terrorism should be defined because of individuals and 
states’ discrete views, and different ideologies, and goals. The difficulty in defining terrorism is 
about a basis for determining when violence (directed at whom, by whom, for what ends) is 
legitimate; which makes definitions of terrorism inherently controversial (Simus, 2016:20). 
The United Kingdom Terrorism Act (United Kingdom, 2000:1) states that terrorism is the use or 
threat of an action, where the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate 
the public or a section of the public, and the use of threat is aimed to achieve a political, religious 
or ideological cause. The US Department of State (2001:13) defines terrorism as premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups 
or clandestine groups, which usually intend to influence an audience. Cilliers (2003:91) defines 
terrorism as the illegitimate use or threat of violence against individuals or property to coerce 
governments or societies for political objectives. The United States Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI, 1999 quoted in Chinwokwu, 2013:268) defines terrorism as the unlawful use 
of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 
population, or any segment, to further a political or social objective. While a commonality of these 
definitions is that terrorism involves the use of violence for a political or social objective, according 
to Howard (2014:10), violence against a regime in and of itself does not represent terrorism. For 




often involved torture and human rights violations (Lotter, 2018:44). The differences and lack of 
conceptual clarity in definitions of terrorism suggest that the meaning of the term can change to 
suit political objectives. Setty (2011:9-10) shows that some nations have prioritised an exclusion 
of state-sponsored actions from definitions of terrorism.  
Gupta (2008:7) argues that the term terrorism has been a source of confusion, contradiction, and 
controversy since its emergence. While unable to find a universal definition, it is important to note 
that the term is not a new. As Hoffman shows, the term dates back to the French revolution, when 
terrorism was defined as “a system of terror [and] government by intimidation, as directed and 
carried out by the [group] in power in France during the French revolution of 1789-1794” (Hoffman 
2006, cited in Howard, 2014:10). Another challenge is that over its 230-year existence, the word’s 
semantic focus has changed many times. While it was originally used to describe the reign of 
terror by authorities during and after the French Revolution, the term terrorist was not used in an 
anti-government sense before the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century (Simus, 
2016:1). The old saying “one man's terrorist is another man's hero” still holds (Gupta, 2014:7). 
Linking the above to the current terror attacks conducted by the Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria, the group might argue that they are fighting to attain their freedom. 
Wardlow (1982 in Rogers, 2008:173), has described political terrorism as acts of violence aimed 
at inspiring fear, whether for or in opposition to established authority, where such actions are 
intended to create extreme anxiety and or fear in a target group, so that the target group will 
accede to the political demands of the perpetrators. The motives and acts of Boko Haram fall 
within the above scenario. Hence it is important to understand the concept of terrorism in this 
study. The absence of an agreed definition of terrorism is problematic because terrorists mostly 
do not regard themselves as terrorists. For instance, Boko Haram members do not regard 
themselves as terrorists but as a sect fighting both against corruption and to Islamise the northern 
states. Adeniran (2019:24) argues that terrorist acts can be used by protesters, rebels, or fanatical 
groups who are not happy with government policies and programs, and are fighting for state 
power, or to impose their own ideological beliefs. As in the case of Boko Haram, terrorism appears 
to be a psychological weapon hidden behind an ideological objective (political, economic, or 
religious).  
Johnson (2018:185), cites the US Department of Defence, which defines insurgency as an 
organised movement that aims to overthrow a constituted government by subversion and armed 




mostly their protracted and transnational nature, and their political, economic and social 
dimensions (Johnson, 2018:185). The above analysis is crucial to this study, as the emergence 
of Boko Haram is not merely a movement, but is driven to achieve religious, political and economic 
goals. As Bamidele (2013:6) emphasises, Boko Haram believes Western institutions were 
responsible for imposing Western values onto people who grew up with Western concepts of 
employment, trade policies, and general administration. This means that apart from being labelled 
as a terrorist insurgency group, Boko Haram’s motives go beyond those of an extreme insurgency 
group, in that they target systems, values, and practices which they believe have brought suffering 
into north-east Nigeria (Amnesty International, 2015:9). 
Disagreements over of what should count as terrorism and what should be considered legitimate 
revolutions have indeed plagued academics for a long time, and divisions still exist (Howard, 
2014:10). Various terrorist organisations have understood revolutions as secessions or attempts 
at national self-determination. The principle that people should govern themselves was supported 
by the American and French Revolutions (Simus, 2016:2), yet Maximilien Robespierre introduced 
government sponsored terrorism to suppress opposition and maintain power. During the Soviet 
Revolution in 1917, Lenin and Stalin used state-sponsored terrorism to secure and maintain 
control of the state against their opposition (Maiangwa, 2012:16). Furthermore, the Spanish 
Inquisition used arbitrary arrest, torture, and execution to punish that which it viewed as heresy. 
Also, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, terrorism was adopted by adherents of anarchism 
in Western Europe, Russia, and the United States, with the belief that the best possibility to effect 
revolutionary political and social change was to execute persons in the position of power (Agang, 
2016:2). 
Chinwoku (2013:268) notes that there are over 100 definitions of terrorism and concludes that the 
only agreed upon characteristics are that terrorism involves violence and the use of threat. Gupta 
(2014:8) noted 109 definitions of terrorism which, he argued, evidenced a lack of conformity, and 
indicates that terrorist is often a political term. The United Nations (UN) (2019b) stresses that 
terrorism is immoral, that it is efficiently used as a justification for religious, political and socio-
economic frustrations, and that it fosters violence, fear, insecurity, and anarchy. In the above 
sense Boko Haram is plausibly understood as a terrorist organisation. 
The confusion and lack of a universal definition of terrorism, however, yields the question of whose 
actions are to be defined as terrorism. For instance, in the Nigerian case, one might argue that 




terrorism, in that the state’s response involved fatalities and high levels of human rights violations. 
Perhaps the state’s strategy was designed to instil fear in the group and its members, which may 
have deepened the catastrophe.  
Similarly, the USA’s unilateral invasion of Iraq has been extremely violent, yielded extreme 
humanitarian consequences, and innocent civilians were caught in the middle of the conflict, but 
the intervention by the USA has not been labelled as terrorism. Rogers (2008:180) notes that four 
years after the invasion, at least 100,000 civilians were killed and about four million were stranded 
as refugees. Looking at the number of fatalities caused by a state, there appear to be tensions 
regarding what constitutes terrorism. Decision-making institutions, involving politicians, or 
opinion-forming institutions, such as the media, might intentionally apply the notion of terrorism 
or terrorist to influence public opinion and discredit certain individuals or groups, to legitimise or 
de-legitimise activities. Thus, terrorist or terrorism labels can become tools for political 
manipulation (Wojciechowski, 2009:3).  
For instance, consider the case of Bherlin Gildo, a 37-year Swedish national who has been 
accused of being linked to terrorist activities in Syria, including receiving weapons training from 
31 August 2012 and 1 March 2013. His prosecution case collapsed after his lawyers argued that 
the British intelligence agencies were linked to the same Syrian opposition groups, and this would 
have embarrassed the British security if the trial continued (Guardian, 2015). Also, in September 
2013, the United Kingdom parliament denied permitting the United Kingdom military intervention 
against the Assad regime in Syria following his use of chemical weapons in Ghouta, Syria 
(Greene, 2017:429). However, in December 2015, the United Kingdom parliament approved the 
government’s request to launch airstrikes in Syria against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria but 
not against the Assad regime (Greene, 2017:429). This indicates how decision-makers constitute 
what determines terrorism and act according to their interests. 
Boko Haram might have exploited the shifting understandings of terrorism. For instance, to some, 
names like Osama Bin Laden have designated heroism, despite him masterminding the 
September 11 attacks. 2002, for instance, witnessed a rapid increase of babies named Osama in 
northern Nigeria, specifically in Kano State where many celebrated the September 11 attacks 
(Olojo, 2013:4). Indeed, seven out of ten babies are believed to have been named Osama, in 




Abang et al. (2017:5) argue that coherent discussions about the impacts of terrorism need a clear 
scenario on which to base discussions, given the challenge of what should and should not be 
classified as terrorism. 
For this study, terrorism as defined by the UN and by the US Department of Defence is utilised. 
The UN and the US Department of Defence define terrorism as “the unlawful use or threatened 
use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or 
societies often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives” (Enders & Sandler, 2011:5). 
The definition indicates at least five core elements that should be present for an activity to be 
classified as terrorism. Namely, a) violence, b) political, ideological or religious motivations, c) the 
presence of perpetrators, d) effects on victims, and e) the targeting of an audience (Abang et al., 
2017). Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria has these characteristics. The Nigerian Terrorism 
Prevention Act (2011) says that terrorism involves the violent destruction of property and or 
homes, comprises mostly attacks on non-combatant populations, causes many people to become 
homeless, creates a humanitarian crisis, and can lead to many citizens becoming Internally 
Displaced People (IDP) (Wilson, 2018:82). 
 2.2.1. Domestic terrorism  
 
This subsection first focuses on exploring the concept of domestic terrorism in Nigeria, given that 
Boko Haram’s main target appears to be the Nigerian state itself, and that the emergence of Boko 
Haram is examined by using failed state theory. Adelaja et al. (2018:36) argue that the group aims 
to create an Islamic state, impose Sharia law in northern Nigeria, and get rid of bad governance, 
corruption and moral deprivation. Boko Haram believe the latter three aspects conflict with Islam. 
Sandler (2011:280) suggests that domestic terrorism is characterised by perpetrators, targets 
victims, venues, and audiences within the boundaries of the same state. Agang (2016:4) contends 
that the political goal of Boko Haram is to create an Islamic nation in the 12 northern states of 
Nigeria and then later take control of the rest of the country. On these views the actions of Boko 
Haram are mainly directed at Nigeria as a state.  
According to Sinnar (2019:1333), domestic terrorism refers to political violence that is domestic 
in its origins and intended impact. Boko Haram terror attacks clearly target the Nigerian state, 
even though it has extended its influence on other countries. Enders et al. (2011:330) note that 
domestic terrorist campaigns might conduct transnational terrorist attacks to attract greater media 




via neighbouring borders and then attack their home country in that way (Enders et al., 2011:330). 
This might be the case with Boko Haram, in that they have used the borders of neighbouring 
countries to fight back against the Nigerian government and the fact that they attracted media 
when they attacked the UN Headquarters on 27 August 2011. 
The concept of international terrorism is also briefly discussed because Boko Haram has lately 
extended its attacks to neighbouring countries. Ogundiya (2009) shows that Nigeria is a state 
under perpetual internal security threats that have negatively impacted the state's social, 
economic, political and environmental domains, which has destabilised the state. Okon (2016:8) 
regards Boko Haram in Nigeria as a case of domestic terrorism. As regards Boko Haram’s 
domestic threats, Alexander (2015, quoted in Yahaya, 2015:36) notes that “at the beginning of its 
violent attacks, it has targeted mainly security forces and politicians” but later tuned to “civilian 
spaces, such as schools, churches, and markets, and kidnap[ping] 270 school girls in Chibok on 
14 April, 2014”. Even though Boko Haram is believed to be linked with other terrorist 
organisations, its activities often occur within Nigeria. 
Utibe (2016) argues that the Nigerian state is trapped in a crossfire, between its national security 
and the Boko Haram insurgency, and emphasising that the region has turned into a hotspot of 
crime and violence with terror dimensions, which have led to property destruction and the death 
of thousands of people, and made the north-east region one of the most dangerous areas. 
Domestic terrorism in Nigeria has led to a loss of dignity and relevance among the international 
community, as the acts of Boko Haram have undermined its sovereignty (Utibe, 2016). Based on 
the above analysis, domestic terrorism in Nigeria is a grave security issue and the continued 
attacks imply challenges to reducing groups' acts of terror. Okon (2016) has indicated that Boko 
Haram acts of terror have impose not only the greatest security threat to the state but also made 
the areas they control the most dangerous. 
2.2.2. International Terrorism 
 
According to Simus (2016:1) the term international terrorism means terrorism involving citizens of 
a territory of more than one country. Botma (2015:26) shares this view, arguing that terrorist 
groups operating outside their home countries are often termed international terrorists. Boko 
Haram has more recently launched attacks in neighbouring countries, meaning the group's 
actions have shifted from being those of a domestic terrorist group to those of an international 




to a certain terrorist group and not by links with other terrorist groups. In the case of Boko Haram, 
it has links to other terrorist organisations. as in the case of Nigeria.  
2.3. What is Boko Haram? 
  
Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s as a small Sunni Islamic sect advocating a strict 
interpretation of Islamic law for Nigeria. Boko Haram has described itself by saying Jama ‘a Ahl 
as-Sunnah Li-da'wa wa-al-Jihad, which is translated from Arabic as “People Committed to the 
Propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad1” (Blanchard, 2016:5). The name Boko Haram 
is derived from the combination of the Hausa word ‘Boko’, meaning book, and the Arabic word 
‘Haram’, meaning something forbidden, or Western education is sinful (Maiangwa & Uzodike, 
2014:99). The sect’s ideological mission is very clear; it wants to take over the Nigerian 
government and impose Islamic Sharia law throughout the country. ‘Sharia’ is translated as road, 
and refers to a Muslim religious code of conduct. It relates to a range of diverse Islamic traditions, 
including an interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, and can refer to strict rules and broad 
principles and objectives (Stuart, 2017:XXII). There was a flare-up of the violence in 2004, until 
the Nigerian police attacked Boko Haram on July 26, 2009, and committed a well-publicised 
murder of Yusuf by the police, after which the group re-emerged a year later under the leadership 
of Abubakar Shekau, with the aid of Mamman Nur and Khalid al- Barnawi (Cook, 2014:4).  
The group then launched violent attacks through 2010 and 2011, assassinating prominent 
politicians and clerics who opposed it, and attacked educational and medical institutions (Cook, 
2014:4). Cannon and Iyekekpolo (2018:374) show that the group enhanced its attacks against 
the Nigerian state after the extrajudicial killings of some of its leaders in the same year, with a 
rapid increase of attacks from about 10 in 2009 to 45 in 2012. The group heavily condemns 
western civilisation. Boko Haram has reportedly attacked churches and schools, pubs and hotels. 
For instance, Mambula (2018:11) notes that over 1000 classrooms have been burnt, 350 teachers 
killed, and 512 schools have been destroyed by Boko Haram attacks in Borno State. Key factors 
contributing to its rise in Nigeria include a legacy of overlapping intercommunal and Muslim- 
Christian tensions in the country, perceived disparities in access to jobs, state services and 
investment in the north, and popular frustrations with elite corruption and other state abuses 
(Blanchard & Husted, 2019:8).  
 
1 Literally translates as ‘struggle’; interpretations range from a personal effort to live according to Islam, to 





2.3.1. The leadership of Boko Haram 
 
Mohammad Yusuf was the founder of Boko Haram and leader from 2002 to July 30 2009 (Centre 
for International Security & Cooperation, 2018). He was executed by government forces while 
trying to escape after the July 2009 uprisings. From 2002 to January 2012 Mamman Nur was 
third-in-command under Yusuf. Misunderstandings with Shekau caused Nur's followers to form a 
splinter group, named Ansaru in 2012 (Centre for International Security & Cooperation, 2018). 
Nur reportedly plotted the UN bombings in 2011. After the IS accepted Boko Haram's pledge of 
allegiance in late March 2015, the IS realised that Barnawi would take over leadership in 2016, 
which did happen. (Centre for International Security & Cooperation, 2018). It has been reported 
that Shekau denounced Barnawi's leadership claiming the leadership was a coup plotted by the 
IS. Barnawi was a spokesperson of Boko Haram, but he left and joined Ansaru, a Splinter group 
of Boko Haram. He re-joined the group in 2015, and the leadership split resulted in two competing 
factions within Boko Haram, Islamic State’s West Africa Province headed by Barnawi and 
Jama’atu Ahl al-Sunnah li-l Dawa wal-Jihad headed by Shekau. Abu Musab al-Barnawi was the 
leader from August 3 2016 to December 29 2016. Abubakar Shekau had led Boko Haram from 
2010. Three reports of Shekau’s death were released but he mocked these claims in jihadist 
videos released by Boko Haram (Centre for International Security and Cooperation, 2018).  
2.3.2. Recruitment of members and sources of weapons 
 
According to Udama (2013:105), since 2001, mostly male Muslim youths, often from the same 
middle class and educated background, aggressively embraced a stricter version of Islam, 
denying anything Christian as well as Western education and culture. Such youths have enacted 
terrorist attacks particularly in the northern states of Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Plateau, Kaduna and 
the FTC. Udama (2013:105) notes further that they also launched the first suicide bomb attack in 
the Abuja police force headquarters. When Boko Haram began as a social movement with 
considerable popularity, its members were predominantly young men, believed to have joined the 
sect voluntarily. When the group expanded, so did its financial resources, and young unemployed 
men found themselves with money and access to guns, which they later used to obtain money 
from others within the society (Amnesty International, 2015:14).  
Between 2005 and 2009, Yusuf established a sect at a compound in Maiduguri’s Railway’s 
District, consisting of hundreds of followers, mainly unemployed and impoverished Islamic 




According to the International Crisis Group (2016:13), Mayo Sava, close to Boko Haram 
strongholds in Borno, was the main area for recruitment between 2012 and 2014. Since 2011, 
between 3500 and 4000 Cameroonians, mostly men, reportedly joined Boko Haram as fighters, 
spiritual guides, and logisticians (International Crisis Group, 2016). Similarly, Connor (2017:9) 
shows that Boko Haram and its affiliates recruited fighters, including women from Cameroon and 
southern Niger, indicating that as of 2011 about 4 000 Cameroonians, have been recruited by the 
militants, including fighters, spiritual guides, and logisticians. 
Boko Haram has capitalised on socio-economic motivations, ideology and religion, coercion and 
or persuasion to secure recruits (International Crisis Group, 2016:13). Boko Haram provides its 
recruits with a motorbike and a recruitment bonus ranging from 300 up to 2000 dollars and 
promises salaries to range from 100 to 400 dollars during the initial months as well as a substantial 
sum of money to the family of a fighter killed in combat (International Crisis Group, 2016:13). 
Walker (2012:3) also shows that the group has attracted more people to become its members by 
providing welfare handouts, food, and shelter. As recently as 2016, Boko Haram recruited fighters 
by offering young entrepreneurs loans and then conscripting them as recruits when they failed to 
repay (Entz & Fanusie, 2017:7). They further contend that Boko Haram pays the widows and 
children of its fighters. Apart from that, through means of coercion, residents had to attend their 
daily prayers, and punishment for not adhering to Boko Haram’s rules were cruel, which has made 
many people join the group involuntarily (Amnesty International, 2015:18).  
According to Heim and McQuaid (2015:32), Boko Haram obtains its weapons, ammunition and 
other materials from the Nigerian Army after defeating government soldiers or by raiding barracks. 
They further illustrate that corrupt military officials redirect what should go to troops to members 
of Boko Haram in exchange for money (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:32). They also note that other 
sources of finance, especially between 2003 and 2009, were dues from members and donations 
from wealthy people and politicians (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:32). Vehicles used for suicide attacks 
were usually stolen, and many weapons were stolen from the government armouries (Campbell, 
2014:3). 
Boko Haram generates money in the ways disclosed in the Table 2.1 below. 
Kidnapping for ransom Boko Haram takes local villagers, foreigners, and political family 




to $3 million for a European family. In 2013, Boko Haram receives 
a $3 million ransom in exchange for a French family. 
Taxation and extortion Boko Haram forces people to join if they cannot repay 
microfinance loans given by the group. Governors of some 
Nigerian states have purportedly paid Boko Haram monthly fees 
to avoid attacks. When in control of territory, Boko Haram levies 
taxes on locals  
 
Looting and spoils Boko Haram gains money and food through cattle rustling. 
The group is outfitted with equipment stolen from the Nigerian 
Army. 
Cash from the Banking 
System 
A 2014 estimate put Boko Haram’s overall revenue from bank 
robberies at $6 million. The group robbed at least 30 banks in 
2011, and the stolen money was distributed among the 
community rather than centrally held. 
Smuggling and Trafficking Boko Haram is primarily involved in human trafficking, primarily 
through kidnapping girls and women. The group has sold 
captives into sex slavery or used them as leverage. 
Donations Donors from the region and the Gulf have funded the group 
through cash couriers. Financial facilitators have received 
funding from contacts in Qatar. 
Commercial enterprises and 
agriculture 
Boko Haram taxes farmers, forces farmers to give up produce, or 
sometimes takes over farms outright. The group’s involvement in 
the cattle and fish trade led the Nigerian government to close 
those markets. 
External Assistance Osama bin Laden sent $3 million in 2002 to Nigerian Salafists, 
much of which to be used to start Boko Haram. From 2012 there 
was growing support from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM), including financial assistance of $250,000. 
Table 2.1 Main sources of funding and significant financial events 
(Source: Entz & Fanusie, 2017:2-3) 
From Table 2.1 above it is evident that the group has various ways of getting funds for its survival. 




Westerners for ransom. For instance, in July 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped the wife of 
Cameroonian deputy prime minister Amdou Ali for ransom (Cook, 2014). Other examples include 
seven French citizens, including an employee of GDF-Suez, Tanguy Moulin Fournier, who were 
kidnapped in the Waza National Park on 19 February 2013. On 13 November 2013 a French 
priest was abducted in Nguetchewe (Mayo Tsanaga); on 19 April 2014, two Italian priests and a 
Canadian nun were kidnapped in Tchere (Diamare); and ten Chinese workers were abducted in 
July 2014, (International Crisis Group, 2016:15-16). The release of the Moulin-Fournier family in 
November 2013 came after a ransom of $5 million to $7 million from Cameroonian sources and 
$3.2 million by Nigerian sources (Cook, 2014).  
The release of 27 hostages, ten Chinese and 17 Cameroonian members of the vice prime 
minister’s inner circle on 10 October 2014 is said to have proved more costly (Cook, 2014). In this 
case Boko Haram managed to extract payment of $5.7 million; $2.6 million for the Chinese and 
$3.1 million for the vice Prime Minister's family together with the release of 31 of its members, 
including senior figures such as Abaka Ali (International Crisis Group, 2016:16). In Cameroon, 
Boko Haram also raise funds by stealing cattle and selling them in the markets of the far north of 
Nigeria; the group has been reported to have stolen about 12,000 cattle since 2013, worth $3.4 
billion, and thousands of sheep and goats (International Crisis Group, 2016:17). Botma 
(2015:117) has also pointed out that Boko Haram has engaged criminal activities such as 
kidnapping for ransom, bank robbery, and illicit trafficking to obtain funds used for conducting 
terror attacks. 
2.3.4. Boko Haram’s links with other terrorist groups 
 
Boko Haram first appeared as a domestic terrorist group, targeting only the Nigerian government. 
The group’s attack on the UN Headquarters raised concerns about the group’s potential links with 
other terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and al-Shabab. According to Maiangwa and Uzodike 
(2014:104), after the rise of Boko Haram's violent attacks in 2009, the Nigerian State Security 
Service claimed that Boko Haram members were being trained in Afghanistan and Algeria by Al- 
Qaeda. Cannon and Iyekekpolo (2018:378) emphasise that some of its members were reportedly 
trained in Somalia in 2009 by al-Shabab while al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb supported Boko 
Haram with weapons and a €200 000 transfer. Buttressing the above, it has been argued that 
Boko Haram’s initial funding could have come from Osama bin Laden who had reportedly 
promised to distribute €3 million to fund global Jihad in Nigeria as early as 2002 or 2003 (Cannon 




Entz and Fanusie (2017:2) contend that under Shekau, Boko Haram received training and support 
from AQIM and the Somalia-based al-Qaeda branch, al-Shabab. This strengthened Boko Haram 
to manage its operations through suicide bombing and kidnapping for ransom. Onouha (2014) 
shows that AQIM is believed to have trained Boko Haram recruits in areas of bomb-making and 
launching shoulder-fired weapons. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was a franchise of Osama 
bin Laden’s Jihad network and the only one to have escaped the decline and crisis of other 
branches of al-Qaeda in the Arab world. AQIM nurtured its most lethal expansion via its Saharan 
networks (Filiu, 2009:2). 
In addition, Basar (2012:2) also pointed out that Boko Haram is believed to have had links to 
AQIM. He further notes that some governments believe that Boko Haram is also active in Niger 
and its militants from Nigeria and Chad were trained in AQIM camps in Mali in 2011 (Basar, 2012). 
Botman (2015:118) shares that view, highlighting that the financial support offered by the Islamic 
World Society, the Al Muntanda Trust Fund, and an unknown Algerian sect, as well as the training 
provided by Al-Shabab and AQIM, gave Boko Haram the means to conduct terror attacks, 
whether nationally or internationally. 
2.3.5. The impact of Boko Haram to its neighbouring countries 
Even though Boko Haram is believed to have started as a Nigerian domestic terrorist group, it is 
very important to highlight its influence and negative impact on neighbouring states because the 
group has extended its influence in Lake Chad basin. According to Goyei (2018:110), the 
extremism of Boko Haram insurgents in north-eastern Nigeria has not only impacted the security 
dynamics of Nigeria, but it has also negatively impacted security in the Lake Chad Basin states, 
namely Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The situation on the Lake Chad basin is very tense in that 
the recurrence of attacks and influx of refugees threatens day to day security. Oluwadare (2018:7) 
narrated that the continued raids and suicide bombings instils fear and widespread trauma for 
people, blocks them from accessing basic essential services, and destroys infrastructure. The 
region consists of about 21 million inhabitants from Nigeria, with improper security to support the 
territorial integrity, involving all sorts of human security issues, affecting health, environmental 
resilience, food access, economies, politics, and comprising negative psychological or social 
effects. 
High volumes of refugees in these countries have worsened poverty and intensified criminal 
activities. The Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2019a) estimates that 




about 40,000 Nigerians were living as refugees, and about 28 000 in Cameroon, adding to food 
insecurity concerns and health facility burden, as Boko Haram destroyed clinics and caused 
nurses and doctors to fear for their lives and flee (Onuoha, 2014:9). The threat of insecurity 
extends businesses as well, as illustrated further by Onouoha (2014:9), who notes that cross-
border attacks have driven off potential tourists and caused a sharp drop in customs’ revenues 
for the central African country. Furthermore, while attempting to resolve the impact of Boko Haram 
insurgents in the region, some of the measures implemented were drastic, for instance, Ani and 
Mahmood (2018:16) demonstrate that Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, like Nigeria, have enacted 
restrictions, banning some local activities under the guise of a state emergency, such as blocking 
locals from selling fish and red peppers, because these were reported to have benefitted militants. 
This disadvantaging people in the Diffa region since such trade was their means of survival. 
The following table temporally arranges major Boko Haram attacks and notable events. 
Date of terror 
attack 
Location and event Casualties and numbers 
wounded 
12/24/2003 Attack on police stations in Geiman and 
Kanama in Yobe state; Afghanistan Taliban 
Flag was raised. 
Unknown 
27/07/2009 A series of attacks in Maiduguri, Borno, 
Nigeria, including burning multiple 
churches, police stations and a prison. 
More than 75 people killed, 
and others wounded. 
26/08/2011 A suicide bomber from Boko Haram 
crashed a car filled with explosives into the 
main building of the UN headquarters in 
Abuja. 
23 people killed and 87 
wounded. 
20/01/2012 A series of bomb attacks and shooting 
sprees in the city of Kano, with police 
stations being the main targets. 
187 people killed and 50 
wounded. 
17/09/2013 Boko Haram raided the town of Benisheik. 
Members impersonated military officials 
and set up checkpoints outside the town. 
Those who attempted to escape were shot. 






14/04/2014 More than 300 girls aged 16 to 18 were 
kidnapped from a secular school in Chibok 
by the Boko Haram insurgency. On 
November 14, the group claimed that the 
abducted girls had converted to Islam and 
were married. Up until May 2016, 219 girls 
were missing but a few who were living as 
wives and mothers among Boko Haram 
fighters were rescued.  
Most girls were still alive and by January 
2018 106 girls had escaped. 
Unknown numbers killed.  
27/07/2014 Attack on the Kolofata town in northern 
Cameroon and kidnapping of the wife of 
Cameroon Deputy minister, Amadou Ali. 
Akaoua Babiana and 27 others who had 
been kidnapped by the group during other 
incidents were released. 
Three people killed and 
unknown numbers 
wounded. 
3/01/2015 Boko Haram insurgents attacked the towns 
of Baga and Doron Baga, and Borno for 
more than 4 days. Boko Haram shot 
randomly from armoured vehicles and 
burned several buildings. 
On January 12, 150 people 
were reported dead by the 
Nigerian government. 
Amnesty International 
released Satellite images 
showing about (2000) 
people killed and unknown 
wounded.  
18/01/2015 80 civilians kidnapped from northern 
Cameroon involving many children. 
Cameroon’s army free 24 hostages and 
chase Boko Haram into Nigeria. 
Three people killed, none 
wounded. 
6/02/2015 Boko Haram insurgents attack Bosso, first 
major attack in Niger. 





13/02/2015 Village of Ngouboua in Chad attacked, two-
thirds of the homes in the village set on fire 
before the Chadian military intervened. 
This was Boko Haram's first attack in Chad, 
probably in retaliation for Chad's 
collaboration with Nigeria, Niger, and 
Cameroon in joint military campaigns 
against Boko Haram. 
10 people killed and four 
wounded. 
28/ 03/2015 Boko Haram attempted to block civilians 
from voting during election day in Nigeria. 
41 people killed, unknown 
wounded. 
October 2015  Boko Haram militants bombed Abuja, 
Nigeria, and suicide bombed the main 
Nigeria refugee camp in Chad. 
54 people killed and 51 
wounded. 
30/01/2016 Boko Haram attacked Dalori, Nigeria, using 
suicide bombers; children were burned 
alive. 
86 people killed and 
unknown number wounded. 
09/02/2016 Two female suicide bombers detonated 
explosives at a displaced persons camp in 
Dika, Nigeria. 
58 people killed, over 80 
wounded. 
21/08/2016 Attack on Kuburvwa village, Nigeria. 11 people killed and 
unknown numbers 
wounded. 
09/12/2016 Attack at a market in Madagali village by 
two female suicidal bombers. 
Nigerian military officials 
claimed 30 killed and 68 
wounded, whereas open 
source news agencies 
reported 57 killed, and 177 
wounded. 
28/07/2017 Boko Haram attacked an oil exploration 
team in north-east Nigeria. 






15/08/2017 Three female suicide bombers attacked an 
internally displaced persons camp and a 
market in north-eastern Nigeria. 
20 killed and over 80 
wounded. 
21/11/2017 A teenage suicide bomber detonated 
explosive during a morning service at a 
mosque in Mubi, Nigeria. 
50 people killed. 
17/01/2018 A male and a female suicide bomber 
attacked a market in Maiduguri, Nigeria. 
12 people killed and over 45 
wounded 
21/02/2018 110 schoolgirls were seized by the militants 
from a school in Dapachi, Nigeria. 
No fatalities recorded. 
02/03/2018 Suspected Boko Haram militants attacked 
military barracks in the town of Rann, in 
the north-east of Borno State near the 
Cameroonian border.  
11 people including three 
aid workers were killed, 
two aid workers were 
contractors with the 
International 
Organisation for 
Migration, the third was a 
doctor working as a 
consultant for the UN 
International Children’s 
Emergency Fund. 
 Table 2,2 Major Boko Haram attacks and notable events 
 (Source: Centre for International Security and Cooperation, 2018) 
The above timeline does not include all attacks orchestrated by Boko Haram militants. From the 
above it is extremely clear that Boko Haram has challenged and threatened the security not only 
of Nigeria but also its neighbouring countries. The attack on military barracks has challenged the 
security systems of Nigeria as a state and demonstrates how brazen the militant organisation is. 
Attacks persist. In February 2019, Amnesty International reported that about 60 people were killed 
following the Boko Haram attacks on Rann, and about 30,000 people fled to neighbouring 




2.4. Factors that explain the emergence of Boko Haram 
In deploying state failure theory and relative deprivation theory to help explain the emergence and 
persistence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, it is very important to acknowledge and briefly highlight 
some ideas that might help to explain what drives collective violence and terrorism. Thereafter 
the significance of employing the theoretical framework comprising state failure and relative 
deprivation theory is explored more deeply. 
Tilly (2003:5) outlines three camps that help explain why different people engage in violent 
activities, these are ideas, behaviour, and social interaction. Idea people stress that ideas 
concerning the worth of others and a willingness towards aggressive actions affect the propensity 
of individuals or groups to engage in collective violence (Tilly, 2003:5). For behavioural people, 
the emphasis is on motives, impulses, and opportunities. Many refer to human evolution as the 
origin of aggressive actions, individually or collectively; suggesting that people are driven to use 
aggressive means to obtain mates, shelter, food, and protection from attacks (Tilly, 2003:5). 
Aggression might link to Boko Haram’s ideological beliefs in that they want to impose Sharia law 
in the northern part of Nigeria using extreme violence. Revolutionary theories also help to explain 
collective violence. Shaw (2009:102) highlights revolutions as one of the highly regarded forms 
of political violence, illustrating that the 1789 French revolution has inspired social historians and 
evolutionary theorists in the twentieth century. Given the fact that that reign of terror was a 
successful revolution, it might as well drive groups or individuals to use violence. According to 
Shaw (2009:102), terrorism can involve terrorising populations by exposing the public to mass 
executions of civilians. 
In support of this view, Stoddard (2019:302) notes that revolutionary rebels do not only aim to 
achieve power, but also transform the society by an extreme reorganisation of social and political 
orders. Revolutionary warfare is ideological, and both factions of the Boko Haram insurgency 
support revolutionary calls to transform the political order in Nigeria and beyond (Stoddard, 
2019:305). Other scholars have pointed out that class theory also helps to explain terrorism in 
Nigeria. Ogunrofita (2013:47) emphasised the significance of class theory in explaining the Boko 
Haram insurgency in Nigeria, arguing that the ruling class’s misinterpreted religious prescripts are 
used to divide people. He asserts that prevalent poverty, unavailability of jobs, untold misery 
caused by the Nigerian military, Structural Adjustments Programmes, and unresolved issues by 
the civilian regime have affected the working and the lumpen class, mostly in northern Nigeria. 
Boko Haram has exploited failures to develop and advance the living conditions of the people 




conceptualised as driving factors of more than 70% of pre-modern wars, making them the most 
prominent motives for violence in human history (Eisner, 2009:47).  
The above briefly highlighted theories for explaining drivers of collective violence or terrorism. It 
is important to note the reasons why revolutions exist, or why groups act violently. They do so to 
achieve their socio-economic, political and ideological wishes which might not be achieved by soft 
approaches. In this case, the state is central and cannot be easily separated from the above-
mentioned reasons. State failure is a broad term which involves a lot of the above theories. The 
emergence and persistence of Boko Haram occurs in the north-east, where all the characteristics 
of state failure exists. A wide range of scholars share the view that state failure and relative 
deprivation play a significant role in explaining the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. The study 
provides empirical evidence on the nature and extent of state failure and relative deprivation in 
north-east Nigeria to justify the significance of the theoretical framework. This occurs in chapters 
three and four. The next section describes the characteristics of state failure and relative 
deprivation. 
2.5. State failure and relative deprivation  
Based on current literature from several scholars, and even though other factors also explain the 
emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, state failure and relative deprivation theory have earned a 
lot of credibility. This section highlights the characteristics of state failure and relative deprivation. 
It also explores conceptions of corruption, bad governance, poverty, and unemployment in 
Nigeria, and establishes how they explain the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria because they 
all fall under the category of state failure, which then leads to relative deprivation. In support of 
ongoing analysis, notice that Maiangwa (2012:180) states that: 
Given the rise in the number of failed and failing states, particularly in Africa, 
scores of books, articles, and reports published in the last two decades have 
usefully underscored the link between failed states and terrorism. By this, it has 
been substantially argued that the conditions of state failure such as political 
tyranny, loss of state legitimacy, bad governance, etc. predispose people to acts 
of terrorism and create the conducive ambiance for terrorist activities. 
The above supports the view the failed states and their effect drive people join or conduct terrorist 
attacks. However, this is discussed in more detail in chapter three when explaining the link 




institutions. That is, only the institution of the executive functions. If legislatures exist at all, they 
are rubber-stamping machines. Democratic debate is noticeably absent. The judiciary is 
derivative of the executive rather than being independent, and citizens know that they cannot rely 
on the court system for significant redress or remedy, especially against the state. In the Nigerian 
situation, political development has always been marred by governance crises and corruption at 
all strata of the society (Omilusi, 2013:5). Omilusi further illustrates that there is a disconnect 
between the governed and the ruling government (Omilusi, 2013:5). This disconnect has been 
exacerbated by the security personnel who have been used to protect politicians who take money 
from the public till, and have conducted themselves in a despicable manner, rather than 
performing their primary responsibility of protecting lives and properties (Udama, 2013:103).  
Rotberg (2002:6) outlined another characteristic of a failed state, arguing that failed states cannot 
control their borders and they lose authority over sections of territory. Often, the expression of 
official power is limited to a capital city and one or more ethnically specific zones. Plausibly, the 
extent of state failure can be measured by how much of its geographical expanse is genuinely 
controlled (especially after dark) by the official government. Boko Haram controlled about 20 local 
government areas at the beginning of 2015 and could operate across borders into Chad, 
Cameroon, and Niger (Idahosa, 2015:7), which is a clear indication that the Nigerian government 
does not have complete control of its territory. Furthermore, Omilusi (2013:7) posits that any 
government that derogates from the fundamentals of securing lives and property soon becomes 
irrelevant and obsolete, as citizens may be forced to resort to self-help for their security.  
According to Pichette (2015:4), relative deprivation theory is a simple, widely recognised 
explanation of terrorism. He asserts that the core belief underlying this idea is that people who 
are not having their basic needs fulfilled are more likely to resort to violence, and that poverty is 
a key factor in explaining terrorism in less developed parts of the world. In Nigeria, the northern 
region associated with Boko Haram activity is the poorest region of Nigeria where the government 
has done little to resolve issues of poverty (Pichette, 2015:4). He contends that relative 
deprivation theory and the failure of the state to improve economic conditions explains the 
emergence of Boko Haram. Ogbonna and Jimenez (2017:14) share this view, arguing that Boko 
Haram's insurgency is deeply rooted in the perceived discrepancy between the expected life 
conditions and the actual ones, together with the hard life experience of many youths in north-




2.5.1. Corruption and bad governance 
Corruption can be defined as the abuse of public office for private gains. Public office is abused 
for private gain when an official accepts, asks for, or demands a bribe. Corruption also occurs 
when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for 
competitive advantage and profit (Adeniran, 2019:23). Political corruption is a manipulation of 
policies, Institutions, and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political 
makers who abuse their position to sustain their power and wealth (Ogbuehi, 2018:371). In 
Nigeria, corrupt public officers are known to hold huge amounts of money in foreign bank 
accounts, despite being statutorily blocked from having such accounts. Such abuse has 
negatively impacted the inflationary trend in the economy, thereby lowering the living standards 
of a large majority of Nigerians (Okogbule, 2007:50). 
Udama (2013:107), stresses that in Nigeria the government at all levels, including the federal 
state and local governments, have not done well in the provision of public goods like infrastructure, 
health, education, employment, and security, regardless of the abundance of oil revenues 
distributed to their offices. Instead, funds allocated to them are being diverted for personal gains, 
hence kidnapping and terrorism are signs and consequences that formal authority is not effective 
and there are no checks and balances in governance (Udama, 2013:107).  
When arrested in January 2004, one of Yusuf's followers explained to a journalist that their group 
has suffered a setback and that they wanted to institutionalise an Islamic government in the near 
future, and claimed that the group’s belief is that Islam is against corruption and that if Sharia law 
were applied, corruption would be eliminated (Akuva, Igyoroko & Zumwe, 2013). 
Corruption and patronage systems came to be the order of the day since independence and it 
has led to the development of civil wars, and security threats, the latter mainly from Boko Haram, 
as claimed by various academics. Achebe (2012:227) illustrates that economic deprivation and 
corruption generate and intensify financial and social inequities in a population, which in turn fuels 
political instability. He asserts that extremists of all kinds, specifically religious zealots and other 
political mischiefs, have a foothold to recruit supporters and sympathisers to help conduct terrorist 
attacks and cause havoc for ordinary citizens.  
Akuva, Ingyoroko and Zumwe (2013:122) argue that terrorism and corruption are inter-related 
due to the damage they cause to society and people, while terrorism kills immediately, corruption 
kills by causing poverty. Udama (2013:108) argues that the Boko Haram insurgency is thriving in 




marginalisation are acute, and unemployment is high. Corruption is a key tool for terrorists, just 
as it is for members of organised crime, and terrorists depend not only on crime for revenue, but 
criminal activity provides recruits employment and generates funds that can deliver social services 
not provided by corrupt and fragile states (Shelly, 2018:4).  
There is a strong consensus that corruption breeds terrorism (Mukolu & Ogodo, 2018) and that 
corruption is a major cause of insurgency in Nigeria. Onuoha and Abimbola (2010) share the view 
that Nigeria's leadership and its institutional weakness, caused by high levels of corruption, 
poverty, and unemployment has generated the basis of Boko Haram. Salihu (2018) also indicated 
that security threats like Boko Haram are exacerbated by inadequate protective factors, and have 
led youngsters to become extremists because they are left without options to navigate the 
society's inadequacies. Even though the Boko Haram insurgency also encompasses religious 
views, much has been said about Nigeria's glaring corruption as the major catalyst of the crisis 
and so it cannot be taken for granted. 
In addition, Adisa and Gbadamosi (2018:17) indicate that corruption in Nigeria is prevalent and 
has been described as Nigeria’s biggest challenge. Albert (2016) indicates that Nigeria's post-
independence leaders have corruptly misappropriated available state resources for private benefit 
rather than using those funds to benefit the public. To buttress, Shelly (2018:5) argues that conflict 
regions where corruption is prevalent provide key opportunities for interactions between criminals 
and terrorists. For instance, AQIM has operated in Libya and Algeria, collaborating with criminals 
to raise funds and secure transport and arms. In West Africa, terrorist groups like Boko Haram, 
have capitalised on the high levels of corruption to take part in various criminal activities such as 
the trade of elephant ivory and kidnapping for ransom (Shelly, 2018:5). 
Adeniran (2019:25) also contends that corruption facilitates terrorism as it undermines 
governance, the economy, health, social order and sustainable development in all regions of the 
globe. Albert (2016) argues that the general consequence of corruption in Nigeria is the 
deprivation and impoverishment of the majority to the advantage of the few. The general 
implication of state officials’ involvement in corruption in Nigeria is that money that is supposed to 
be utilised for building schools, hospitals, water schemes, and generally to boost industrialisation 
so as to ensure better living standards, has been stolen by those holding public office position 
(Albert, 2016). Corruption cannot provide basic services, create jobs, encourage growth or 





The NBS and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime have claimed that sectors and institutions 
(public and private) are overwhelmed with bribery and corruption, and that the judiciary is 
extremely corrupt (Gholani & Salihu, 2018). A vast amount of judicial corruption occurs among 
court clerks and registrars, while prosecutors work with judges to destroy evidence or case files 
(Gholani & Salihu, 2018). The judiciary has been implicated in high levels of corruption in the form 
of bribery. For instance, the National Judicial Council proved that Justice Okwuchwukwu Opene 
acquired the sum of 15 million naira ($100,000) through bribery, while Hon. Justice David 






Figure 2.1 Overview of corruption in Nigeria with categorized examples 
(Source: Page, 2018:5) 
Figure 2.1 indicates that corruption in Nigeria is diversified; it involves legalised corruption and 
deliberate waste. These categories are not recognised as forms of corruption. For instance, 
according to Page (2018:7), due to corrupt officials, the National Space Research and 




satellite cost Nigerians $32.7 million in 2018. High levels of corruption in defence spending has a 
negative impact on curbing the attacks by Boko Haram in north-east. For example, the death of 
83 soldiers in late 2016 by a Boko Haram ambush was due to insufficient resources caused by 
the rise of corruption among army leaders (Page, 2018:14). 
Salihu (2018) shows that poor leadership at all governmental levels, occasioned by unbelievable 
levels of corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, weak institutions, bribery, and 




Figure 2.2 Perceived corruption among public officials in 2017 
(Source: Afrobarometer, 2019) 
The survey data above shows that citizens believe that corruption in Nigeria is highly prevalent, 
in particular among police and the National Assembly. This makes it easier to understand why 




that Nigeria lost $65 billion to the power sector from 1999 to 2015, and Nigerian officials are 
estimated to have taken $4.6 billion in bribes between 2015 and 2016.  
The uprisings of violence by Boko Haram terrorists or militants in the Niger Delta emerged 
because of anger generated by corruption and the attendant social discomfort of poverty, lack of 
jobs, extreme levels of economic distress or deprivation caused by official corruption (Akuva et 
al., 2013:131). Every government must ensure that leaders and those chosen to serve the public 
are committed to performing their duties accordingly and to ensure that the demands of the society 
are being attended to. Good governance is a system where the resources of the society are 
managed transparently with accountability and room for popular participation in governance by 
responsible leaders (Othman et al., 2015:38). Nigerian leaders use state resources for personal 
aggrandisement at the expense of the majority directly and indirectly in government (Othman et 
al., 2015:38). Misallocation of resources due to corruption is responsible for teeming unemployed 
youths in the country, these unemployed youths such as Almajerri in the north, Agbero in the 
south west, the Bakassi boys in the south East and the Nigerian Delta militants in the south-south, 
are often recruited as terrorists by disgruntled politicians and opportunistic religious leaders - 
where the Boko Haram insurgency lays its roots (Faleye, 2013:81).  
2.5.2. Poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria 
 
The federal government of Nigeria puts the unemployment and youth unemployment rates at 23% 
and 40% respectively, and it is believed that over 70% of the youth population are unemployed 
(Ayeba, 2015:96). A statistical distribution of poverty in Nigeria indicates that northern Nigeria is 
extremely affected, with the north-central states recording a 67% poverty rate, north-west states 
71%, and the north-east states 72%. It is evident that poverty is so prevalent in northern Nigeria 
due to injustice, absence of fairness in policy, and negligence on the part of the political class to 
develop education in that region, as well as an imbalance in resource allocation (Oluwadare, 
2016:43).  
 
The most immediate source of the disconnect between Nigeria’s wealth and its poverty is the 
failure of governance at the federal, state and local levels, as well as the lack of transparency and 
accountability, which has destroyed the government's legitimacy, and has facilitated the rise of 
groups that embrace violence and reject the authority of the state (Faleye, 2013:181). Recent 
statistics as by World Poverty Clock (WPC, 2018) named Nigeria as the poverty capital of the 




indicating that 4 million Nigerians have become impoverished, occasioned by factors such as 
unemployment, and insecurity, among others. It is indicated that by 2030, the percentage of 
Nigeria’s population living in extreme poverty is estimated to a total of 120 million people living 
under $1.90 per day. There is a population growth of approximately 2.34% per annum and it is 
estimated that by 2030, Nigeria’s population will grow up to 263 million, of which 150 million will 
be below under the age of 25, and if current economic trends persist, they may have 
consequences as their mean disposable income could approximately decrease by 9% between 
2018 and 2030 (World Poverty Clock, 2018). 
 
Country Poverty rate, 2018 (%) Forecasted poverty rate, 
2030 (%) 
   
South Sudan 85 95 
Burundi 74 85 
Congo 45 54 
Nigeria 44 46 
Venezuela 15 23 
 Table 2.3 Nigeria’s forecasted poverty rate 
 (Source: World Poverty Clock, 2018) 
 
Table 2.3 indicates estimates that the poverty rate in Nigeria will keep increasing instead of 
decreasing, which poses challenges to the current situation. If the poverty rate is determined to 
increase, there is also a risk of enhancing frustration. 
Poverty and underdevelopment are one of the biggest challenges affecting the lives of the majority 
despite the resource abundance, especially in the north-east region, leaving a huge number of 
youths miserable and desperate for survival. Bamidele (2013) has cited poverty as responsible 
for explaining the existence of Boko Haram. The northern region is the poorest with people who 
have been denied access to education and proper or enough economic resources for basic 
survival, and this is where Boko Haram has its operational base (Akuva et al. 2013). Ani and 
Mahmood (2018:7) have indicated that poverty in Borno State, the epicentre of Boko Haram crisis 
is so acute, was 70% in 2017, making it higher than many states in the south of the country where 




improvements in people’s standard of living over time to such a point that levels of inequality, 
unemployment, and poverty are minimised (Coker & Genyi, 2014:1131). Hogendoorn (2018:7) 
posits that development cannot happen overnight, but most radical groups prey on a loss of hope. 
He argues that radical groups would have much less support if the government implemented 
reforms and programs that provide hope for and confidence in a better future (Hogendoorn, 
2018:7). 
In addition, Ogbonna and Jimenez (2017:17) argue that several scholars agree that poverty, 
extreme level of unemployment, illiteracy, economic disparities and marginalisation in the North-
east made it easy for Boko Haram to mobilise the youth and easily attract them. The inability of 
successive administrations in Nigeria to resolve poverty issues, lack of employment and an 
unbalanced distribution of wealth within ethnic nationalities is one of the core causes of insecurity 
in Nigeria (Achumba et al. 2013:82). Othman et al. (2015:35) illustrate that the presence of political 
and socio-economic frustrations, mostly in north-east Nigeria where Boko Haram thrives, and 
where poverty, unemployment and the absence of education are more acute than other parts of 
the country, serve as reasons for the emergence of Boko Haram. Faleye (2013:40) argues that 
unemployment harms the youth as it makes them available for easy inducement for militancy, 
terrorism and other social services. 
2.6. Efforts made by the Nigerian state 
Various scholars have heavily condemned how the Nigerian state has responded to curb the 
terror attacks orchestrated by Boko Haram. The Nigerian state resorted to violence and 
oppressive military expeditions. In 2009, the then President Umaru Musa Yar' Adua primarily 
resorted to using the military to stop Boko Haram attacks, his successor Goodluck Jonathan 
enhanced military operations to fight against Boko Haram, claiming to regain the territory. In 2015 
president Buhari vowed that military operations against Boko Haram were part of restoring peace 
and resuscitate the economy (Bala & Ibrahim, 2018:4) However, even though the number of 
terrorist deaths declined from 4,940 in 2015 to 1,832 in 2016, this did not fully curtail the full 
operations of Boko Haram. These military interventions have been heavily criticised for their 
harshness, and which resulted in violations of human rights.  
Pichette (2015:7) asserts that the Joint Security Force has earned itself a reputation of brutality, 
similar to Boko Haram’s. In addition, Amnesty International (2019a:8) shows that there have been 
serious human rights violations perpetrated by the Nigerian military forces during its security 




1,200 people, arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 people, mostly young men and boys, and have 
engaged in torture. The Nigerian state did not properly strategise proper means of dealing with 
the Boko Haram attacks. However, other than Military intervention, the Nigerian government, 
according to Ani and Mahmood (2018:21) has established an amnesty program for repentant 
Boko Haram fighters through Operation Safe Corridor. He asserts that the operations entailed a 
16-week rehabilitation program, of which 95 ex-combatants graduated in February 2018. 
However, while this could help, local populations affected by the crisis hold different views and 
some are not willing to see or mix with former Boko Haram fighters.  
2.7. Efforts made by the Economic Community of West African States and its 
effectiveness for curbing the crisis 
This section examines efforts conducted by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) as attempts to curb the terror attacks. On a more collective level, the ECOWAS, which 
had for a while maintained a limited reaction to the crisis, has of late been influential curbing the 
terror attacks by Boko Haram. Of significant importance is the adoption by the ECOWAS of a 
Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism in 2013, which provides for a 
regional counter-terrorism strategy and an implementation plan to help member states combat 
terrorism. The strategy has been designed for the implementation of regional, continental, and 
international measures to curb terrorism and to provide a common operational framework for 
community-wide actions to prevent and eradicate terrorism and related events (Onuoha, 2014). 
However, according to Brenya and Kuffor (2015:87), Boko Haram activities started in 2003 and 
yet, as of 2015, not even an emergency meeting had been held by the authority of the heads of 
state to deliberate on Boko Haram insurgency as a regional security threat. It seems that the 
ECOWAS did not prioritise or regard the attacks by Boko Haram as a matter of urgency. 
2.7.1. Efforts made by the African Union (AU) and its effectiveness 
The AU has also not done much to mitigate the terror attacks by Boko Haram. As a regional 
organisation the AU has a prerogative to maintain peace and order on the continent. It has 
abandoned the Organisation of African Unity’s non-intervention policy and adopted an approach 
which allows intervention in member states in cases of human rights violations. The AU has been 
very reluctant to intervene in the Nigerian terror attack crisis. It took the abduction of the Chibok 
girls in 2014 for the AU to intervene, when the campaign of the abducted girls took centre stage 
in the media and which drew the attention of the International community to Boko Haram’s threats. 




Nigeria from Boko Haram. In addition, it has been noted that the Peace and Security Council held 
a session exclusively devoted to Boko Haram for the first time on 23 May 2014 (PSC, 2014). For 
such an important continental body to take such a long time to intervene to mitigate the crisis, 
alone signifies a lack of commitment to assist member states. However, there are several 
challenges which are addressed in detail in chapter five when examining the intervention made 
by the regional and continental bodies. 
2.8. Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an overview and conceptualisation of the term terrorism, introducing to 
the reader different definitions by various scholars. Exploring a wide range of meanings of 
terrorism was to indicate a lack of clarity or commonly agreed upon definitions of terrorism. Doing 
so indicated different trends and motives or drivers of extremism and terror attacks in Africa and 
globally, and also linked the theoretical conceptualisations with empirical events. This chapter has 
also familiarised the phenomenon of Boko Haram to the reader by citing a wide range of scholarly 
reviews about the emergence of Boko Haram. This has been done by providing information about 
the evolution of Boko Haram, its leadership structure, recruitment strategies, sources of finance, 
and major attacks from 2003 to 2019, as well as links with other International terrorist 
organisations. The chapter has also explored the link between state failure and relative 
deprivation and the connection between corruption and terrorism by providing a wide range of 
literature on how these concepts are inter-related in explaining the emergence of Boko Haram. 
The following chapter deploys the theoretical framework of state failure and relative deprivation 
theory. It provides an in-depth analysis of these two theories and outlines their relevance to the 










Chapter 3: Theoretical framework: state failure and relative deprivation 
3.1. Introduction  
 
The previous chapters explored the ways in which state failure and relative deprivation are inter-
related and can help to explain terrorism in general and specifically the emergence of Boko Haram 
in Nigeria. The previous chapters also explored the concepts of domestic and international 
terrorism, defined Boko Haram, highlighted its leadership, recruitment processes, weaponry 
sources, its links to other terrorist organisations, and included a timeline of Boko Haram terror 
attacks. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of state failure and relative deprivation theory 
and familiarises the reader with its relevance in explaining terrorism. This chapter is used to link 
the analysis of the theoretical frameworks with the empirical evidence about the rise of Boko 
Haram and its terror attacks. The chapter gives a definition of the state, discusses state failure 
theory and discusses relative deprivation theory. This chapter also briefly explores the proponents 
of both state failure theory and relative deprivation theory justifies these two theories as relevant 
to explaining terrorism. Recall that the aim of this thesis is to analyse the origins of Boko Haram 
and assess its expansion from a small group to becoming the most dangerous terrorist 
organisation in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, and to assess if the actions taken by the 
Nigerian state and regional organisations were effective, and, if appropriate, recommend possible 
alternatives in dealing with the recurring attacks.  
3.2. Defining a state  
 
According to Peruzzotti (2015:1), the concept of the modern state refers to a specific institutional 
configuration that leads to the development of a sovereign structure of political authority within a 
territory. It involves a set of constitutionally regulated agencies, possessed by supreme jurisdiction 
over a certain territory and population (Peruzzotti, 2015:1). Similarly, Solomon and Okon 
(2004:53) defined the state as: 
A geographically bounded and specified sovereign territory inhabited by a 
permanent population tied together by some form of socio-political cohesion and 
governed by a permanent population of the state. The state should also be 
recognized as a legally equal and independent member of the international 




There are many definitions of states, but it is not the aim of this study to go deeply into defining 
the state. However, from the definitions provided above, both definitions note that a state has a 
“sovereign territory”, and that the state has broad economic and social responsibility. The second 
definition highlights that “the permanent population is tied together by some form of political 
cohesion” meaning that states have the duty to make sure that its population is unified by 
providing political, social, and economic opportunities. A state, as being a sovereign territory, has 
the autonomous authority of governing its territory and its inhabitants without them being coerced 
by any external authority. The following section briefly discusses the characteristics or functions 
of the state before explaining state failure theory.  
3.3. Functions of a state 
Howard (2014:14) argues that it is the state's prerogative to make sure that its borders are safe, 
and its citizens are free from internal and external conflicts. He contends that the primary duty 
and goal of the state is to cater for the public good of security. Rotberg (2004:3) shares this view, 
illustrating that the state's prime function is to provide the political good of security, to make sure 
that there are no cross-border attacks and penetrations, to avoid any loss of territory, and abolish 
internal threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure. He adds that the state 
has to ensure that crime and related threats to domestic human security are prevented, while also 
ensuring that citizens are capable of resolving their differences with the state and their fellow 
citizens without the use of arms or physical force (Rotberg, 2004:3). In other words, the state has 
the sole responsibility of making sure that all services from the provision of basic goods to security 
are taken care of.  
In support of the above, Patrick (2006:29) claims that the strength of the state can be measured 
by its ability and the will to provide the fundamental political goods associated with statehood, 
which entails physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management, and social 
welfare. Achonu and Damien (2014:4) argue that political goods include security, health, 
education, good governance, economic opportunity, law and order, as well as basic infrastructure. 
They assert that if the state is not capable of delivering these fundamental goods and services to 
its citizens, state failure can follow (Achonu & Damien, 2014:4). In support of the above views on 
state, it is very important to note that the state has the responsibility of making sure that the day 
to day services of a given territory are being monitored and governed properly, providing security, 




human security emphasises the preservation of the wellbeing of persons, involving the protection 
of their social, economic, political and environmental rights.  
3.4. Characteristics of state failure  
The notion that failed and fragile states have threatened international security has been widely 
recognised. Failed and fragile states are often characterised by an inability to provide basic 
services and by serious conflicts internally (Cojanu & Popescu, 2007:114). Such conflicts can 
also destabilise neighbouring states and generate uncontrolled territories that are conducive for 
terrorist activities (Cojanu & Popescu, 2007:114). According to Newman (2007:466), state failure 
entails a government that is unable to uphold public services, institutions, authority, or might have 
lost its autonomy to control its territory. “A failed state” says Rotberg (2003:6) “is a polity that is 
no longer able or willing to perform the fundamental jobs of a nation-state in the modern world”. 
Therefore, when a state is not supplying basic services or is unable to perform some of its 
functions, as mentioned previously, it will lead to that state to be determined as a failed state. On 
a different view, Solomon and Cone (2004:58) stress that state failure refers to instances where 
“less than complete collapse occurs”. This might be the situation where states, for instance, can 
only prioritise certain policies like focusing on education and military while ignoring health, social 
and economic development. 
Also, some scholars define state failure under the umbrella of an inability or incapability to perform 
statehood responsibilities. These are some conditions which help to explain the characteristics of 
failing or failed states. For instance, Coggins (2015:461) lists some examples: 
(1) The government fails to provide basic public infrastructure and services leading 
to extreme deprivation within its population (human security); (2) the government 
fails to provide stable and reliable public institutions, offering only increasingly 
corrupt, exploitative, and or ineffective governance (state capacity); (3) the 
governing regime experiences fundamental political collapse or is so internally 
contested that political authority is ambiguous throughout significant portions of the 
territory (political collapse). 
To paraphrase the above, state failure leads to the disillusionment of the citizens who rely on the 
services provided to them by the state. That deprivation will then cause havoc and generate chaos 




definition of state failure, but there is a consensus among scholars about certain characteristics 
of failed states. Rotberg (2003:5) states that: 
Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by 
warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led 
by one or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of 
communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and groups 
within the state. 
By closely looking into the above scholarly reviews on definitions of state failure and its 
characteristics, it appears that state failure is a broad term that covers the inability of states to 
function properly and uphold the responsibilities of the state as a whole. There might be 
disagreements over whether state failure is directly linked to terrorism, but there is a wide 
consensus that failed or weak states are possessed with a wide range of problems that provide 
conducive environments for violent and terrorist activities. With the aid of some empirical 
evidence, the following section discusses the state failure argument and its links to terrorism.  
3.4.1. State failure’s link to terrorism 
Newman (2007:466) asserts that failed states have succumbed to violent conflicts, and that forced 
migration often leads to the spread of insurgents, threatens regional stability continuously and 
sometimes induces conflicts in neighbouring countries. For instance, the military coups that 
happened in Guinea-Bissau and Mali, and the insurgency in the Sahel region negatively impacted 
West African countries such as Mali, Niger, and Mauritania (Annan, 2014:5). Newman further 
indicates that failed states are often involved in open armed conflict and create an enabling 
environment for the trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons through porous borders 
(Newman, 2007:466). What makes failed states hotbeds for terrorism is the lack of security which 
makes its citizens vulnerable to many dangerous activities. For instance, failed and failing states 
like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan have regarded as producing terrorism by United States 
policymakers (Piazza, 2008:469). Newman (2007:466) further contends that illicit activities can 
be used to finance armed conflict and to generate sources of income for terrorist groups. 
Therefore, terrorists often exploit such situations to enhance their operations, since raising funds 
or smuggling weapons is achievable in failed states due to a lack of security. 
As stated previously lack of security is one of the characteristics of state failure, and this security 




territory and its citizens. Security is an absence of those aspects which undermine the internal 
cohesion and corporate existence of the state and its capability to uphold significant institutions 
for enhancing its fundamental values and socio-political and economic objectives, and at the 
same time legitimately fulfil its people's aspirations (Onyepuemu, 2015:124). For instance, the 
failure to come up with a solution to the Palestinian crisis has been the root of deep frustration in 
the Arab or Islam world (Gupta, 2010:74). According to Onyepuemu (2015:124), the security of 
any country includes a set of orders or conditions suitable for keeping the functioning and 
reproduction of an existing state in the face of internal and external threats. Meaning that states 
have to provide security from threats within the state and threats from outside its territory. 
Supporting the above argument, Coggins (2015:464) claims that, due to social dislocation from 
economic refugees crossing borders and migrating to neighbouring countries, an increase in 
human insecurity can generate terrorism.  
States with limited capacity may also create a conducive environment for international terrorism, 
as they do not support law and order, because corrupt officials can easily be bribed (Coggins, 
2015:465). People who are forced to migrate because of human insecurity are vulnerable to join 
criminal or terrorist organisations because they can be easily manipulated by terrorists or violent 
organisation because they are often offered some source of living, such as money and food for 
survival. Therefore, it means that state failure is a broad concept to the extent that it covers all 
aspects of statehood, and failure to maintain the responsibilities of statehood leads to insecurity 
which then explains the link between state failure and terrorism due to vulnerabilities created by 
insecurity and weak institutions. For instance, Howard (2014:23) posits that Africa’s most tragic 
failed states such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Somalia are known to be 
sponsoring terrorism and have all been providing, at some time in their history, a conducive 
environment for dangerous terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda. 
In addition, Ottaway and Mair (2004:1) argue that failed states are unable to provide security to 
their citizens and they cannot supply fundamental public goods to their citizens. Failed states 
succumb to violence because they cannot establish peace or stability for their citizens or control 
their territories. Brooks (2005:1159) also claimed that failed states are incapable of sustaining the 
growth of their economies and they cannot provide equal distributions of basic goods. He further 
asserts that failed states are overwhelmed by huge economic inequities, warlordism, and violent 
competition for resources (Brooks, 2005:1159). There is wide agreement by various scholars that 
failed states are characterised by violent extremism, political violence, and human insecurity 




failed state. This strengthens the significance of using state failure theory in this research study. 
In support of this persistent argument, Howard (2014:20) states that: 
[w]ith the recent attacks in Kenya and Somalia, and the failed bombing attempt on 
a U.S. airliner by a Nigerian national, it is becoming increasingly evident that 
internationally sponsored terrorist networks have found their base in sub-Saharan 
Africa and within the hearts and minds of its people, which poses significant 
challenges for the international community, given the region’s patchwork of failed 
states, where terrorists can hide and thrive. 
Furthermore, Patrick (2006:36) asserts that disgruntled groups are prone to adopt violence 
against repressive regimes and their perceived sponsors in the absence of peaceful avenues for 
political expression. He notes further that states that do not control borders or territories enhance 
the infiltration of terrorists and their operations. He contends that when states do not provide 
fundamental social needs this creates opportunities for charitable organisations or educational 
systems linked to radical networks to operate (Patrick, 2006:36). According to the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF, 2016:5), armed terrorist groups in northern Mali – such as AQIM, Ansar Dine, 
with its affiliates such as Macina Liberation Front in central and Southern Mali and Al-Mourabitoun 
– operate in historically non-governed and under-governed spaces and this has enabled local 
alliances with rebel groups.  
Therefore, state failure theory helps to explain terrorism. From the above, state failure creates an 
environment which is highly insecure, especially when the state is incapable of performing its 
security services. Rotberg (2003:6) shows that as failed states become characterised by 
increases in criminal violence, arms and drug trafficking will become prevalent, and ordinary 
police forces will not be effective. This situation will then cause citizens to seek support from 
warlords or any other prominent figures who show loyalty to ethnic or clan solidarity (Rotberg, 
2003:6).  
Apart from the aforesaid, other scholars argue that failed states generate nests for transnational 
terrorist activities. Coggins (2015:456) claims that the borders of failed states lack control and 
order, and instead enable trafficking of arms, drugs, money, and people regionally. In Sudan, 
because of the state’s failure to contain internal violence, military groups ended up conducting 
violent raids across its border into Chad and attacking the refugee camps, thereby worsening the 




to its neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Chad, and Niger with grave terror attacks 
directed at government and civilians (Financial Action Task Force, 2015:5). Also, human security 
threats such as ecological degradation, refugee flows, contagious diseases, and famine worsen 
situations for foreign governments because failed states are unable to control their humanitarian 
crises (Coggins, 2015:456). When states fail to control their borders, the danger posed is the 
enhancement of all illegal activities by criminals, taking advantage of weak institutions and 
security apparatuses, which then enable terrorist activities. For instance, South Asia has turned 
into a dangerous zone of terrorist hotbeds, because terrorists have found a conducive 
environment due to the lawlessness of the Afghanistan state and the uncontrolled tribal regions 
of Pakistan (Howard, 2014:157). 
It has been shown in the earlier sections that failed states are deeply corrupt. It is, therefore, 
important to further explore how corruption facilitates or creates a conducive environment for 
terrorist activities, illicit trading, and terror-related incidents. According to the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2017:1), terrorists and criminal organisations 
engage in broad activities that are facilitated by corruption. In order to raise money, al-Shabab in 
Somalia has opted to smuggle charcoal and sugar through the Kismayo port. Al-Shabab has been 
reportedly taxing the production and export of charcoal to the Gulf and facilitates sugar-smuggling 
imports (Izenman & Keatinge, 2020:13). It has been shown that Kenyan soldiers in Somalia are 
working with al-Shabab to enhance these smuggling channels (Izenman & Keatinge, 2020:13). 
At the border point, criminals often bribe custom officials to smuggle prohibited goods 
unnoticeably. Corruption enables terrorists to finance their activities, smuggle equipment and 
secure their networks by defeating security and justice via bribing officials (OECD, 20107:3). If a 
state is functioning properly, upholding its responsibility to govern and keep the integrity of its 
institutions, corruption will not survive. In the absence of checks and balances, corruption exists, 
and it is that failure which then generates easy ways for criminal activities to take place. In addition 
to the above, Shelly (2018:6) notes that at border posts corruption enhances the entry of many 
forms of illicit trade that further weakens state stability. These illegal trades include drugs and 
arms, where terrorists often bribe corrupt officials and smuggle migrants easily (Shelly, 2018:6). 
Terrorists use weapons such as guns. If they can acquire as many guns as they want means that 
they can have the capability to counterattack militaries. State failure, therefore, does not only 
create conducive environments for terrorist activities but it also undermines states’ abilities to deal 




Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2017:2), one of the bombing suspects was 
reported to have paid a bribe to enter Thailand before the August 2015 Bangkok bombing. 
Furthermore, terrorist or violent organisations might as well capitalise on the failure of the state to 
provide services to its citizens. For instance, in different regions of the world where states have 
been unable to provide services, terrorist and criminal groups such as the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia, drug cartels, Hamas, or the Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have 
stepped in as service providers, which often meant they obtained support from citizens (Shelly, 
2018:6). Therefore, state failure explains and facilitates terrorism. The logic in this scenario is that 
when governments are unable to provide goods and services to their citizens, at some point it 
drives those who do not have options to become easily manipulated. Citizens will accept any 
means or source of living offered from any potential group, without taking into consideration the 
negative consequences, because what matters most is receiving basic services. In support of the 
above argument, Howard (2014:20) contends that because of continued state failure in the region, 
the people of sub-Saharan Africa are dissatisfied with their leaders and political institutions, which 
leaves them prone to the extremist ideologies of internationally sponsored terrorist groups who 
purport to offer economic advancement and political power.  
Furthermore, Anaraki (2012:16) argues that the more corrupt governments are, the more likely 
the extremist groups in those countries to get involved in terrorist activities, meaning that 
corruption fuels terrorist activities. Adeniran (2019:25) is also of the view that various highly 
corrupt countries are full of terror acts, suggesting that corruption enables terrorism whether 
directly or indirectly. At borders or points of entry, officials who are corrupt can provide documents 
required by terrorists to conduct their operations, and corruption also enhances the smuggling of 
arms and drugs into countries, which impedes the competency of civil-militaries in curbing criminal 
acts (Adeniran, 2019:25). For example, in Beslan (in the North Caucasus of Russia) logistics were 
handled by a corrupt police official who accepted bribes from a terrorist who then conducted a 
terror attack at a school (Shelly, 2018:6). Owing to the availability of illegal arms in the hands of 
the wrong people, corruption not only promotes terrorism, but it further negatively impacts the 
capacities of states to control or to prevent criminal activities within their territories. According to 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2017:2), in the 2004 
Domodevo Moscow airport bombing it might be that terrorists bribed security personnel to make 




Agang (2018:3) demonstrates that terrorist organisations often prey on disappointed youths who 
are affected economically as a result of few elites who are greedy and corrupt to such an extent 
that the youth are left with limited or absent economic opportunities. In other words, corruption 
undermines economic development because the resources that are supposed to be used for 
public benefit are used to benefit specific individuals. Lack of economic development leads to 
unemployment, which terrorists often take advantage of, and so those who are unemployed can 
easily end up as targets for terrorist recruitment. Further, Choi (2014:137) contends that when 
people are desperate, with no economic opportunities open to them, they can engage in terrorist 
activities as a way to express their demands. Therefore, state failure theory is very important in 
this study as it offers relevant explanations for terrorism. 
3.5. Relative deprivation theory 
The previous section has explored the concept of state failure and indicated its links to terrorism. 
It was argued that state failure generates a host of problems including the emergence of violence 
and resentment which creates a conducive environment for terrorism and enables insurgencies. 
This section will explore the theory of relative deprivation to understand its relevance in explaining 
terrorism. There is strong evidence in the existing literature numerous scholars believe that 
relative deprivation theory does well to explain the origins of violence, protest, or terrorism. 
However, before delving into this theory, it is appropriate to first define relative deprivation theory. 
Thereafter its relevance in explaining terrorism is explored, and some examples are invoked to 
substantiate the analysis. 
3.5.1. Defining and conceptualising relative deprivation  
According to Onyepuemu (2015:125), relative deprivation is a classical theory that helps explain 
why people get involved in violence such as riots, rebellion, coups, and any other criminal 
activities. Onyepuemu (2015:125) conceives of relative deprivation as the difference between 
what people think they deserve and what they predict they can get. Pettigrew (2015:12) defines 
relative deprivation as a judgment that one or one's ingroup is disadvantaged compared to a 
relevant referent and that this judgment generates feelings of anger, resentment, and entitlement. 
He describes three fundamental components of relative deprivation. Those who experience 
relative deprivation do the following. First, they make cognitive comparisons. Second, they make 
cognitive appraisals and conclude that they themselves or their ingroup are disadvantaged. Third, 





Similarly, Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin and Bialosiewicz (2015:2) posit that relative deprivation is the 
judgment that one is worse off compared to some standard, and that this judgement is 
accompanied by feelings of anger and resentment. The definitions above share the view that 
there is a sense or a feeling of anger or frustration, that these feelings derive from perceived 
relative deprivation, and that perceived relative deprivation is a result of people making either 
individual to individual or group to group comparisons. In general, people have expectations. And 
if those expectations are unmet, while at the same time they see other individuals or groups have 
those expectations met, they, the relatively deprived, become frustrated. That frustration can lead 
to violent actions either collectively or individually.  
Relative deprivation is used by social scientists to predict a wide range of important outcomes, 
such as willingness to join protests, personal achievement, defiance, intergroup attitudes, and 
physical and mental health (Smith et al. 2015:2). For centuries relative deprivation theory has 
been used to explain links between frustration and political violence (Chassman, 2017:225). 
Relative deprivation theory illuminates connections between grievance, understandings of 
grievance, the mobilisation of individuals, and political violence (Chassman, 2017:225).  
Furthermore, relative deprivation has been categorised into fraternal deprivation and egoistic 
deprivation. Chigozie (2016:2835) states that fraternal deprivation is the feeling that one's group 
is deprived of compared to another, while egoistic deprivation is the feeling that one individual is 
deprived in relation to another. Buttressing the point, he further argues that individuals and groups 
who do not fully get some goods, services, and stability are prone to organise jointly to enhance 
or defend their conditions (Chigozie, 2016:2853). According to Onyepuemu (2015:125), relative 
deprivation takes place when value anticipations exceed what one can reach. These expectations 
entail welfare, security, and self-actualisation, while value capabilities involve any legitimate ways 
of fulfilling expectations, such as employment, for example. For instance, a country with a high 
number of annual graduates, that has little to no employment prospects, may engender feelings 
of frustrations because, after graduation, graduates expect to be employed, and after years of 
unemployment they become frustrated (Onyepuemu, 2015:126). The following section will 
provide some examples to substantiate the above discussion.  
3.5.2. Relative deprivation’s link to terrorism 
In light of the previous argument, note that the Global Terrorism Index (2017:65) contends that 
recent studies have suggested that individuals who conduct terrorist attacks or who join terrorist 




and economic welfare have been frustrated are at high risk for extremism. For instance, countries 
with high proportions of secondary educated populations who remain unemployed or 
underemployed often generate hotbeds for extremist ideology (Global Terrorism Index, 2017:65). 
Tunisia, for instance, has the highest number of citizens working as fighters for ISIL, of about 
700,000 Tunisian job seekers in 2015, 200,000 were university graduates, who were competing 
for 79,000 largely low skill job vacancies. ISIL were at one point paying monthly salaries of up to 
$2,000, and so many Tunisians were recruited due to economic desperation and poor economic 
and social conditions (Global Terrorism Index, 2017:67). Similarly, high rates of unemployment 
among graduates in Nigeria and accompanying disillusionment has led to Boko Haram 
recruitment (Aina, 2016:55). 
According to Ige (2014:87), relative deprivation is linked to discrimination, feelings of injustice and 
subjective ill-being, and is used to interpret measures of inequality and income redistribution. He 
claims that relative deprivation clarifies notions of absolute poverty because relative deprivation 
is a significant factor in understanding objective and subjective impacts of inequality (Ige, 
2014:88). As noted above relative deprivation is linked to discrimination, where discrimination can 
relate to ethnic, political, or economic dimensions. According to Saleh (2013:171), when ethnic 
groups inhabit the same political space while being treated differently politically, that can spur 
tensions that drive ethnic violence, terrorism, and civil war, and also present dangers to national 
unity, which in turn threaten the state's legitimacy and undermine its territorial integrity. Annan 
(2014:8) argues that within ten years of Samuel Doe’s autocratic rule in Liberia, Krahn and 
Mandingo ethnic groups received more favourable opportunities in comparison to other ethnic 
groups, which led to ethnic violence, which in turn stimulated an invasion by the Americano-
Liberian Charles Taylor. This invasion led to a violent war which shattered Samuel Doe’s 
autocratic government. 
Onyepuemu (2015:126) argues that deprivation can also instigate competition for limited 
resources, which can lead to an armed conflict which in turn often causes atrocities and 
displacement. The view of Coggins (2015:464) closely supports the above; he argues that the 
decline in services leads to relative deprivation or stimulates societal groups to compete for scarce 
resources, and in this environment, terrorism might be used to target those closely associated 
with or favoured by the regime. Thus, deprived groups or societies might use violence or terror to 
express their grievances or challenge the legitimacy of their incompetent governments. 
Supporting this view further, Annan (2014:5) contends that bad governance and corruption have 




d’Ivoire and other West African countries. Enaikele, Okekunle, Adebawole and Adeoye 
(2017:113) maintain that socio-economic deprivation, inequality, marginalisation and unequal 
access to opportunities presuppose relative deprivation. They contend that socio-economic and 
political deprivation culminates in violent and terrorist activities (Enaikele et al., 2017:113). Other 
scholars insist that inequality fuels forms of deprivation which then generate social discontent and 
encourage collective actions that can lead to large scale political violence and wars (Ige, 2014:88). 
For instance, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan conducted a jihad against the Uzbek 
government due to social injustice experiences (Oriola & Akinola, 2018:607). 
In addition, Majeed (1979:140) maintains that: 
Dissenting behaviour is based on political discontent and is an attempt to remove 
interference to goal achievement and, therefore, is indicative of frustration in the 
individual's feeling of his value expectation and value position. The former is the 
value people believe they are rightfully entitled to and the latter is the level of a 
value achieved. This discrepancy is known as relative deprivation, [which is] a 
cause for frustration and discontent [that] may easily lead to political instability and 
often, violence.  
In relation to the above, Saleh (2013:166) mentioned that when the state is unable to meet 
people's needs (or their expectations) which they believe they are legitimately entitled to, those 
people will be frustrated and demonstrate their frustrations to the state. Saleh (2013:166) 
additionally claims that insecurity within society takes place when people within a certain 
geographically defined state have the assumption that their identity is threatened. The logic in this 
scenario is that the perceived threat might be because of a joint feeling of relative deprivation, 
which is either social, economic, political or cultural (Saleh, 2013:166). From the existing 
literature, what is agreed upon is that violent actions are generated by disillusionment and 
frustration emanating from relative deprivation. It is extremely important to acknowledge that the 
continued use of violence by elites to sustain their hegemony intensifies the cycle of violence and 
deprivation, deprivation which initially led groups to mobilise. The effects of deprivation feelings 
are salient in facilitating collective responses (Ige, 2014:89). There is a wide range of existing 
literature recognising that poverty fuels the emergence of terrorism, especially the fact that young 
men who are not employed might lack other avenues of employment other than those 




In addition, Hansen (2011:3) claims that terror might be high in particular states not because of 
the weakness in law enforcement and border control, but also because deprivation has driven the 
disgruntled population to entertain political violence and seek public goods from non-state actors. 
Supporting the above, and linking deprivation to frustrations, Olojo (2013:6) argues that individual 
and group grievances, like poverty, lack of employment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic 
marginalisation can be utilised as mobilising tools by harmful groups to garner support and 
recruits for terrorist activities. Hence the significance of using the theory of relative deprivation in 
this research study. Furthermore, supporting the previous point, Pichette (2015:4), maintains that 
relative deprivation is a simple and widely recognised theory for explaining terrorism, contending 
that the core belief within relative deprivation is that those who do not fully attain their basic needs 
are prone to resort to violence. For instance, the United Liberation Front of Asom emerged in 
1979 in north-east India as a result of poverty and relative deprivation from the Mokotos members 
of the community, whose land has been seized by the British during colonialism (Mitra, 2008:3).  
Pichette (2015:4) advances poverty as a key factor in explaining terrorism in less developed parts 
of the world. As said earlier, when people do not get or reach what they expect to reach while 
seeing others doing so, they become angry and or frustrated. In the modern world, evidence exists 
that a wide range of people are denied livelihoods. Agang (2016:3) stresses that when the youth 
view their future being disrupted by those causing social, political and economic injustices, the 
result is frustration, and because of the painful and bad experiences, in this situation, they can 
feel they are left with no other avenues except to take arms against those who act against their 
prospects. Of significant importance with regards to this theory is that people who are frustrated 
and are not happy can be easily manipulated. Terrorists often prey on deprived youths (Okon, 
2016:138).  
Paying attention to the effect of frustration caused by relative deprivation and linking its 
significance to terrorism, Adeniran (2019:24) argues that protestors, rebels or violent groups who 
are dissatisfied with government policies and programs, and are competing with the state, either 
for power or from ideological motives, might also conduct terror attacks. Also, if a regime is not 
incapacitated, or too ignorant to stabilise the macroeconomic conditions, and its citizens are 
unable to make ends meet, there is a potential for violence against those causing such situations 
(Coggins, 2015:459). For example, between 1966 and 1994 terrorist activities in Colombia, Brazil, 
Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador were influenced by high inequality and poverty (Mitra, 2008:4). For 
instance, the Group of Popular Combatants in Ecuador is an existing terrorist group motivated to 




imperialist policies (Mitra, 2008:4). This further suggests that relative deprivation theory helps to 
explain terrorism. 
Coggins (2015:459) emphasises that several studies have suggested that richer countries and 
their citizens can be targeted by transnational terrorist groups. He argues that this is evidence 
that terrorist groups target those deemed complicit in the poverty and suffering of their people 
(Coggins, 2015: 459). The issue of inequality is very crucial, particularly in its influence on and 
effectiveness in generating feelings of frustration. In relation to the foregoing argument, Krieger 
and Meierrieks (2016:4) broadly argue that: 
Relative deprivation theory suggests that a country's level of income inequality is 
directly related to its level of terrorist activity. Income inequality breeds frustration 
due to feelings of relative deprivation; frustration, in turn, results in terrorism. 
Societies that see higher levels of economic inequality also see larger parts of 
society affected by relative deprivation. That is, more income inequality within a 
society coincides with a large pool of frustrated “have-nots” and thus a higher risk 
of terrorism. Terrorism is used by the frustrated “have-nots” to violently voice 
discontent, punish the “haves” and challenge (and possibly change in their favour) 
the distribution of economic resources. For one, this notion indeed matches the self-
perception of terrorist groups which often portray themselves as fighting for the 
“poor” or “social justice”. For another, it also corresponds to the political goals and 
incentives often associated with terrorism.  
There is a combination of inequities that drives individuals or groups to act violently because of 
frustration stemming from deprivation. Inequality is a transparent and consistent cause of relative 
deprivation and is not limited to social-economic or political issues. Inequality fosters not only 
frustrations but also poverty, which is an additional motive for frustration. Victoroff (2005:19) 
maintains that one possibility is that either absolute deprivation or economic disparity fuels 
terrorist sentiment, specifically within members of an oppressed underclass. There is empirical 
evidence of employment discrimination against Bengalis in eastern Pakistan during the 1950s 
and 1960s, which generated frustrations (Dzuverovic, 2013:126). Hutus and Tutsis have fought 
over control of central state institutions in Rwanda and Burundi, and the Tamils in Sri Lanka have 




To support the argument further, Parida (2007:130-132) posits that the link between social 
inequalities and experiences of relative deprivation has been spotlighted as an explanation of high 
levels of violence and terrorist activities. Parida contends that before they achieve their national, 
regional or global stature, terrorist groups start locally and then later expand. Their expansion is 
in relation to their ideology and political aims. A desperate economic situation often drives poor 
and disadvantaged groups to violence and terrorism because they are convinced that they have 
nothing to lose. The poor and disenfranchised are susceptible to become domestic terrorists 
because of their feelings of anger, frustration and lack of other avenues to enhance their living 
standards (Choi, 2014:142). In Morocco, individuals who conducted suicide attacks have had 
histories of disillusionment and feelings of bitterness that were engendered by a lack of jobs, 
poverty, and social tensions (Chukwu & Chukwu, 2017:2020). 
Relative deprivation, as indicated previously, emanates from a state's failure to govern its territory 
and an inability to provide or distribute goods and services equally amongst its people. In other 
words, when states are incapable of alleviating poverty and creating employment, the result is 
deprivation, which spurs feelings of frustration from the pain of suffering and hardships. Elu (2012: 
348) maintains that what motivates minority groups to turn to violence is captured by relative 
deprivation theory. For instance, when their income is lower than expected or lower that what they 
believe they deserve (Elu, 2012:348). For terrorism to occur, there need to be factors that promote 
or facilitate it. And as shown above, deprivation is a result of a host of conditions that are not 
favourable either to individuals or groups. According to Mitra (2008:57) poverty, ignorance and 
lack of employment can also act as catalysts for terrorism since they generate a sense of 
hopelessness. 
3.5.3. Criticism of relative deprivation theory in explaining terrorism 
Even though the theory of relative deprivation has been selected for explaining terrorism, some 
scholars have disputed this theory. For instance, Pichette (2015:4) argues that relative deprivation 
theory does not account for many impoverished people who do not use violence to resolve their 
grievances. Besides, other studies have tried to analyse terrorism based on individual behaviour. 
According to Okon (2016:9), their findings suggest that, on the individual level, violent activity is 
not linked with poor economic conditions or low levels of education. Some author claim that higher 
income and better education does not stop people from conducting terrorist activities (Okon, 




violence, relative deprivation is neither necessary nor enough to explain revolutionary terrorism. 
He argues that right-wing extremism occurs independently of economic status.  
Furthermore, another factor lacking in the theory of relative deprivation in explaining collective 
violence or its links to terrorism is the absence of clarity in explaining violence from the 
government's point of view. Brush (1996:536) notes that relative deprivation theory fails to 
address the role of government violence. State violence might be crucial in some cases. However, 
relative deprivation theory assumes that state violence, whether or not actively inflicted, is normal 
whilst the behaviour of dissidents is not legitimate or normal, and such requires more explanation. 
There has also been a lack of clarity about the link between relative deprivation and the extent of 
violence. Brush (1996:536) notes that a positive correlation between relative deprivation and an 
amount of violence does not prove that relative deprivation causes the full extent of the violence. 
Parida (2007:133) is of the view that even though poverty makes a population vulnerable to an 
extremist message in the Muslim world, it cannot be the only cause of terrorism because some 
individuals might engage in terrorism for personal reasons. Destroying property and killing 
innocent human beings cannot be characterised by poverty but only by anti-wealth and anti-life 
ideas (Parida, 2007:133).  
Even though other scholars disputed the link between relative deprivation and poverty, noting that 
poverty does not necessarily lead to terrorism, recent studies have suggested that there is a link 
between inequality and terrorism. For instance, Choi (2014:138) discusses research that indicates 
that countries with minority groups who are economically alienated are more prone to domestic 
terrorism because those groups enduring economic hardship will resort to violence. This 
reinforces the significance of relative deprivation in explaining terrorism, which has been justified 
by citing empirical evidence in section 3.5.2 above. Evidence pertaining to relative deprivation in 
Nigeria will be presented in greater detail in chapter four. 
Furthermore, supporting relative deprivation in explaining terrorism, recent empirical research by 
Krieger and Mierrieks (2016:3), offers empirical findings after conducting a sample of 114 
countries from 1985 to 2012 which suggests that higher levels of income inequality result in more 
terrorist activity. They show that income inequality specifically enhances terrorism by spurring 
social frustration, directly because of relative deprivation, and indirectly by facilitating the decay 
of institutions, for example, by undermining the rule of law (Krieger & Mierrieks, 2016:3). This 
means that relative deprivation is still relevant and can be utilised to help explain terrorism and 




between relative deprivation and terrorism cement the significance of this theory particularly with 
relevance to the aims of this research study. 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the theoretical framework of this research study, namely state failure 
theory and relative deprivation theory. The chapter first defined the concept of state and then 
articulated characteristics of the failed states to create a logical connection between states, 
characteristics of state failure and its links to terrorism. This has been done by citing a vast 
literature comprising different scholars who argue that terrorism is facilitated by the fact that 
governments are failing to maintain their statehood responsibilities. The literature also suggested 
that state failure creates a conducive environment for facilitating or enabling terrorists to conduct 
attacks. After exploring the state failure argument and its links to terrorism, chapter three also 
explored relative deprivation theory and offered a review of the literature to indicate the concept’s 
significance in explaining terrorism in general. Relative deprivation was defined, there was a 
discussion of the factors which facilitate relative deprivation so as to familiarise the reader with 
why this theory is relevant in explaining terrorism. Chapter three indicated that several scholars 
support the view that relative deprivation has been used and is still being used by scientists to 
explain social movements, revolutions, political violence, coups, and terrorism.  
It has briefly discussed some scholars who do not support this theory because of its inability to 
remedy individual interests and some terror acts that are conducted by people who are not poor. 
However, the disagreement has been remedied by providing evidence from different scholars 
who argue for relative deprivation as a significant theory to explain terrorism. There is a link 
between state failure and relative deprivation, which has made these two theories relevant in this 
research study. The findings of this chapter will be used in chapter four to empirically analyse the 








Chapter 4: To what extent have state failure and relative deprivation facilitated the 
expansion of the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria? 
4.1. Introduction 
Recall that two of this thesis’s supportive questions are: what is state failure theory and how can 
it explain the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria? And: what is relative deprivation theory and how can 
it explain Boko Haram’s rise? 
In order to respond to these supportive research questions, chapter four examines the factors 
that have led to the rise of Boko Haram. It does so by linking the understandings of state failure 
and relative deprivation provided in chapter three with the empirical evidence, namely a case 
study of Boko Haram. The nature and the extent of both state failure and relative deprivation, 
particularly in northern Nigeria, in which Boko Haram has found its roots are examined in this 
chapter. By doing so, chapter four addresses one of the main aims of this study, which is to 
analyse the origins of Boko Haram and assess its expansion from a small group to becoming the 
most dangerous terrorist organisation in Nigeria and Lake Chad Basin. An additional aim, also 
pursued in this research study, which is to assess whether actions taken by the Nigerian state 
and regional organisations were effective and if not recommend possible alternatives for dealing 
with the recurring terror attacks, will be addressed in chapter five and in chapter six. 
Chapter four examines in detail how, inequality, poverty, insecurity, continued economic 
underdevelopment, institutional weaknesses such as lack of political accountability and legitimacy 
within political parties and elites, and lack of security within Nigerian borders created fertile 
grounds for terror attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. This chapter 
provides the latest evidence of the ongoing attacks orchestrated by Boko Haram in 2019, 
evidencing the continued existence of Boko Haram. Thereafter, it discusses Borno State and 
other north-east states in Nigeria. It highlights, by using maps, the hotspots of violence in northern 
Nigeria, which helps to demonstrate that state failure and relative deprivation helps to explain the 
rise of Boko Haram. 
4.2. The ongoing attacks 
According to Human Rights Watch (2019)’s world report, regardless of state military advances, 
and despite the claim made by the government that it has curbed Boko Haram militants, Boko 
Haram remains a threat to security in the north-east region. The group is still active although not 




insecurity, and uncertainty being caused, not just the extent of the present threat. As stipulated 
by Human Rights Watch (2019) in 2018, about 1,200 lives have been lost and approximately 200, 
000 people have been displaced by suicide bombings and abductions conducted by Boko Haram 
militants. For instance, 84 fatalities were reported in a double suicide bomb explosion 
orchestrated by Boko Haram terrorists at a Mosque in Mubi Adamawa State (Human Rights 
Watch, 2019). The attacks by Boko Haram have never fully been stopped; new attacks have been 
and are still being conducted. A recent CNN report stresses that about 65 people have been 
reported dead after attacks by suspected Boko Haram members in Nganzai District, near the 
Borno capital in Maiduguri (Busari et al. 2020). Also, on 15 August 2019, according to The 
Defense Post (2019), three soldiers were killed by Boko Haram militants in a village located on 
the outskirts of Borno State capital Maiduguri. 
The economic impact of Boko Haram, according to World Bank (2015:3) amounts to $9 billion 
throughout six north-east states, with two-thirds of the damages $5.9 billion in Borno. Other 
affected states include Adamawa and Yobe, with damages amounting to $1.6 billion in Adamawa 
and $1.2 billion in Yobe. Three-quarters of the total damages have been on agriculture, $3.5 
billion, and housing, $3.3 billion. The conflict has resulted in 400,000 destroyed housing units, of 
which 95% have been in Borno State (World Bank, 2015:3). The above indicates the extent of the 
damages caused and that the terror attacks have continued, which presents a worrisome 
situation. These recent attacks prove that the issue of security in Nigeria is still of great concern 










Map 4.1 Numbers of death caused by conflict between Boko Haram, military, sectarian 
actors and state actors from May 2015 to January 2019  
(Source: Giles, 2019) 
Map 4.1 highlights the extent of fatalities from 2015 to January 2019, with high rates being in 
Borno, followed by Yobe and Adamawa. About 9,154 deaths have been recorded in Borno State, 
followed by other states in the north-east. The next section briefly discusses Borno State and 
some states in the north-east to familiarise the reader with the high rates of poverty, lack of 
employment, inequality and bad governance in these states, and also empirically demonstrates 
that poverty caused by relative deprivation, which was born out of state failure, helps to explain 
the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. 
4.3. Overview of Borno State and other north-eastern states in Nigeria 
The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has its origins in Borno State, for this reason, it is important 




(2018:181), Borno State is a traditionally Muslim region in the north-east of Nigeria, with its capital 
in Maiduguri being the largest of Nigeria’s 36 states. It covers an area of 116.589 kilometres, and 
has a population of about 4.3 million people, of which 80% are Muslim. Borno State shares 
borders with Cameroon and Chad to the east and Niger to the North, and in which Kanuri, Babur 
and Shuwa Arabs are the major ethnic groups (Johnson, 2018:181). Furthermore, the 
infrastructure of Borno State is highly underdeveloped; there are about 2.449 kilometres of tarred 
roads and 755 kilometres of untarred seasonal roads. The city of Maiduguri, according to Johnson 
(2018:181), is connected to the rest of Nigeria and the outside world by an international airport. 
Electricity supply is only provisioned to urban areas, specifically to areas where offices of the local 
government are located (Johnson, 2018:181). The impact of poverty and low education prospects 
in northern Nigeria is remarkable. Only 2% of children under 25 months are vaccinated, while 
83% of youths are illiterate, and 48% of children have never been to school (Agiboa, 2013a:20). 
This is a strong indication of state failure and the presence of the conditions which lead to relative 
deprivation. 
Borno State had remained the hotspot of violence, over 60% of Boko Haram attacks in 2011 
occurred there, and in terms of death, over 70% in 2013 and over 80% in 2014 have been reported 
in Borno State (Weeraratne, 2017:614). There are also other states in the northern part of Nigeria 
in which poverty is extremely high and those are places in which Boko Haram attacks have been 
acute. For instance, according to Osumah (2013:554), in Sokoto, at one point the poverty rate 
was 81.2%, with other states sitting above 70%. In terms of the north-east region, high poverty 
rates have been recorded. In Adamawa 74%, Bauchi 73%, Gombe 74% and Yobe 74%. In the 
north-west region, Jigawa 74%, Katsina 75%, Kebbi 72% and Zamfra 71%. The north-central 
Plateau State has 74% and Ebonyi 74% in the south (Osumah, 2013:554). These might not be 
the present poverty rates in these states. But these poverty rates empirically suggest that poverty 
has actually led to the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, given the fact that the terrorist hotspots have 
emerged in the states in which poverty has been prevalent. See Map 4.2 below, which highlights 






Map 4.2 Nigeria’s terrorist hotspots 
(Source: Giles, 2019) 
Most states highlighted as hotspots on Map 4.2 are the same states cited by various scholars as 
the nests for Boko Haram terrorist attacks. For instance, Weerarante (2017:614), Agiboa 
(2013a:20), Meagher (2014:2), Smith (2015:85), Bourne (2015:235), and others believe that 
poverty in the northern states has made the youth vulnerable to extremism and easy recruits for 
Boko Haram terrorist militants (Adelaja et al., 2018:6). The following section examines the extent 
and the nature of state failure in northern Nigeria. 
4.4. Explaining how state failure has facilitated the rise of Boko Haram 
In chapter three state failure theory was conceptualised together with the presentation of some 
empirical evidence from those states deemed to have failed or be failing and which have 




a failed or weak state, it is crucial to highlight the characteristics of state failure explored in chapter 
three and then illustrate the nature and the extent of state failure in northern Nigeria. Chapter 
disclosed that state failure entails a government that is unable to maintain public services, 
institutions, or authority, or might have lost the autonomy to control its territory. Similarly, Coggins 
(2015:461) has argued that failing or failed states’ dysfunction entails the following conditions. 
The government a) fails to provide basic public infrastructure and services, leading to extreme 
deprivation within its population, involving human insecurity. The government b) fails to provide 
stable and reliable public institutions, offering only increasingly corrupt, exploitative, and or 
ineffective governance. The state is incapacitated. The governing regime c) experiences 
fundamental political collapse or is so internally contested that political authority is ambiguous 
throughout significant portions of the territory. In this case there is political collapse. 
Having highlighted some of the characteristics of state failure above, the following section will first 
examine the nature and the extent of corruption, lack of accountability and legitimacy amongst 
political elites and explain its impact in fuelling terrorism in northern Nigeria.  
4.4. Corruption and its impact in fuelling terrorism in Nigeria 
4.4.1. Lack of accountability and legitimacy amongst political elites 
Chapter three argued that failed states can have officials so corrupt that they accept bribes from 
terrorists. It might not be fair to argue that Nigerian state as a whole is a failed or a failing state, 
but by paying particular attention to the nature and the extent of corruption in northern Nigeria 
and linking its impact to the rise of Boko Haram, it is evident that the northern part embodies the 
characteristics of state failure. In support of this view, Heim and McQuaid (2015:23) note that 
corruption in Nigeria is prevalent in political and economic life across the country, indicating that 
corruption is prevalent mostly in the north-east where there is a limited genuine or legal pathway 
to wealth. Government officials have been accused of receiving payments from Boko Haram 
(Heim & McQuaid, 2015:23). Human Rights Watch in 2012 discovered that the car bomb attack 
at the UN Offices in Abuja in August 2011 was enabled by a government security officer, who 
accepted a bribe at the checkpoints, within an 800 kilometres route from Maiduguri to Abuja 
(Anthony & Humphrey, 2017:649). Corrupt activities likely offered an opportunity for Boko Haram 
members to access important information which the group could have used to its advantage 




Aina (2016:54) contends that the failure of the Nigerian government to provide adequate jobs to 
most graduates, who spend time loitering in the streets seeking employment opportunities, helps 
to explain the rise of Boko Haram memberships. Onuoha (2010:62) argues that failure within the 
Nigerian leadership should be considered as worsening the crisis, in that political elites have failed 
to lawfully provide public resources to curtail prevalent human security vulnerabilities. Since 
poverty rates are high, and there is a lack of employment prospects for the youth, Boko Haram 
could offer the disgruntled youth an opportunity to fight against the system they believe is causing 
their sufferings (Onuoha, 2010:62). Corruption has negatively impacted the provision of 
necessities to Nigerian citizens. Some argue that the biggest factor that has hindered the Nigerian 
state from efficiently maintaining the distribution of fundamental service delivery to its people has 
been corruption (Mlambo, 2017:5). 
Apart from failing to give people freedom and civil or political rights so that they can air their 
frustrations to the elites, the Nigerian state has also not been able to provide economic security 
to the Muslim north of the country (Pichette, 2015:6). If the state followed legal procedures and 
committed to resolving the national issues in a manner that exemplifies a legitimately functioning 
state, the rise of Boko Haram would have been limited to some extent. Suleiman and Karim 
(2015:5) contend that the prevalence of corruption by public officials in Nigeria has sustained the 
level of unemployment and poverty and has led to an unstable social environment. Heim and 
McQuaid (2015:15) stress that the northern politicians, and their counterparts at the federal level, 
have jointly failed to provision public goods and services, as well as public funds, and instead 
they have used extrajudicial means like illegal militias to kill those who do not support them, so 
that they can secure their political positions. 
While Boko Haram is striving to implement Sharia law in Nigeria, continued corruption, extreme 
poverty and lack of employment for the youth continue to fuel the supporters of Boko Haram and 
its members (Agiboa, 2013b:148). Heim and McQuaid (2015:23) note that local clerics in the north 
have also accepted bribes from Boko Haram members, not because of personal monetary 
reasons but as a means to buy protection from the group, at the same time promising Boko Haram 
members powerful positions in the region. Therefore, because of the above scenario, it is 
coherent for one to argue that the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria has been enhanced or motivated 
by corruption, emanating from state failure, where government institutions are fragile and not 




Political patronage has essentially been the basis of dispensing benefits to a 
few of the citizenry while a large number without ‘political connection’ are still 
left uncared for. Thus, this situation has made the youth aware that the elites 
have no plans for them. Many young people have thus been tempted into 
involvement with Boko Haram in the northern part of the country. 
From above scenario, it is clear that the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria has been facilitated by a 
dysfunctional government. As a result of patronage and ignorance, those who are not themselves 
closely linked to political elites or prominent figures, have been struggling to find meaningful life 
prospects. The behaviour of political elites has driven the youths to sacrifice themselves to Boko 
Haram militants to make ends meet. According to Osumah (2013:553), most Boko Haram fighters 
are mostly youths who left rural areas for towns, and who were seeking for better opportunities.  
Besides, Olojo (2013:5) echoes the view that other political elites in Borno State have been 
suspected to have been funding Boko Haram and the lifestyle of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf. 
These politicians could capitalise on the popular support which Yusuf would garner for them in for 
electoral victory during elections in 2003 and 2007 (Olojo, 2013:5). 
In this situation, one cannot ignore the idea that the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria has been 
exacerbated by corruption, and, to make matters worse, by the very political elites on whom 
people rely. Political elites have allowed Boko Haram members and their leaders to gain public 
credibility and exposure by allowing them to address the public. Having known that Boko Haram 
was a terror group, one questions why the state would have permitted them opportunities to freely 
address public gatherings. According to Maiangwa et al. (2012:29), Yusuf has held the belief that 
his group would prefer death over accepting the corrupt system in the country. The group had 
several clashes with state security forces over their refusal to accept a national law requiring 
motorcyclists to use helmets (Maiangwa et al., 2012:29-30). Olojo (2013:5) further contends that 
Alhaji Buji Foi, an affiliate of Yusuf at that time, was appointed as the Commissioner of Religious 
Affairs in Borno State, and he was believed to have been sponsoring Boko Haram before he died 
in July 2009 in the hands of police.  
Weerarante (2017:626) points out that prominent Borno politicians, like the former governor, Ali 
Modu Sheriff, former Commissioner, Alhaji Buji Foi, and Senator, Mohammed Ali Ndume have 
been accused of sponsoring Boko Haram with finance and logistics. The existence of this 




Boko Haram terrorists strengthens the view that corruption has fuelled the rise of Boko Haram in 
Nigeria. Indeed, this has made it easier for Boko Haram to manage their operations, purchase 
guns, food or other useful resources they might have required to launch their attacks. In the 
absence of financial support from political elites it would have been difficult for Boko Haram 
members to effectively continue to enact their terror activities. This also justifies the view that the 
northern part of Nigeria has characteristics of state failure. For example, in chapter three it has 
been stressed that when the governing regime experiences fundamental political collapse or is 
internally contested to the extent that political authority is ambiguous throughout significant 
portions of territory, this leads to a failing or a failed state (Coggins, 2015:461).  
The connection between Boko Haram and local politicians is evident in the inauguration of both 
Foi and Yusuf, who have held crucial positions in the government of Borno State (Akinola, 
2015:9). High credibility for supporting Boko Haram has been gained by the image of Yusuf’s link 
with popular politicians who allowed him to implement and spread Sharia law. Being able to push 
their agenda for a period of more than five years without being interrupted shows that Nigerian 
politicians were responsible for enhancing the rise of Boko Haram. The failure to fulfil the desire 
of Boko Haram leaders to fully implement Sharia law, according to Akinola (2015:9), has driven 
Yusuf to be disappointed and rally against his political allies. Akinola (2015:9) argues that Sheriff 
becoming the executive governor of Borno State from 2003 to 2007 was due to the support 
garnered from Boko Haram members and some local militias. The northern politicians created an 
image of hope, imagining that Boko Haram would become a useful tool in Nigeria but at the same 
time used brutality and turned against them after the 2003 elections. This, in other words, instilled 
anger and violent resentment in those who faced Boko Haram’s brutality. 
One wonders if the Nigerian state cares about or legitimately monitors the legality of political 
parties or individual politicians within its state. Allowing governors to associate with Boko Haram 
members to the extent of giving them crucial positions in some states indicates a great disaster 
within the Nigerian government. As Iyekekpolo (2018:8) state: 
Sheriff's association with the fundamentalist Boko Haram group made it politically 
relevant in the state and therefore boldly made extreme demands which were 
unattainable in a secular Nigerian state. The uncompromising nature of these 
demands set Boko Haram against the state in violent confrontations which included 
the killing of Boko Haram members and subsequent revenge mission by a 




The behaviour of Nigerian political elites facilitated the rise of Boko Haram. What might have been 
most dangerous in this poor campaigning tactic was the fact that the public or even those who 
might have never heard about Boko Haram, could have perceived Boko Haram as a legitimate 
group because of its association with trusted people within the society. Thus, stimulating an 
environment in which people were not scared to associate themselves with Boko Haram terrorists 
saw the rise of the group and its ability to pose the greatest security threat to the state. Akinola 
(2015:9) contends that the political connection between politicians and militant groups in Nigeria 
exemplifies a lack of democratic politics in Nigeria. He asserts that politicians unlawfully use 
militants’ groups to coerce citizens to support their political parties. Although these groups were 
usually neglected, they still possessed the arms and ammunition given to them by politicians, and 
the rise of militancy and Boko Haram before the 2003 elections is attributed to such behaviour 
(Akinola 2015:9). This implies that the state’s failure to monitor campaigns democratically and the 
inability of the Nigerian state to obstruct the intimidation activities against civilians in a sovereign 
state justifies the impact of state failure in stimulating the rise of Boko Haram. 
Anthony and Humphrey (2017:649) show that at some point northern politicians and traditional 
and religious leaders have been backing the Boko Haram insurgency to fulfil their agenda of 
promoting northern domination and the supremacy of the Muslim religion in the affairs of the 
Nigerian state. Furthermore, to get elected, politicians have been toying with Islamic concerns 
everywhere in the north since the end of military rule in 1999 (Montclos, 2014b:148). For instance, 
in 2001, Muhamad Buhari, by then, the opposition leader of the All Nigeria People’s Party was 
reported to have announced that Sharia law must be introduced throughout the country. This 
approach was suddenly followed by the northern governors of the ruling People’s Democratic 
Party. These acts by politicians, on which Boko Haram has preyed, in the context of leaders 
elected fraudulently, saw Boko Haram unafraid to pay private militia to destroy those who were 
against them (Montclos, 2014b:149). This links with the views of Chukwu and Chukwu 
(2017:2016) who assert that the structures of government were dysfunctional and holders of 
political offices unaccountable, and that campaigning candidates did not hesitate to kill to win 
elections and become rich overnight.  
During their field research, Olofinibiyi and Steyn (2018:134), remarked that, while responding to 
the survey, a former state security officer maintained that: 
The cause of Boko Haram has much to do with economic crises in north-eastern 




making use of the group for self-political interests, after which they are now 
trying to curb it. Unfortunately, it is no longer within their control. 
The above suggests that politicians in Nigeria have been unscrupulously using Boko Haram for 
their own ends without taking into consideration or recognising that they have been strengthening 
Boko Haram. 
Walker (2012:9) argues that Boko Haram grew to such an extent that it acquired many state-like 
functions, like giving welfare handouts, job training, employment within small industries, 
provisioning resources for the community, and imposing moral police along the same lines as the 
Hisbah religious police in Kano. Boko Haram gained popularity by replacing the Nigerian state's 
prerogative to provide its citizens with basic human needs. People within certain communities 
could see the capability and the perceived ability of Boko Haram to change their lives. 
According to Anthony and Humphrey (2017:649), because of the Nigerian government’s inability 
to deal with social and economic issues, opportunities were granted to some radical Islamic clerics 
and other religious extremists, who preyed on state failure, and offered welfare handouts to the 
poor, which in turn saw the Boko Haram insurgency being buoyed by youth who assumed that 
Boko Haram could help to resolve the problems which came as a result of state failure. 
Olojo (2013:5) argues that political actors who have been associated with Boko Haram members 
have done so because of the group's capacity to mobilise a large number of people. In turn, the 
group gained greater access to resources, such as access to tax, busses, and motorcycles. These 
motorcycles were then distributed to the unemployed youth who became Boko Haram recruits 
(Olojo, 2013:5). The fact that politicians allowed Boko Haram leaders access to resources illegally 
signifies how state failure facilitated the rise of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria. The youth, having 
realised that Boko Haram was able to provide them with motorcycles and some economic relief, 
even volunteered to commit to Boko Haram and assist in terror attacks. For instance, Boko Haram 
have been reported to have been offering daily meals, organising affordable marriages, and giving 
credits for small commercial activities (Meagher, 2014:2). Derso (2017:8) shows that Yusuf has 
used resources acquired from Buji Foji to offer small loans to youth so they could buy weapons 
from Chad. Also, greed for positions as prominent politicians has fuelled the rise of Boko Haram 




4.4.2. Poor security apparatus and lack of intelligence to forecast the dangers of 
extremist groups 
Chapters two and three argued that failed states are also characterised by weak security 
apparatuses. Lack of proper security, emanating from the state's failure to maintain robust and 
strong security to protect its weapons also contributed to the rise of Boko Haram. Terrorists fight 
with weapons and ammunition. Smith (2015:13) stresses that Boko Haram members have 
managed to steal ammunition from the Nigerian military. This has made them able to conduct 
their violent attacks and grow in strength. In addition to state failure which has weakened the 
security apparatus of the Nigerian state, Azama (2015:56) shows that Boko Haram terrorists have 
managed to execute government officials, chiefs, and local Islamic leaders to instil fear within 
citizens and prove the government's weakness and its failure to guarantee security to its people. 
However, this scenario implies that the incapacity of Nigerian security has made people doubt the 
government and has likely driven them to believe in the superiority of Boko Haram. People thus 
join Boko Haram more easily, which expands their numbers, and further enables them to fight 
against the government forces.  
The previous analysis also helps to support what has been explored in chapter three while 
showing how a state’s failure is linked to terrorism. Absent security undermines internal cohesion 
and the functions of the state and its capacity to use its institutions for enhancing its fundamental 
values and socio-political-economic objectives and legitimately fulfil its people's aspirations 
(Onyepuemu, 2015:124). The incapacity of the security forces has enhanced the rise of Boko 
Haram. 
In addition, Aina (2016:29) argues that the failure of the government’s security apparatus to 
guarantee safety and security has been a matter of concern because the insurgents possess 
heavy weaponry. This weakness in security apparatuses has been a great advantage for terrorists 
who could then counter-attack the government forces. Another danger has been the ability of 
Boko Haram to control ammunition industries where bombs have been made illegally (Maingwa 
et al., 2012:33). Niger’s State Security Services raided a bomb-making factory in September 
2011, in Chechnya village, in a remote part of the Tafa Local Government Area of Niger State, 
that had crucial links with Boko Haram. Another bomb-making industry was discovered in the 
Rafin Guza area of Kaduna state in April 2011 (Maingwa et al., 2012:33). The fact that Boko 
Haram managed to have two bomb-making industries in a sovereign state demonstrates a lack 




Another fact that has facilitated the rise of Boko Haram has been the weakness of the intelligence 
services and the incapability of the Nigerian security to identify, assess, and take precautions 
against containing the crisis before it reached climax level (Onuoha, 2010:61). The failure of the 
intelligence agencies and state security to predict the dangers caused by Boko Haram at an early 
stage permitted the group to expand its influence until it managed to start launching attacks 
against the government. For these reasons, the absence of solid security has played a role in 
facilitating the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Onapajo and Uzodike (2012:33) show that the 
Presidential Panel designated to investigate the dangers of Boko Haram reported that ‘there was 
no effective and coordinated intelligence gathering to forestall crime’ prior to the recent attacks 
by Boko Haram. 
In addition, Solomon (2012:9) shows that high-ranking politicians have not been able to 
sufficiently arm their security services or give them enough resources to conduct long-term 
intelligence operations to investigate Islamist organisations within the state. Explaining this 
differently, poor intelligence has been blamed for not identifying the dangers of what was being 
planned by different Islamic organisations before they conducted attacks against the state. In this 
scenario, it appears that Boko Haram intelligence has been or is more advanced than the state's 
security intelligence. Therefore, in the case of the rise of Boko Haram, poor security explains and 
seems to prove that it has facilitated the crisis. Furthermore, Ofongo (2016:158) maintains that 
the destruction of strategic institutions and expertise indicates that prominent government officials 
have been involved in the continued attacks conducted by Boko Haram against the state. Due to 
weaknesses and a lack of honest, solid security systems, Boko Haram has managed to prey on 
the security defects in the Nigerian state. 
Some Nigerian political elites, including two former military heads of state, and ex-civilian vice 
president from the north, were formally accused of collaborating with Boko Haram militants 
Aghedo and Osumah (2012:858). It has also been noted that some of the state security agencies’ 
members were Boko Haram members who assisted Boko Haram with training (Aghedo & 
Osumah, 2012: 858). This explains the failure of the Nigerian state’s security apparatus. The state 
lacked the internal security intelligence to assist the government in identifying or investigating 
official members believed to have been linked with Boko Haram militants. While these 
weaknesses were prevalent, it is germane to argue that the state’s lack of proper security, which 




4.4.3. Nigeria’s failure to fully govern its territories and the negligence to protect rural 
areas 
The failure of the state to fully govern its territory has been indicated as one of the characteristics 
of state failure. Looking into this perspective and relating its impact to the rise of Boko Haram in 
Nigeria, this section highlights incidences which support the view that the northern part of Nigeria 
is a failing or a failed state. According to Aina (2016:14), the existence and survival of Boko Haram 
has been sustained by the weakness of the central government in Nigeria. The failure of the 
Nigerian government to fully control its territory has made Boko Haram able to conduct its criminal 
activities, mostly in north-east and north-central Nigeria, where the government’s sovereign 
authority is limited (Aina, 2016:15). In other words, if the Nigerian state managed to exercise its 
legitimacy and authority, by continuously governing its territory and maintaining order, the group 
would not have grabbed opportunities to conduct its criminal activities, and it would not have 
managed to intimidate villagers and recruit as many youths. 
Several states were under control of Boko Haram militants by July 2013. Agiboa (2013b) contends 
that Marte, Mobbar, Guzama, Gubio, Abadam, Kukawa, Kala- Balge, and Gamboru local 
government areas in northern Borno have been under control of Boko Haram militants. This is an 
indication of how state failure has facilitated the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. While Boko Haram 
militants were in total control of these states, the group garnered support and recruited people 
easily because, at that particular time, Boko Haram militants proved that the state was incapable 
of obstructing its influence. That states, who had a legitimate government, with the power to 
govern all their territories, that have been under the control of Boko Haram is a matter of concern. 
Moreover, the inability to protect certain villages and rural areas has also been one of the factors 
that have allowed the group to survive and expand especially since 2014. According to 
Weeraratne (2017:618), about 3 million people in north-eastern Nigeria and the border regions of 
Cameroon were under Boko Haram's control in late September 2014. The fact that Boko Haram 
at some point has managed to have such a vast number of people under its control is a clear 
indication of the Nigerian government’s inability to govern its territory. Indeed, this might not be 
the current situation, but the impact of the damages caused by poor state control cannot be 
reversed. Aghedo and Osumah (2012:863) show that Boko Haram has taken advantage of the 
weakness of the Nigerian security apparatuses, such as the police being poorly equipped for 




The other aspect of insecurity is uncontrolled crime. Solomon (2012:9) has pointed out that armed 
gangs in northern Nigeria, some of whom are thousands in number, including groups like the 
Almajirai, Yan Tauri, Yan Daba, Yan Banga, and Yan Dauka Amariya, provide recruits to 
extremists, Boko Haram in particular. This indicates that the Nigerian government has been 
unable to deal with gang violence, and this weakness in security apparatuses is evidence of state 
failure. The above supports the view indicated in chapter three that failed states are characterised 
by an increase in criminal violence, arms, and drug trafficking, which becomes acute as ordinary 
police becomes more ineffective (Rotberg, 2003:6).  
Reinforcing the above, Onapajo and Uzodike (2012:31) argue that the negligence of security 
officers, and a lack of freedom from injurious consequences, in the context of poverty, and a 
shortage of proper security are crucial factors that have accelerated Boko Haram terror attacks. 
The authors argue that there have been several warnings by the imams and reports to the police 
and the government about the anticipated dangers of Boko Haram, but unfortunately the 
government had a deaf and dumb response up until the escalation of violent attacks in July 2009 
(Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012:33). The above argument indicates a lack of commitment by the 
Nigerian government to listen or to accept the views of society. The government only reacted 
when they realised that their interests were threatened and challenged by the group's ability to 
attack the state's security agents and premises. As a result of ignorance, Boko Haram had ample 
time to prepare and expand its influence on the state without being disturbed, which shows that 
state failure in Nigeria has facilitated the rise of Boko Haram.  
In addition, Walker (2014:2) indicates that weaknesses within institutions of politics and security 
services have created a political situation in which threats to stability could not be resolved until 
violence occurred. The uses of violence to deal with the crisis of Boko Haram were created under 
such conditions. Supporting the above argument, lack of state functionality and political will to 
deal with these issues by using alternative solutions contributed heavily to the Boko Haram 
insurgency. Dersso (2017:8) has argued that the Boko Haram insurgency need not be generalised 
as the group's strength and tactics because the weakness of the institutions, norms, and systems 
of governance of the Nigerian state are also responsible for the crisis.  
4.4.4. Lack of proper security and porousness of Nigerian borders 
Another factor that has contributed to the rise of Boko is a lack of security at the Nigerian borders. 
Chapter three has noted that the borders of failed states lack control and order and they enable 




for neighbouring countries (Coggins, 2015:456). Dersso (2017:8) argues that Boko Haram has 
been operating in the remote border regions of north-east Nigeria, where the government security 
forces have no or limited control, and thus the group's activities have spilled over into 
neighbouring states in Lake Chad basin, such as Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. With Nigerian 
borders being porous, and given that Cameroonians, Chadians, and Beninois could easily join 
each other in Nigeria, illicit trading can occur unnoticed. Porous borders combined with weak 
security has made it easy for weapons to be smuggled into Nigeria (Achumba et al., 2013:82). It 
is therefore easy for Boko Haram to have access to weapons for its attacks. 70% of about 8 million 
illegal weapons in West Africa have been estimated to be in Nigeria (Achumba et al., 2013:82). 
The same view is shared by Oluwaddare (2016:44) who argues that insecurity deepened because 
of the proliferation of SALW. It is the abundance of these uncontrolled weapons in the wrong 
hands that have negatively impacted on the security of the Lake Chad region, as a result of arms 
being smuggled illegally through unpoliced, porous borders, and which have been used to commit 
crimes against the state. The result is that Boko Haram has preyed on these weak securities 
within Nigeria and its neighbouring countries. 
Boko Haram has extended its influence beyond Nigeria. As Warner (2017:638) notes, the group 
has attacked Nigeria's neighbours, Chad Niger, and Cameroon and has used spaces in these 
countries as safe havens for its operations, and as a result, the group has managed to expand 
tremendously. Maiangwa (2012:88) indicates that Boko Haram appears to have taken advantage 
of these shared borders to get memberships in Niger, Chad, and Mali, and claims that Boko 
Haram likely acquired weapons from these countries. Migrants from Nigeria's neighbouring 
countries has been enhanced by the porousness of the Nigerian borders, and these migrants, 
specifically the youth, have often turned to criminal syndicates (Achumba et al., 2013:82).  
According to Weerarante (2017:625), the increasingly porous boundaries between Nigeria and its 
neighbors Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have been a contributing factor to the growth of Boko 
Haram. The weakness of government capacity has enabled Boko Haram to evade security forces, 
and the constant flow of fighters moving back and forth facilitates cross-border hit-and-run attacks 
(Weerarante, 2017:625). The influx of migrants and arms to enhance the operations of Boko 
Haram militants were facilitated by Nigeria’s porous borders (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012:863). This 
implies that the Nigerian state’s failure to tighten security measures at its borders has paved an 
open and unobstructed path for Boko Haram to smuggle weapons easily. This would have been 




4.5 Explaining how relative deprivation exacerbates the rise of Boko Haram 
Chapter three argued that terrorist organisations often capitalise on disgruntled youths who are 
economically affected because of greedy and corrupt elites who leave youths with little to no 
economic prospects (Agang, 2016:3). Relative deprivation theory has been defined as the 
judgment that one is worse off compared to some standard accompanied by feelings of anger 
and resentment (Smith et al., 2015:2). It has also been pointed out that socio-economic and 
political deprivation can lead to violence and terrorist activities (Enaikele et al., 2017:113). This 
section examines the nature and extent of relative deprivation and links its impact to enabling 
terrorism in northern Nigeria. 
4.5.1. Unemployment, poverty, and inequality 
The nature and the extent of relative deprivation in the northern Nigeria is high compared to other 
regions. In north-east and north-west zones relative poverty rates are high, 76% and 78%, 
whereas in southeast and southwest zones poverty rates are lower, 67% and 59% (Duke et al., 
2017:7). This is evidence for why Boko Haram managed to manipulate those who have been 
suffering from poverty. The root causes of Boko Haram have been attributed to poverty caused 
by bad governance in the north (Duke et al., 2017:6). Boko Haram has managed to take 
advantage of recruiting unemployed and uneducated street beggars commonly known as the 
Almajirai who have been neglected by governors and other incumbents (Duke et al., 2017:6). 
Poverty in the north has driven the unemployed to be vulnerable and easily convinced by Boko 
Haram that it will ease their poverty.  
Olojo (2013:7) argues that in Africa, specifically in Nigeria, the phenomenon of a “youth bulge” 
has intensified the availability of individuals who are economically deprived to be vulnerable to 
Boko Haram's recruitment. In other words, relative deprivation has facilitated the rise of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria. The different levels of relative deprivation in Nigeria in the north and the south 
have been caused by bad governance induced by successive northern leaders and their 
constituencies (Olojo, 2013:7). This implies that bad governance has created feelings of 
deprivation, which then led most youth and the unemployed to be vulnerable and easily employed 
by Boko Haram. Also, Suleiman and Karim (2015:6) have pointed out that Boko Haram's strategic 
approach to recruitment, under the guise of social justice, has been useful. Those youths with no 
jobs easily join Boko Haram because of the elite's unfairness (Suleiman & Karim, 2015:6). This 
means that the elites were responsible for creating the environment in which the youth could 




(2015:85) points out that in northern Nigeria, there have been allegations that most families are 
too poor to afford to take care of their children and send them to boarding schools, and so these 
children ended up begging on the streets. Thus, according to Smith (2015:85), the Almajiris might 
have contributed significantly to the rise of Boko Haram.  
Akinola (2015:12) notes that Almajirai refers to impressionable Quranic students, consistently 
recognised as poor and vulnerable, who left rural areas to town centres to study the Quran with 
Islamic teachers known as Mallams. The burden or the torment of social and economic 
inequalities, marginalisation, and human insecurity has made these young men vulnerable to 
Boko Haram militants. In support of the foregoing argument, Osumah (2013:553) notes that the 
social context that incubates Boko Haram has been enabled by absolute poverty, lack of 
employment, a huge number of economically desperate people (Almajiris), poor social control, 
and crises within juridical systems. This is evidence that poverty has made it easy for Boko Haram 
to convince suffering populations with the logic that they can provide them with basic needs such 
as food and shelter. For instance, in chapter three, it was argued that poverty, ignorance, and the 
unavailability of jobs enhanced terrorism because such conditions create a sense of 
hopelessness (Mitra, 2008:57). And this has been the case in Nigeria, as indicated above, and 
as a result one can argue convincingly that relative deprivation has fuelled the rise of Boko Haram 
in northern Nigeria. 
A report by Mercy Corps (2016:7) illustrates that continued grievances in the northern region, 
emanating from relative deprivation, explains the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. According to 
Mercy Corps (2016:7), over 76% of the population in the north-east lives under the poverty line 
compared to 59% in the Southwest. To add more, a report by Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation 
Programme posits that opportunity inequalities can make youths more susceptible to recruitment 
by Boko Haram (Mercy Corps, 2016:7). This scenario indicates that most of the youth in Nigeria 
were disillusioned by a continued lack of opportunities, which has made them deprived; a situation 
which has allowed Boko Haram to garner support by promising them employment opportunities.  
As claimed by the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (2019) in a report about poverty and inequality 
from September 2018 to October 2019, 52.1% of the rural population are poverty stricken, mostly 
in northern Nigeria. Chapter three conceptualised individual and group grievances, like poverty, 
lack of employment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalisation as being used to 
garner support and recruits for terrorists (Olojo, 2013:6). This has been the case in northern 




of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The following section looks into the impact of inequalities in northern 
Nigeria. 
4.5.2. The impact of educational inequalities in facilitating the rise of Boko Haram 
High levels of inequality are apparent. For instance, less than 23% of women and 54% of men in 
the north-east Nigeria can read, whereas more than 79% of women and 90% of men in the south 
can read (Duke et al., 2017:7). In terms of educational inequality as one of the factors facilitating 
the rise of Boko Haram, Bourne (2015:235) illustrates that educational deficiencies, mostly at 
primary and secondary levels in the north, are connected to lack of employment, and in turn to 
the rise of Boko Haram. This evidence of inequality and social disparities is clear evidence that 
the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria is attributed to the state's inability to govern equally and provide 
the fundamental goods and services to its citizens, particularly in the north. Meagher (2014:2) 
claims that one in five adults in the Muslim north are illiterate, in comparison with 80% literacy 
rates in southern Nigeria, stating that even the educated youth in the north battle for employment 
opportunities, to such an extent that they compete for jobs in the informal sector. Hence the youth 
become desperate and disillusioned. 
According to the World Bank (2015:21), financial mismanagement undermines the effectiveness 
of policy and the implementation of programs, which then blocks citizens’ access to basic 
services. For instance, 40% of people surveyed in the north-east disclosed that they have to pay 
a bribe for their children to be enrolled at schools or access health facilities (World Bank, 2015:21). 
Johnson (2018:185) shows that Boko Haram’s favoured recruits were those from impoverished 
backgrounds, with limited education or opportunities, who seem to be easily manipulated to Boko 
Haram’s ideology of interpreting Islam radically. The previous analysis supports Okon’s 






Map 4.3 Percentage of primary and secondary school attendance in Nigeria 
(Source: Giles, 2019) 
The above map indicates high rates of uneducated youths in Sokoto, Jigawa, Yobe, Bauchi, 
Gombe, and also in Adamawa, Borno, Kano, Katsina, and others. These are the areas in which 
Boko Haram attacks have been rampant. These are also areas which are hotspots of Boko Haram 
terrorist attacks. This highlights the nature and extent of inequality in northern states and its impact 
in facilitating the rise of Boko Haram. These areas are not only poverty-stricken, but they also 
have high levels of illiteracy. A report by Giles (2019) showed that about 10.5 million children 
between five and 14 are out of school, and 69% of them were in northern Nigeria. Bauchi had the 
highest concentration and then Katsina. The high percentage of uneducated youths indicated on 
the map above shows why most Boko Haram members are youth militias. The youths are 




4.5.3. Continued underdevelopment and human insecurity inequalities  
The experience of relative deprivation has been pinpointed as responsible for explaining high 
levels of violence and terrorist activities (Parida, 2007:130-132). In order to determine if this has 
been the case in northern Nigeria, it is important to illustrate the level of underdevelopment and 
human security inequalities. There is a stark difference in inequalities between the north-east and 
the south of Nigeria, and these inequalities include improper infrastructure. 24% of households in 
the north-eastern part of Nigeria have access to electricity, in contrast to 71% of southwest 
households (Duke et al., 2017:7). Had it not been the fact that the Nigerian government was 
unable to provide the sufficient goods and services equally, it would have reduced feelings of 
deprivation, and more people might not have been frustrated or disappointed to the point of joining 
Boko Haram as recruits.  
In line with this analysis, Smith (2015:13) notes that foot soldiers could be recruited as much as 
needed because of the availability of a high number of desperate young men exposed to extremist 
ideas, often lured by the support and money which Boko Haram members could provide to them. 
Inequality in the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria, therefore, has played a role in the expansion of 
Boko Haram activities. With a high number of youths desperate and struggling for survival, and 
the government showing no interest in alleviating their social inequities, Boko Haram easily 
convinced the unemployed youth, grew their recruit numbers, and were able to fight against the 
state. 
Anthony and Humphrey (2017:649), posit that frustrations mostly in the northern states, have 
been induced by the unavailability of jobs and economic opportunities, and a lack of justice in the 
distribution of wealth. Boko Haram has, therefore, preyed on the prolonged poverty and 
deprivation caused by consistent corruption at all governmental levels, social inequalities, and the 
absence of jobs, and used these factors to validate its violent extremism (Antony & Humphrey, 
2017:649). Suicide bombers are more frequent in communities where misery and joblessness are 
prevalent than in communities in which basic needs such as food, education, health, housing, and 
sanitation are provided to the majority of the people. Some people might have not wanted to join 
Boko Haram but they did not have any alternative means of survival, and so they could take the 
risk of serving Boko Haram.  
Aghedo and Osumah (2012:861) show that Boko Haram members consist of those who are not 
educated, including school dropouts, unemployed youths, political thugs, and those students with 




about socio-economic injustice and who have been looked down upon (Aghedo & Osumah, 
2012:861). Heim and McQuaid (2015:22) further posit that poverty and the absence of services 
affecting the northern Muslims has generated rejections of the political status quo and has 
accelerated extremist ideologies. There have not been holistic solutions to address the deep 
economic differences between the north and the south. No implementations or infrastructural 
projects have been designated to resolve the insufficient social services required by the local 
population (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:23).  
Supporting this point further, Iyekekpolo (2018:2-3) asserts that the weak economy of Nigeria, 
which can be seen in the level of poverty, illiteracy, lack of jobs and economic under-development, 
has enhanced the rise of Boko Haram. The discrepancy between high expectations and the 
inability of the Nigerian government to foster economic prospects has ignited feelings of relative 
deprivation, which has led to disillusionment aggression, as evidenced by the insurgency 
(Iyekekpolo, 2018:3). Also, Suleiman and Karim (2015:7) argue that people with resentment 
feelings, caused by the unchanging corrupt behaviour of elites, can be easily recruited to act 
against the system. In addition, unemployment in the north has been worsened by the destruction 
of infrastructure, a shortage of energy, and high volumes of imported products, which has led 
many factories to shut down (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:17). The result has been frustration and 
disaffection for many youths, and Boko Haram has been reported to have paid those poor and 
vulnerable youth to bomb schools or to spy on those believed to have been collaborating with the 
government (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:18). 
Strengthening this argument further, the World Bank (2015:21) shows that limited government 
support, poor management, and limited access to new technologies has led to the destruction of 
rural livelihoods in agriculture, pastoralism, and fishing. The absence of jobs and a better means 
of survival, mostly among young people, has been the driving factor of frustration and discontent, 
which in turn leads to violence (World Bank 2015:21). It cannot be disputed that continued 
underdevelopment has enhanced the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, given all the evidence about 





Map 4.4 Percentage of unemployed working age people in Nigeria 
(Source: Giles, 2019) 
Map 4.4 indicates the different percentages of people who are at working ages but do not have 
jobs. High rates of unemployment in areas like Katsina, Bauchi, Adamawa, Taraba, and Zamfra 
(1 - 9.9%) followed by Gombe, Kano, Jigawa, Niger, Sokoto and other states, correlate with Map 
4.2’s hotspots for Boko Haram activities. It also correlates with the indication of high number of 
uneducated youths highlighted on Map 4.3. This evidence spotlights the fact that the northern 
region is marked by inequality and relative deprivation. Many northern citizens are disillusioned 
due to a lack of opportunities, which then drives them to join Boko Haram. 
According to Mercy Corps (2016:8), the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria is attributed to grievances 
generated by an inadequate provision of basic services and abuses orchestrated by the state. 
For Boko Haram to fight it needs members, and without difficulties in recruiting its members, the 
group has expanded to the extent of being able to fight against the state. Amaru (2015:37) notes 
that the recruitment of Boko Haram members has been motivated by poverty, lack of employment 




has not been able to provide enough security, roads, water, health care, education or sustainable 
energy. There have been allegations that the Kanuri ethnic group, where many Boko Haram 
members come from, have been unfairly treated by the national government in the distribution of 
resources, and are generally economically marginalised (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:15).  
The previous argument concurs with the theoretical discussions explored in chapter three. 
Namely, when ethnic groups are in a same political space, but are not being treated the same 
politically, tensions that cause ethnic violence, terrorism, and civil war can be generated, and as 
such can threaten the state's legitimacy and its territorial integrity (Saleh, 2013:171). The 
ignorance of the government and poor service delivery throughout the north-east regions are 
factors that caused communities to support Boko Haram (Brechenmacher, 2019:10). 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has responded to the main research question and the theoretical frameworks 
conceptualised in chapter three by empirically exploring the nature and extent of state failure and 
relative deprivation in northern Nigeria. In order to show how these theories help explain the rise 
of Boko Haram in Nigeria, examples, and statistics have been cited. Chapter four first offered a 
brief overview of Borno State and other north-eastern states in Nigeria. It linked the evidence of 
state failure and social inequities in north-east Nigeria and cited a vast literature, with examples 
of how poverty, inequality, unemployment, corruption, and bad governance have accelerated 
Boko Haram activities in Nigeria. Evidence has been provided in the form of maps, showing all 
sorts of problems, such as social, economic, political deprivations, and insecurity, which emanate 
from state failure and lead to relative deprivation. 
In terms of corruption, examples have shown politicians being incompetent and being accused of 
sponsoring Boko Haram and giving them important information and access to resources so that 
they could secure state positions or win elections. Chapter four also showed how northern 
Nigeria’s poor security has enhanced the rise of Boko Haram. It did so by citing empirical 
evidence, for instance that Boko Haram had a base to manufacture bombs, was able to steal 
weapons at military bases, and smuggle weapons and foreign recruits, all because of a lack of 
security at the border posts of Nigeria. It has also argued that state failure has allowed Boko 
Haram to at some point control more than 10 states. This control gave the group credibility, 
garnered support, and enabled them to manipulate thousands of people. This in turn expanded 




scrutinises the methods used to deal with the crisis at state, regional and continental levels, and 






















Chapter 5: Counterterrorism in Nigeria (state level, regional level, and continental level) 
5.1. Introduction 
 
From 2009 to 2020 a year did not go by in Nigeria without a terror attack from Boko Haram 
militants. Whether the attack was big or small does not matter. What matters is the insecurity of 
the Nigerian citizens in the north-east and in neighbouring countries. Their lives are insecure 
although not always on a regular basis. In 2020, according to CNN News (Busari et al., 2019) 
Boko Haram militants ambushed top Nigerian military officials in the Kaga local government 
Nigeria, including major general Olusegun Adeniyi. Mitigating Boko Haram terror attacks in 
Nigeria is thus still a profound challenge. One might be very concerned about how Boko Haram 
militants knew where the top military officials were. ACLED data from 15 December 2019 to 4 
January 2020 shows that there have been clashes between Nigerian security forces and Boko 
Haram militants in north-east states of Nigeria, namely, Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe; 30 Boko 
Haram ISIS affiliates are reported to have been killed in Yobe state the capital of Damaturu (Lay, 
2020:1). It has also been stated that 23 civilians have been killed by Boko Haram terrorists, as 
well as 11 Christians who have been held in captivity (Lay, 2020:1). This indicates that a lot still 
needs to be done to fully mitigate the Boko Haram crisis.  
This chapter provides an analysis of responses to Boko Haram. It analyses the actions taken by 
the Nigerian government to mitigate the crisis. These are negotiations, military intervention, and 
civilian-military operations. Thereafter, it evaluates the counterterrorism intervention at the 
regional level (ECOWAS) and the continental level (AU), assessing the effectiveness of the 
responses and the challenges encountered. In so doing, this chapter responds to the final 
supportive questions. These are: how has the Boko Haram insurgency been dealt with on a state 
level and how has the regional organisation (ECOWAS) and continental organisation (AU) reacted 
to mitigate the crisis? And: Has this regional response been effective, and, if not, what are possible 
alternative means of countering Boko Haram’s terrorist activities? By responding to the above 
research questions, the chapter offers recommendations. This chapter uses critical approaches 
to studies of terrorism. However, before getting into detail, the following section will briefly define 




5.2. Defining counterterrorism 
 
According to Onapajo (2017:62), counterterrorism approaches entail the measures taken by 
states and intergovernmental organisations to “protect or mitigate future terrorist attacks” and the 
“proactive actions designed to retaliate against or forestall terrorist actions”. This means that there 
should be pre-outlined strategies when responding to terrorist actions. However, these strategies 
also depend on the nature and the extent of the attacks. Explaining responses to terrorism, 
Aghedo and Osumah (2014:209) metaphorically highlight two strategies as the ‘carrot’ and the 
‘stick’. The former signifies the military approach, such as the war on terror by the United States, 
whereas, the latter entails a soft approach, such as conciliatory strategies that involve dialogue 
and co-optation to deal with conflicts (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014:209). 
However, fighting terrorism through military action has often been the approach of many 
countries, such as the US’s war on terror, where the result was the creation of a terrorist zone in 
Iraq with thousands of innocent people being killed. In Nigeria, the military approach has had 
many negative consequences and has proved ineffective. The following section briefly discusses 
the critical approach and outlines its significance for mitigating terrorism. 
5.3. Critical Terrorism Studies approach 
 
The Critical Terrorism Studies approach consists of a body of work specifically developed as a 
critique of Traditional Terrorism Studies (Onapajo, 2017:64). The critical approach argues that the 
counterterrorism practiced in orthodox terrorism approaches provides only “a short term” and 
“immediate assessment” provided by the state elites without considering the wider “social and 
historical context…or questioning to what extent the state or the status quo have contributed to 
the threat of terrorism” (Onapajo, 2017:64). In other words, critical theory condemns the sate 
centric approach to counterterrorism, which involves the use of military force while ignoring the 
broader context of the root causes of the problem and side-lining the concerns of citizens. 
Onapajo (2017:64) stresses that the critical approach views terrorism as a social fact, linked to 
historical contexts and social circumstances, and argues that a good approach to counterterrorism 
has to principally address the root causes of the problem, which would lead to a long-term 
solution. The approach favours negotiation and dialogue and involves many strategies like 




means, which is capable of changing violence to sustainable peaceful outcomes (Onapajo, 
2017:64).  
Critical theory has placed much emphasis on perpetual threats to democracy, disregard for 
human rights, harmful security practices, and all illegitimate military activities that have been 
mobilised under the umbrella of the war on terror (McGowan, 2016:13). Critical theory contributes 
to our understating of inequality, suffering, and extrajudicial deployments of state power, which 
relates to victimisation (McGowan, 2016:13). However, the Nigerian government’s response to 
Boko Haram terror attacks appears to have favoured the traditional approach, and has heavily 
focused on military intervention and extrajudicial killings, which exacerbate tensions (Oriola & 
Akinola 2018:608). Grievances over injustices against Boko Haram have emanated from 
structural issues of socio-economic injustices and killings conducted by state agents. 
Furthermore, the other reason the critical approach could be favoured is that the emergence and 
rise of Boko Haram has been as a result of state failure. Eji (2016:209) argues that the domestic 
nature of terrorism in Nigeria needs a people-cantered counterterrorism plan, which embodies 
economic and social transformations, democracy, and the observance of human rights. Eji 
(2016:209) further states that: 
[i]n religious, ideological, and socio-economic grievance-driven cases of terrorism 
such as Nigeria appears to have had and is still experiencing, winning the hearts 
and minds of the citizens as well as those of the terrorists and their sympathizers [is] 
significant. Measures aimed at national orientation, winning the confidence of the 
populace, and social re-engineering including granting concessions to the terrorists 
could arguably in such situations better contain terrorism than the traditional hard 
approach. 
Because of the above assertion, this study argues that the counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria 
needs to be well balanced and evaluated properly, ensuring that it is not only state-centric but 
also considers the root causes of the problem, and tries to engage all parties involved to find the 
best alternative solutions to mitigate the crisis. Supporting the argument further, Heim and 
McQuaid (2015:61) contend that the government approach to Boko Haram has been 
nonconservative with its heavy military action intended only to capture and kill the group's 
members. Most Nigerians also believed that the government has not been able to construct a 
solid strategy for mitigating the conflict because it did not make any concerted efforts to address 




Terrorism Studies approach as opposed to the heavy-handed military approach. The following 
section explains and analyses the methods used to respond to the crisis and their effectiveness. 
5.4. Counterterrorism methods taken by the Nigerian state  
5.4.1. Military intervention (The Joint Task Force) 
 
Since Boko Haram terror attacks have never been fully curbed, it is important to analyse the 
effectiveness of the responses taken to mitigate the crisis and highlight weaknesses. This helps 
to understand the reasons the attacks continue regardless of efforts to mitigate the crisis. There 
have been condemnations from a wide range of scholars over the repressive measures used by 
the Nigerian security forces to counter-attack Boko Haram militants. Military intervention has been 
the first strategy deployed by the Nigerian government. However, it is important to introduce to 
the reader to what comprises the Joint Task Force and then analyse its actions. According to 
Mbah and Nwangwu (2014:73), the Joint Task Force was established with the motive to restore 
law and order in north-east Nigeria and Borno State. The Joint Task Force involves different 
security organs, such as personnel from the Nigerian Armed Forces, Nigerian Police Force, the 
Department of State Security, Nigerian Customs Service, Nigeria Immigration Services, and the 
Defence Intelligence Agency (Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014:73). Having seen that the Joint Task Force 
was a combination of all special security agencies of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, one would 
have expected highly organised strategies to deal with the crisis, however, this has not been the 
case. 
5.4.2. Brutality and human rights violations by the military and the Joint Task Force 
 
Human rights violations have been one of the biggest crimes committed by the Nigerian Army 
and the Joint Task Force (JTF) while attempting to deal with the crisis. Instead of engaging 
smoothly with the civilians to get information about the whereabouts of Boko Haram members, 
the military itself have been terrorising the civilians. As noted by Smith (2015:17), in some 
incidents residents were caught between the continuous attacks and the heavy-handed response 
of the soldiers, and soldiers were often accused of rounding up young men and arresting them, 
setting fire to homes, and executing civilians. This indicates a poor response and recklessness 
from the Nigerian security agencies. Blanchard (2016:13) argues that human rights abuses by 
the military in parts of the country, mostly in the north-east, has been one of the reasons that has 




to strengthen their security cooperation due to military raids conducted against the Shia Muslim 
community in the northern city of Zaria in December 2015, during which over 300 people are 
estimated to have been killed (Blanchard, 2016:13). Pichette (2015:7) argued that the Nigerian 
government has failed to handle Boko Haram from the beginning, by ignoring the early warnings 
about the rise of Boko Haram, and that they have worsened the situation by deploying the Joint 
Security Force in 2005 whose response was brutal. The government security forces have caused 
severe property damages, killed citizens, have conducted extra-judicial killings without trial by 
jury, committed torture, and arrested people at checkpoints (Pichette, 2015:7).  
Properties have been destroyed by government forces, and access to basic commodities such 
as maize and beans have been affected, implying that the government security agencies have 
worsened poverty and living conditions in north-east Nigeria. Mbah and Nwangwu (2014:75) show 
that about 4,000 houses were razed by fire in areas like Bulabulin, Bayan, Tasha, Panpan 
Gajagaja, Adam Kolo and Bagadaza, and property valued at millions of Naira has been destroyed 
by the blazes burning about 30 vehicles, 57 motorcycles and about 100 bags of maize and beans. 
This suggests powerfully that a critical approach would have been preferable to the military 
approach that was deployed by the Nigerian security. Despite being able to have known that 
poverty and poor living conditions have been cited as factors that gave Boko Haram militants 
access to more recruits, the JTF further increased the rate of poverty, anger, and frustration. The 
government has failed to resolve the crisis and worsened it by side-lining the civilians even more, 
thus deviating from the counterterrorism approach which demands local support to help plot the 
elimination of Boko Haram assets (Pichette, 2015:8). Osumah (2013:545) shows that the military 
operations of the Joint Task Force ended up arresting and killing several non-Boko Haram 
members in different areas. So, this might have silenced informants or blocked a platform for 
dialogue. Therefore, in this scenario, it is evident that the military approach was not well 
strategised or designed to target only the Boko Haram militants.  
According to Solomon (2012:9), the Joint Task Force raided homes in Maiduguri on July 9 2011; 
security forces were shooting people, beating women and children, burning houses, and men and 
boys were subsequently reported missing. These actions by the security forces worsened the 
situation and made it harder to mitigate the crisis in Nigeria. Beating women and innocent children 
is a clear indication of ruthlessness by the military, which indicates a lack of human respect, which 
could also fuel frustrations among people, who in turn might join Boko Haram to fight against state 
security forces. Mbah and Nwangwu (2014:70) argue that the JTF counter-insurgency actions 




the JTF has been responsible for failing to deal with the crisis and enhancing Boko Haram’s 
activities. In the above ways, the JTF counter-insurgency operations have not been effective. 
Meagher (2014:3) maintains that continued abuses like arrests of Boko Harams’ family members, 
destroying homes, and the execution of young men during security raids in northern states has 
obstructed coordination with the military and has enhanced radicalisation and anger directed 
against the state. The Nigerian securities have been responsible for fuelling the crisis in Nigeria, 
it would have been very difficult for those who have lost homes they have built after hard work to 
trust the same government security forces, and Boko Haram can take advantage of this. Also, 
Mbah and Nwangwu (2014:68) illustrate that the repressive acts of the JTF have made it seem 
plausible that Boko Haram militants have been against the government's cruelty. They further 
assert that the JTF's brutality has often made those who have been deprived of their rights refuse 
to give important information about the militants, and this has further obstructed the effectiveness 
of the response (Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014:68).  
Weeraratne (2017:624) argues that the brutal repression by the military in response to the terror 
attacks has further intensified the violent extremism of the group. At some point, about 600 people 
suspected to be Boko Haram fighters were guillotined without trial after the Giwa barracks attacks 
in March 2014 in Maiduguri (Weeraratne, 2017:624). The military’s activities in Nigeria seem to 
be causing problems rather than bringing the crisis to an end. Military responses have managed 
to drive Boko Haram from some parts of the region but have intensified anger, poverty, and poor 
living conditions. It has also been suggested that the inability of the army to curb the crisis 
indicates an unwillingness to fulfil their mission (Weber, 2015:28).  
To support the above analysis, Botha and Abdile (2019:510) quote a former Boko Haram member 
who states that “they kill innocent people that are not members, so people join the group to fight 
the military.” The level of brutality has made people angry and so people have joined Boko Haram 
even though they did not have other motives to join the militant group. This means that if the 
military were not so brutal and irrational, Boko Haram would have struggled to garner support, 
and this would have helped the state to deal with fewer militants. In addition, the local governor 
of Jos City has been reported to have ordered the police and the army to shoot suspected 
protestors during November 2008 disturbances (Forest, 2012:91). It appears that counterterrorist 
strategy of using heavy force has been unorganised, and extremely inhuman. In this way, 
because they feared execution, it was very difficult for ordinary citizens to voluntarily share or 




was unacceptable. For instance, there have been reports from locals that the army burned homes 
and randomly shot unarmed civilians while responding to Boko Haram militants who killed two 
soldiers while on patrol in Maiduguri on July 2011 (Forest, 2012:91). Given the fact that the JTF 
comprised security agencies at the highest state level, and the way it has been violating human 
rights, it is very clear that the Nigerian government has been and is responsible for the continued 
existence of Boko Haram in north-east Nigeria. 
5.4.3. Government’s efforts to negotiate with Boko Haram 
 
The Nigerian government has also attempted to negotiate with members of Boko Haram as a 
strategy to resolve the crisis. For instance, under the leadership of Goodluck Jonathan, in April 
2013 the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in 
the north was created as an attempt to prepare negotiations with Boko Haram militants (Heim & 
McQuaid, 2015:62). However, the negotiation efforts were fruitless for various reasons. Boko 
Haram refused to negotiate with the government by the time when it was given the chance, (Akpan 
et al., 2014:153). Besides, the demands of Boko Haram militants were unacceptable. These 
included demands such as dividing Nigeria into two states, fully establishing an Islamic state, 
involving separate Christian areas, and the demand that Goodluck Jonathan had to convert to 
Islam. And so many Nigerians doubted the negotiation channels (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:62). 
Additionally, there were quarrels within Boko Haram, and there were reports that the group 
murdered some of its members after an attempt to negotiate with the government between 2011 
and 2012 (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:62). Under such circumstances, it would have been too difficult 
to achieve dialogue. 
 
Boko Haram is believed to be linked to and receive support from extremely dangerous 
international terrorist organisations such as ISIL. So, it would have also been difficult for the 
government to trust the group, and often the group’s dynamics and tactics unpredictable. It would 
have been difficult to trust Boko Haram in negotiations. The group’s leaders reportedly meet with 
AQIM and send their members for military training in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, 
Mauritania, and Algeria. Algeria and its leaders have once stated that their fighters have also 
been trained by the Somali militant group al-Shabab (Solomon, 2012:08). The above-mentioned 
terrorist groups are extremely dangerous and violent and this might have made the Nigerian 
government doubt the possibilities for dialogue. However, given the fact that evidence by various 




unemployment in the north-east part of Nigeria, and that there was no violence up until police 
brutality started, it is fair to claim that the root causes of the conflict had to be addressed first, and 
perhaps doing so would have made a big difference. Military intervention might have been an 
option only when totally necessary and in a way that could save and protect the ordinary citizens. 
5.4.4. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
 
Due to the fact that the government was not able to provide enough security in the north-east 
states, ordinary civilians formed their own groups so that they could defend themselves from Boko 
Haram. Weerarante (2017:124) note that the CJTF initially appeared to be instrumental in chasing 
Boko Haram fighters out of Maiduguri, but their efforts were weakened by their inability to acquire 
the right weapons and because Boko Haram members could flee to deep rural areas in Borno 
and then retaliate heavily. Human rights violations have also been a matter of concern. Meagher 
(2014:3) stressed that the establishment of the CJTF assisted in weakening the militants in the 
capital city of Maiduguri as a result of civilians seeking to protect themselves from the military by 
handing over suspected Boko Haram militants. Due to a shortage and the occasional 
recklessness of regular troops in the north-east, with the support of the Emir of Kano, local self-
defence groups emerged to defend their towns (Bourne, 2015:256). This indicates the Nigerian 
state’s ineffectiveness in actively mitigating Boko Haram’s terror attacks.  
 
Meagher (2014:3) maintains that due to a lack of proper training, human rights’ abuses, the 
difficulties of re-integrating the CTJF members into society, and the dangers of them being 
captured by local politicians during the election campaign in 2015, the CTJF introduced new 
challenges and problems. This has been dangerous for the many civilians who have been 
engaged in this operation. Some of the officials attempted to apply soft approaches by attempting 
to engage communities via economic activities but there has been lack of support from the federal 
government. A few officials noted that a more solid approach could include the demands of the 
population to defeat Boko Haram and also to limit the population's support for anti-government 
groups in north-east Nigeria (Heim & McQuaid 2015:62). The government did nothing to address 
the root causes of terrorism in northern Nigerian and even those officials who tried to enhance 
education and create employment opportunities have not been assisted by the federal 




5.5. Challenges, and reasons the responses have been ineffective 
5.5.1. The nature, tactics, and extent of Boko Haram terror attacks 
Another major challenge regarding curbing Boko Haram attacks is that group used highly 
sophisticated weaponry, which the Nigerian security agencies were not initially aware of, and thus 
did not anticipate. For instance, under Shekau, Boko Haram shifted to using assault rifles, 
improvised roadside explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and suicide 
bombers (Eji, 2016:203). This means that the group was heavily armed and could exchange 
attacks with the Nigerian security forces. According to Eji (2016:2013), the capacity of the security 
agencies and other institutions that were involved in the Nigerian government’s counterterrorism 
effort has been hindered by Boko Haram’s level of complexity and sophistication, in particular 
because their coordination and cooperation was inadequate. In addition there have also been 
unexpected relapses of the militant activities in the Niger Delta. The emergence of groups like the 
Niger Delta Avengers, who started bombing oil installations, actually enabled further terrorist 
activities, which disrupted the government's counterterrorism efforts against Boko Haram (Eji, 
2016:204).  
Apart from that, the Boko Haram militants were also using highly advanced ammunition. Solomon 
(2012:8) shows that the quality of explosives used by Boko Haram evidenced the group's 
sophistication; powerful explosives like pentaerythritol tetranitrate and triacetin triperoxide, often 
used in shaped charges, and which magnify the impact of explosions, were used for the UN 
headquarters attack on 26 August 2011. This has made it difficult for the state to counter-attack 
the militants. The state did not expect Boko Haram to be in possession of such dangerous 
weapons. Another reason the state has also not been able to deal with the attacks has been the 
use of suicide bombers, which they did not expect. For instance, according to Willard (2015:36), 
Boko Haram uses female suicide bombers, mostly young girls aged between seven and 17, with 
two thirds of them were being deployed against soft targets. This method has made the militants 
able to attack often and unexpectedly because security agencies and personnel did not suspect 
girls of those ages to conduct such horrific attacks. 
5.5.2. The loopholes within the Nigerian Terrorism Act and the abusive nature of some 
sections of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
 
In order to understand why the police forces or the military at some point could have violated 




crisis, it is crucial to examine some loopholes within the Nigerian constitution and the Nigerian 
Terrorism Act of 2013. Some sections of the constitution automatically deny people's rights to life, 
which enables security forces to abuse their power. For instance, Section 33 of the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) states that: 
(1) Every person has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life, 
save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offense of which he 
has been found guilty in Nigeria. 
(2) A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention 
of this section, if he dies as a result of the use, to such extent and in such circumstances 
as are permitted by law, of such force as is reasonably necessary [:] 
(a) for the defence of any person from unlawful violence or for the defence of property 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; or  
(c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny. 
Observing the above, it is clear that the constitution itself has been designed in a way that infringes 
on rights to life and this might be a reason that counterterrorism efforts to weaken Boko Haram 
have been widely associated with human rights violations by the military and police. This is likely 
the reason perpetrators of such abuses are not arrested and prosecuted. There appear to be 
constitutional justifications for abuses of power by the government. What makes matters worse is 
that those families who have lost their loved ones as a result of police brutality and unlawful arrest 
will not be able to report such wrongs or seek justice because the constitution favours the security 
forces. The government has given power to the security forces to kill people without evidence or 
trial, and that is why the security forces could kill or burn the houses of suspected Boko Haram 
members in Nigeria. The absence of justice has rendered the efforts to curb the Boko Haram 
crisis less effective. 
In addition, Akujobi (2018:34) notes that there have been concerns about the Principal Terrorism 
Act in 2011 (amended in 2013) regarding the violations of fundamental rights stipulated in chapter 
four of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Akujobi (2018:34) posits that the Act 
empowered security and intelligence officers to act outside of judicial procedures. With no warrant 
of arrest, section 25 (a-e) granted the National Security Advisor or the Inspector General of Police 




on a suspicion that a person might have committed or might commit a crime (Akujobi, 2018:35). 
This means that the constitution does not stipulate proper legal channels for arrest. Arrests have 
been common during the efforts to mitigate Boko Haram crisis. And so, efforts have not been 
effective but rather a recipe for frustration and anger which have aggravated tensions in north-
east Nigeria. Willard (2015:57) has argues that the behaviour of Nigerian security personnel does 
not comply with the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2013. For instance, section 1 (2) (a) of the Act 
says that there is a “conformity of Nigeria's counterterrorism laws and policies with international 
standards and United Nations’ convention on terrorism” (Willard, 2015:57). However, in light of 
the wide condemnations of human rights abuse and extrajudicial killings described previously, 
Nigeria is far away from complying with international standards, particularly with respect to reports 
of arbitrary arrest and torture. 
5.5.3. Corruption as a challenge to effective counterterrorism in Nigeria 
 
Corruption in the Nigerian armed forces have made the fight against Boko Haram terrorism largely 
ineffective, and by extension has linked the state to the insecurity of lives and property (Duke et 
al., 2017:5). Smith (2015:15) argues that the reason the insurgency could not be curbed efficiently 
is because of the decline of the Nigerian army, which is often due to corruption. The military has 
focused more on engaging in corrupt activities than committing themselves to holistically dealing 
with the terror crisis. In addition, an absence of faith both in the government and the military, has 
remained one of the reasons Boko Haram terror attacks have not been effectively prevented 
(Smith, 2015:15). Pate (2015:30), after interviewing some informants, noted that the informants 
stressed that Boko Haram had penetrated the military and was collaborating with military 
commanders. The informants noted that military leaders could use $9 of $10 from the defence 
budget campaign; they also indicated that Boko Haram has gained support from the military and 
other security forces (Pate, 2015:30). Corruption is a profound challenge in Nigeria, and perhaps 
the biggest challenge. Corruption benefits many officials, and if corruption is not addressed, it will 
be extremely difficult to fully curb Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria. 
There has been criticism from both local and international agencies about the effectiveness of the 
Nigerian government and its military and security agencies in fighting against Boko Haram terror 
attacks (Adelaja et al., 2018:36). Transparency International has reported that because of 
corruption within the defence sector, coupled with an insufficient supply of equipment and 
materials, the Nigerian army struggles to counter-attack Boko Haram insurgents (Adelaja et al., 




against the Nigerian military. Thus, corruption in Nigeria not only causes poverty but has also 
made it difficult for the military to counter-attack Boko Haram. However, the military comprises 
the state’s main response to Boko Haram. An International Transparency report contends that at 
times the Nigerian military has retreated during Boko Haram attacks because of a shortage of 
weapons and fuel, which corrupt officials had withheld (Adelaja et al., 2018:36). This enabled 
Boko Haram to overpower the Nigerian security forces. This shows that corruption in Nigeria is a 
great concern. In order to win the battle against Boko Haram terror attacks, corruption in the 
military and security forces has to be addressed. 
For instance, Blanchard (2016:10) has noted that Jonathan's former Chief of Defence has been 
accused of stealing $20 million from the air force, and as of late March 2016, some 300 
individuals, including army officers, were implicated in fraudulent or bloated defence contracts. 
This poses a dangerous security risk because it shows that corruption occurs at the highest level 
of state security, and is perpetrated by those who understand the significance of state security, 
and are responsible for protecting the country. This makes it difficult to manage or curb Boko 
Haram terror attacks. In such a context of corruption, Boko Haram has an advantageous ability 
to counterattack the Nigerian military because the latter are under-equipped due to insufficient 
resources or weakened by corrupt officials. 
Also, the Nigerian State Department terrorism report released in early 2015, upon Buhari taking 
office, contends that the absence of coordination and cooperation between security agencies, 
corruption, misallocation of resources, limited relevant databases, the slow pace of judicial 
systems, and a lack of sufficient prosecutors and judges to implement anti-terrorism laws were 
factors that limited Nigeria's response to Boko Haram terror attacks (Blanchard, 2016:13). 
Importantly, it appears that the same factors that contributed to the rise of Boko Haram have 
weakened the Nigerian state’s ability to deal with Boko Haram. 
The above evidence is an indication that the Nigerian security apparatuses have not been dealing 
with Boko Haram issues logically or through proper consultations and investigations. Supporting 
the argument further, Walker (2012:12) argues that the Nigerian government's security agencies' 
tactics to curb Boko Haram attacks have been brutal and unproductive, and that the use of 
extrajudicial executions for the problem in Nigeria not only helped to create Boko Haram but also 
enabled its expansion. Walker (2012:12-13) pointed out that: 
[t]he main technique currently used to fight Boko Haram is mass arrest at the site 




these people, they are intimidated, and money is extorted from them. Any 
information about Boko Haram hideouts they do receive is acted on in a very 
heavy-handed way. The police and army descend on the supposed hideout, all 
guns blazing, with innocent passers-by often caught and killed in the line of fire. 
This shows why the state's response to Boko Haram terror attacks has not been efficient and 
effective. In other words, corruption and poor investigation methods including intimidation and 
arresting innocent people, has worsened the situation. People may also have been driven to 
join Boko Haram have their imprisoned but innocent families not released. Heim and McQuaid 
(2015:63) share this view, indicating that a lot of people have disappeared and are believed to 
have been executed by the police, and roadblocks have been used to obtain bribes instead of 
preventing the movement of terrorists. With little to no evidence, the properties of suspects 
have also been seized by the government. This has led several observers to claim that the 
government has intensified the crisis and alienated the population, whereas the population 
could have provided important information about the enemy (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:64). 
5.5.4. Insufficient resources and poor security intelligence systems 
  
Another challenge is that the Nigerian Securities were poorly equipped to face heavily armed 
Boko Haram members, and these members are believed to have been trained by other 
dangerous terrorist groups. According to Solomon (2012:8), General Owoye Andrew Azazi, a 
National Security Advisor to President Jonathan, conceded that the state’s security 
infrastructure was insufficiently equipped to contain Boko Haram terror attacks. This implies 
that state failure has been responsible not only for the emergence and the rise of Boko Haram 
but also for hindering the effectiveness of curbing the attacks. Funds that were allocated to the 
defence budget from 2010 to 2014 were not utilised properly. For instance, according to Pate 
(2015:26), the Nigerian state extended its military budget from $625 million in 2010 to $6 billion 
in 2011. From 2012 to 2014 the budget was extended to $1 trillion. However, there was still a 
shortage of equipment, and even a lack of food parcels for soldiers. These funds could have 
been used to support economic reforms in the north-east and for programs to alleviate poverty 
so that Boko Haram would not have been able to easily recruit impoverished and unemployed 
youths. 
Pate (2015:26) has argued that the military has been the dominant department for confronting 




Presidency; the Nigerian National Assembly; the Department of State Services; the Office of 
the National Security Advisor; the Nigerian Police Force; the Nigerian Security and Civil 
Defence Corps; and, the Nigerian Emergency Management Agency. With the option of using 
all these groups but only using the military indicates a lack of coordination within the security 
apparatuses, which hinders effectively curbing Boko Haram attacks. 
According to the Congressional Research Service, the absence of coordination and 
cooperation amongst Nigerian security institutions, limited database use, delays within the 
judicial process when dealing with criminals, and insufficient training of prosecutors and judges 
for implementing anti-terrorism regulations are factors that have obstructed responses for 
resolving the crisis (Blanchard & Husted, 2019:9). A Recovery and Peace Building Assessment 
report (2015:17) indicates that difficulties in coordination, a lack of coherence, and the absence 
of operational specifications and responsibilities within several agencies tasked to respond to 
the crisis have been the challenges for the state’s military response. 
For instance, soldiers on the frontlines raised complained that they were not receiving 
adequate logistical support, and that their payments were delayed, which made them lose 
confidence in the military (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:63). They were also unable to track the 
group using technology. Drones bought from Israel in 2006 were not functioning, and 
intelligence gathering was so poor that soldiers in the north-east shot their commander after 
12 of their members were killed in an ambush by Boko Haram militants (Heim & McQuaid 
2015:64). This scenario indicates that intelligence gathering is an issue in Nigeria. In light of a 
2020 ambush in north-east Nigeria, it appears that the issue of intelligence gathering has not 
yet been addressed. This means that the Nigerian government still has a long way to go 
towards upgrading its security apparatuses so that it can foresee or capture militants before 
attacks. 
Montclos (2014a:24) also notes that security officials have been bribed during roadblocks, and 
that vehicles are able to pass without being checked. Boko Haram militants have also 
pretended to be soldiers, wearing camouflage stolen from soldiers or sold to them by destitute 
soldiers; militants then insist that they are members of the Red Cross (Montclos, 2014b:24). 
The literature shows that the Nigerian military has been abusive, and lacks professionalism 
and respect for human rights. This has blocked them from receiving ammunitions from potential 
donors. For instance, Bourne (2015:256) shows that the United States refused to sell arms to 




rights abuses orchestrated by the Nigerian army. Human rights training was lacking, and the 
soldiers were ill-equipped (Bourne, 2015:256). As a result of human rights abuses and a 
shortage of troops, one can see that the state's response to Boko Haram has been marred by 
a lack of commitment by the state itself.  
Intelligence gathering has been another factor that has hindered a successful counterterrorism 
strategy in Nigeria. This has been limited by an absence of cooperation with local populations. 
Force (2012:90) argues that high levels of distrust among Muslims in the north has disrupted 
the extraction of intelligence, which may have supported the government's counterterrorism 
efforts. Lack of trust has been caused by the way the military and the police responded to the 
crisis, which has threatened the legitimacy of the already fragile government (Force, 2012:90). 
Another reason the state’s response to the group has been ineffective is a lack of intelligence-
gathering capacity in the Nigerian security apparatuses. According to Azama (2015:64), Boko 
Haram has managed to forge links with civilians in high places, including politicians, 
government officials, and security agents who were later believed to have been cooperating 
with Boko Haram. This situation might have helped Boko Haram members to access significant 
information about the state's plans, which could be helpful for counter-attacking government 
forces.  
Furthermore, Chinwoku (2013:269) has pointed out that, after a sample of an imported cache 
of guns and ammunition were discovered at Apapa Wharf in 2010, American experts 
concluded that the Nigerian military lacked the expertise to deal with terrorism. Boko Haram 
was able to counter-attack the Nigerian military on some occasions because the latter did not 
have the knowledge and skills to fight against Boko Haram. One researcher has shown that 
the Nigerian security agency is capable of taking fingerprints of arrested criminals but unable 
to conduct forensic DNA investigations (Chinwoku, 2013:269). This means that, due to a lack 
of forensic technology, they only conduct basic investigations. Hence the inability of the 
Nigerian state to contain the Boko Haram crisis.  
5.5.5. Police brutality and incompetence 
 
Police brutality is another factor that has fuelled the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Boko Haram 
acted violently in July 2009 in retaliation to the Nigerian security forces after these forces executed 
Boko Haram members on 11 July 2009; thirteen Boko Haram members are believed to have been 




26 and July 27, and thereafter attacks spread to Kano, Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, and Katsima, 
resulting in more than 500 fatalities. Nigerian police brutality was blamed for fuelling the anger of 
Boko Haram, and enabled by a lack of proper security, the sect managed to attack many police 
stations (Duke et al., 2017:7). If the Nigerian police were not so brutal, perhaps the sect would 
have not sought revenge by attacking more police stations. 
Bala and Ibrahim (2018:9) note that police credibility has deteriorated due to using force instead 
of conducting thorough investigations and abiding by the law. They show that 150,000 police 
officers out of 400,000 were designated to protect VIPs as well as those who ordinarily could not 
qualify for police protection (Bala & Ibrahim, 2018:9). This is a clear indication that ordinary 
citizens were ignored and remained unprotected. Crime is common whenever security is absent. 
Rasheed Akintude, Inspector General of police in Benon city in southern Nigeria reported that 
only 20% of police officers are engaged to protect the lives of people and maintain peace while 
80% are designated to provide personal security to prominent people (Bala & Ibrahim, 2018:9). It 
therefore appears that security in Nigeria has been arranged for a few individuals, and the 
percentage of the police designated to ensure peace is unreasonable, which allows crime 
syndicates to operate freely. The above supports the view that there was and is an absence of 
commitment from governmental security services, whose prerogative is to ensure the safety of its 
citizens. 
5.6. Efforts by the regional and continental organisations to mitigate the crisis and its 
effectiveness  
5.6.1. Efforts by ECOWAS: effectiveness, and challenges encountered 
Strides have been made by ECOWAS, who have tried to bring to an end to the crises caused by 
Boko Haram militants. As briefly highlighted in chapter two, in 2013 the ECOWAS adopted a 
Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism as a regional counterterrorism 
strategy to assist member states in stopping terrorism (Onuoha, 2014). In its plan the ECOWAS 
developed three strategies for dealing with counterterrorism: a) to prevent terrorism, b) to pursue 
perpetrators, and, c) reconstruction after terrorist attacks (Salihu, 2015). However, the most 
important question is whether the ECOWAS had an approach to counterterrorism that was 
holistic. For instance, the pillar of preventing terrorism involves various actions such as monitoring 
political, social, economic and cultural activities in order to isolate enabling situations for terrorism 
(Salihu, 2015). In contrast to efforts made by ECOWAS, there have not been specific efforts to 




The ECOWAS like Nigeria followed the military approach, and with limited success. The fact that 
the ECOWAS also did not take into consideration the social, political and economic issues that 
have been affecting north-east Nigeria has hindered its effectiveness as a regional organisation 
designated to combat terrorism and monitor the social, political and economic activities in the 
region. It appears that there was a lack of evaluation and analysis. Analysis would have shown 
that to overcome terrorism one has to know why Boko Haram was able to recruit members so 
easily. In addition, many of ECOWAS plans have been more theoretical than practical. For 
instance, in 2014 the ECOWAS regarded the proliferation of SALW as the main cause of the 
threats posed by Boko Haram militants, and noted the need for integrative efforts to mitigate 
terrorism in Lake Chad region (Goyei, 2018:121). But little to nothing was or is being done to stop 
the smuggling of small light weapons in the Lake Chad region. Therefore, a lack of action has 
made the ECOWAS efforts ineffective in dealing with the Boko Haram crisis. Furthermore, the 
ECOWAS's findings that the root cause of insecurity caused by Boko Haram is the proliferation 
of SALW, proves that the ECOWAS did not deeply investigate poor economic conditions, 
including unemployment and absent economic prospects, in north-east Nigeria. Had they done 
proper analysis they would have recognised the role of these factors in driving the expansion of 
Boko Haram. Their solution could then have related to the actual causes of the crisis, as opposed 
to symptoms, namely Boko Haram’s acquisition of light arms and weapons. 
Brenya and Kuffour (2015:88) argue that ECOWAS has failed to address the Boko Haram issue, 
even though the activities of the insurgent groups serve as a great security threat to the region. It 
has been identified that compliance and implementation of the ECOWAS normative frameworks 
were encompassed with insufficient financial resources, absence of political will and lack of 
coordination among member states. According to Salihu (2015), the dependency of external 
funding to regionally implement goals tends to affect that regardless of having holistic initiatives, 
a shortage of funds has been a heavy blow for the ECOWAS and its member states to fully 
execute its goals of curbing the terror attacks.  
Onuoha (2014:10) argues that the ECOWAS lacks both intelligence architecture and an 
operational standby force it could use in counterterrorism operations. Since Boko Haram is also 
operating to the countries such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, and does not belong to the 
regional organization, the ECOWAS could not effectively ring-fence Nigeria to curb Boko Haram's 
transnational operations. Tejpar and Albuquerque (2015) contend that the ECOWAS has not been 
involved in the fight against Boko Haram, for the fact that the violence has spread to neighbouring 




there were no proper risk assessments as to note that the crisis did not need to be attended based 
on country borders but the impact of the crisis to the region. 
5.6.2. Efforts made by the AU and its effectiveness 
For various reasons, the AU has not received much credit for its attempts to combat the Boko 
Haram crisis. Around the time when the AU Peace and Security Council had its first meeting on 
Boko Haram in 2014, regional coordination was poor, and was mainly marked by ad hoc bilateral 
arrangements between Nigeria and its neighbors. At the same time regional bodies including the 
ECOWAS, Economic Community of Central African States and AU considered Boko Haram as 
an internal issue (Desmidt & Hauck, 2017:26). Reluctance, and regional bodies’ perception that 
Nigeria could tackle the crisis alone hindered the effectiveness of the regional bodies to curtail 
Boko Haram insurgency. And so, the crisis could not be mitigated. However, the Nigerian 
government played a role in this failure. The Nigerian government framed conflicts within its 
borders, including Boko Haram activities, as local conflicts that ought to be resolved internally 
(Desmidt & Hauck, 2017:26). The Peace and Security Council (2014) argues that until 2014, the 
continental body did not have any major responses, and did not mobilise political support or 
coordinate the response of member states and regional organisations. In 2014 the AU decided to 
revive the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), initially set up by Lake Chad Basin 
Commission in 1989.  
There was a glimmer of hope on 29 January 2015 when a decision was made by the Peace and 
Security Council to meet relevant heads of states, who then authorised the deployment of the 
MNJTF, consisting of up to 7,500 military and non-military staff for an initial period of 12 months, 
which could be renewed. Zamfir (2015:2) shows that the mission was to establish a conducive 
environment for cooperation, restore state authority, and facilitate humanitarian assistance in 
affected areas. Human Rights Watch has argued that one remaining challenge is that while the 
AU and the UN strongly urged that the fight against Boko Haram considers humanitarian law, this 
has not always been the case (Brubacher et al., 2017:294). The problem with the AU is its 
overgeneralised view that the Nigerian state is taking the fight to the terrorists and that with the 
help of training and with the assistance of legislative frameworks, this will curb the crisis, which is 
not the case (Solomon, 2015). The AU has also lacked commitment, and has not taken on a 
responsibility to urgently intervene in the Nigerian Crisis, which has made it ineffective as a 




According to Abugbilla (2017:237), analysts believe that capacity issues, such as limited human 
capital and financial resources, are preventing the AU from dealing with terrorism. Another factor 
that has led the AU to be less effective in dealing with terrorism is its non-implementation of 
initiatives. For instance, there have been aby human rights violations perpetrated by Boko Haram, 
the Nigerian police force, and the Nigerian military. The Peace and Security Council of the AU 
have motivated to establish an Africa-wide arrest warrant for persons including Boko Haram 
members involved in terrorism (Abugbilla, 2017:236). However, no actual plans have been 
executed to convict police and military personnel who have violated human rights. 
5.6.3. Efforts made by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) 
There have been several attempts made by the Lake Chad Basin states to curb the terror attacks 
launched by Boko Haram militants. This was done as an effort for regional cooperation because 
Boko Haram extended their threats to the Lake Chad region as a whole. But the operations of the 
MNJTF have been limited to managing cross border crimes at the border posts in the Lake Chad 
region (Brubacher et al., 2017:292). When the MNJTF expanded its scope in 2015 to involve 
counterterrorism operations, the MNJTF operations were ineffective due to logistical problems, 
and Boko Haram preyed on that weakness and successfully attacked the MNJTF headquarters 
in Borno State on January 3, 2015 (Brubacher et al., 2017:293). The attack led to the death of 
thousands of people, and as a result Chad has pulled back from the MNJTF and instead opted to 
integrate Cameroonian soldiers, which has not been very effective because Boko Haram has 
managed to counter-attack both forces in Fotokol, Cameroon (Brubacher et al., 2017:293). 
There have been signs that Boko Haram is militarily strong and is able to fight the MNJTF. But 
despite the evidence, the Nigerian government remained adamant about consulting the AU so 
that military capacity could be enlarged. It took about five years to consider the threats posed by 
Boko Haram, which raises the issue of a lack of clarity in regional collaboration and integration. 
Dersso (2017:8) argues that the quality of interventions by national security forces, and 
coordination between Nigeria and neighbouring countries, are major institutional factors affecting 
the balance of power in Boko Haram’s favour. 
Lack of commitment is a serious issue affecting the effectiveness of regional integration and this 
will make it difficult to curb continued attacks by Boko Haram militants. For instance, it has recently 
been reported that Chadian forces of about 1,200 soldiers pulled back their military support in 
north-east Nigeria, claiming that their mission was completed (France 24, 2020). This creates a 




victory in the media can foster new attacks by the Boko Haram militants, who know that there is 
no military presence. According to the Guardian (2020), even though the Nigerian Defence 
Headquarters denies that the Chadian forces pulled out of the MNJTF counterterrorism efforts, 
saying they only withdrew forces from Nigeria, there is great danger in the move because the joint 
task force numbers have been reduced, and if Nigeria delays action the militants will use this to 
their advantage. It has also been reported that the withdrawal will likely weaken the Nigerian 
soldiers (Guardian, 2020).  
5.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an analysis of the responses of the government of Nigeria, the regional 
organisation, the ECOWAS, and the continental organisation, the AU, to curb the Boko Haram 
crisis. All steps that have been taken at the state level, including military intervention, limited 
negotiations, the Joint Task Force operations, and the efforts made by the CJTF have relied 
heavily on military intervention. The nature and extent of the interventions has been examined, 
and evidence has indicated that military and police brutality has been acute, and as such has 
worsened the crisis in Nigeria, even though to some extent terrorist have been driven away from 
areas of operations. By analysing the methods used to deal with the crisis in Nigeria, from all 
parties involved, chapter five has responded to the first part of the last question. This question is: 
has the regional response been effective? The other part of the last question is: and if not, what 
are the possible alternative means of countering Boko Haram’s impact? This is addressed in 
chapter six. 
To fully respond to the above research question, chapter five cited the recent 2020 attacks to 
prove that Boko Haram attacks have not yet been fully curbed, which shows the relevance of the 
topic and question. Chapter five has also defined counterterrorism to familiarise the reader with 
the expected actions involved in attempts to mitigate the crisis. The root causes of the emergence 
and rise of Boko Haram have been shown in previous chapters to be dire social, political and 
economic conditions. But Nigeria’s approach was state-centric and militaristic. The regional and 
continental organisations also placed great emphasis on military intervention. Chapter five 
introduced to the reader the significance of critical approaches when dealing with terrorism 
because they focus on addressing root causes of the problem and denounce the heavy-handed 
military approaches. The regional and continental approaches were shown to incorporate no 
efforts to address socio-economic conditions, corruption, and human rights abuses. The 




This chapter has indicated the weakness of such approaches, and shown why the efforts were 
not effective. Challenges indicated included brutality from state security forces, corruption in the 
military and police, bribery, the military engaging with and sometimes incorporating Boko Haram 
members, a lack of resources and poor intelligence, and a lack of cooperation and coordination 
by the parties involved. 
Chapter six reflects on the major and supportive research questions, ensuring that the problem 
statement and the aims of the study have been responded to. Chapter six provides alternative 
and practical actions regarding what should be done in the long run in order to win the hearts and 
the minds of the people in the Lake Chad region so that the situation can be stabilised. Finally, 
















Chapter 6: Reflections on the major and supportive research questions, 




Chapter five scrutinised and evaluated actions taken on the state level, regional level, and 
continental level to resolve the Boko Haram crisis and terrorist attacks. Chapter five indicated 
several reasons the approaches taken have been less than effective. It argued that the heavy-
handed military approach, abuse of power, human rights violations, corruption, poor security 
mechanisms and an absence of common will to address the root causes of the problem are factors 
that have hindered and still hinder the effectiveness of mitigating the continued Boko Haram terror 
attacks. Chapter six reflects on the major and supportive research questions, ensuring that the 
problem statement and all the research questions outlined in chapter one have been responded 
to. To achieve this, chapter six provides a summary of what has been analysed from chapters 
two to five to indicate that the theories applied connect to the research questions and that the 
problem statement and aims of the study have been addressed. Chapter six offers alternative 
practical actions that can be taken and monitored regularly to counter the impact of Boko Haram. 
Chapter six also seals the study and provides recommendations for further research. The 
following section briefly summarises the literature review provided in chapter two. 
6.2. Reflecting on the literature review  
 
In order to provide clarity and indicate the logic of this research study, the literature review in 
chapter two overviewed the whole study. First, the chapter familiarised the reader with the term 
terrorism. Several definitions of terrorism were provided. There remains a lack of clarity on 
terrorism’s definition because, as others have argued, many definitions do not have a broad 
enough scope to cover the context of the present day's insurgency, given its transnational nature, 
and political, economic and social dimensions (section 2.2). Chapter two also argued that defining 
terrorism remains difficult because some states do not want to include state sponsored violence 
when defining terrorism.  
The literature review also showed that fanatical groups who are not satisfied with government 
policies and programs can also conduct terrorist activities to fight the state for power or to impose 




ideological objectives (political, economic, or religious). The purpose of conceptualising terrorism 
was to make the subject clear and to be able to understand the theoretical frameworks. 
Chapter two also differentiated domestic terrorism and international terrorism. The concept of 
international terrorism was explored in order to balance the analysis of Boko Haram's extended 
attacks in neighbouring countries. The literature review described Boko Haram in section 2.3, and 
in section 2.3.2., it indicated the group's recruitment strategies and sources of weaponry. Sources 
of finance were explored in table 2.1. Chapter two showed that kidnapping for ransom, taxation, 
extortion, looting, bank robberies, smuggling and trafficking, donations, commercial agriculture, 
and external assistance have been sources of finance that have sustained the survival of the 
group. This is part of a response to the problem statement. 
The literature review explored the group's links to other terrorist organisations, and examined the 
group's impact on neighbouring countries in Lake Chad Basin. To evaluate the extent of Boko 
Haram attacks, Chapter two table 2.2. provided a timeline of Boko Haram's major attacks from 
2003 to 2018, and the most recent attacks were described in other chapters. The final part of the 
literature review outlined factors responsible for the emergence of Boko Haram, which were then 
utilised in chapter three and chapter four, where empirical evidence was supplied to respond to 
the research questions and the problem statement. This is discussed in the following section. 
6.3. Responding to the problem statement 
 
Boko Haram terrorists persist with terrorist attacks, and, although not regular occurrences, the 
attacks indicate that peace and security in Nigeria are still at risk. Since corruption, inequality, 
lack of employment, and poverty have been argued by various scholars to be the key causes of 
concern, state failure theory and relative deprivation theory were deployed to examine the 
emergence of Boko Haram and to evaluate state, regional, and continental responses to Boko 
Haram. The following section reflects on the main research question and the supportive research 
questions. It summarises how the research questions have been addressed, and so responds to 
the problem statement to fulfil the aims of the study.  
6.3.1. A reflection of the major and supportive research questions 
 
The study’s major research question is: How does state failure theory and relative deprivation 




articulated to fully respond to the main research question. The first supportive research question 
is: what is state failure theory and how can it explain the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria? State 
failure was defined before exploring how it explains Boko Haram’s rise in chapters three and four.  
Chapter three defined the state, examined its functions, explored the characteristics of state 
failure, and then scrutinised the connection between state failure and terrorism in general. 
Chapter four provided examples of how state failure in Nigeria is linked to the rise of Boko Haram. 
Chapter four noted that the strength of the state can be determined by its will and ability to provide 
fundamental political goods, such as physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic 
management, and social welfare. Security, health, education, good governance, economic 
opportunity, law, order, and basic infrastructure were regarded as political goods. This was done 
to examine whether the Nigerian government has or can provided political goods to its citizens. 
Chapter four thus responded to the other part of the first supportive research question, namely, 
‘how can state failure explain the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria?’. 
Chapter three described characteristics of state failure and linked these to empirical evidence of 
terrorism in chapter four. Chapter three, section 3.4., explored the characteristics of a failed state. 
Chapter four, section 4.3., examined how Borno State, the epicentre of Boko Haram operations, 
is poorly developed and where about 60% of Boko Haram attacks occurred in 2011, 70% in 2013, 
and 80% in 2014. In 2020 there have been more than five attacks in north-east Nigeria. Chapter 
four, section 4.4.1., discussed how corruption enhanced Boko Haram activities. Section 4.4.3. 
has explored the ways in which other security deficiencies have been responsible for the rise of 
the militant group. Finally, section 4.4.4. indicated that porous borders, which is a feature of failed 
states, has further facilitated the rise of Boko Haram. The conceptualisation of relative deprivation 
theory and state failure theory in chapter three, and the empirical evidence of these theories as 
presented in chapter four, served the purpose of responding to the major research question as 
well as the first and second supportive research questions.  
The second supportive research question is: what is relative deprivation theory and how can it 
explain the rise of Boko Haram? Chapter three, sections 3.5.1. to 3.5.2., responded to the second 
research question. The chapter illustrated that relative deprivation is the judgment that one is 
worse off in relation to some standards, and is accompanied by feelings of anger and resentment. 
Chapter three responded to the second research question by exploring the link between relative 
deprivation and terrorism in general, in order to justify its significance in responding to the aims 




work seekers and very few vacancies, has been a major recruitment area for the ISIL. 
Unemployed youths in Nigeria were also more easily recruited by Boko Haram. This 
demonstrated that relative deprivation is linked to terrorism.  
Chapter three also responded to the second supportive question by arguing that relative 
deprivation is connected to discrimination and injustice. It showed that discrimination might be 
ethnic, political or economic. Discrimination then generates tensions, violence, and terrorism, 
which in turn threatens state sovereignty. The following section reflects on the last part of the 
second supportive research question, which is: how can relative deprivation explain the rise of 
Boko Haram? 
Chapter four cited a wide range of empirical evidence from north-east Nigeria, which illustrated 
how unemployment, poverty, and inequality enhanced the rise of Boko Haram. Chapter four linked 
the theoretical frameworks with the empirical evidence. For instance, section 4.5.1 indicated that 
north-east Nigeria has high rates of poverty. High rates of illiteracy and unemployment aided Boko 
Haram, as explored in chapter four, section 4.5.2. 
Chapter four responded to the second supportive research question with the aid of maps. For 
example, Map 4.3 showed high rates of uneducated youths in north-east Nigeria, where Boko 
Haram often launches its attacks. Ongoing underdevelopment and the human security 
inequalities, as well as a lack of infrastructural development were highlighted. For instance, only 
24% of the households in north-east Nigeria have access to electricity, compared to 71% in south-
west households. Relative deprivation suggests that political, economic or social alienation drives 
people to violence or rebellion.  
The second to last supportive research question is: how has the Boko Haram insurgency been 
dealt with on a state level and how have the regional organisations such as the ECOWAS and 
the AU reacted to mitigate the crisis? The final supportive research question is: have regional 
responses been effective and, if not, what are the possible alternative means of countering Boko 
Haram’s impact? These questions informed chapter five. Chapter five explored and criticised the 
methods chosen and actions taken by states and by regional and continental organisations. The 
chapter also highlighted Boko Haram’s January 2020 attacks to indicate that Boko Haram remains 
a significant security threat. 
The challenges around and the effectiveness of state-level responses were critiqued in chapter 




explored in sections 5.6.1. to section 5.6.3. The last research question – what are the alternative 
means of countering Boko Haram’s impact? – guides the following part of chapter six from 
sections 6.4.1 to section 6.4.9. These sections suggest practical alternatives to previous 
strategies. Section 6.5. summarises the key findings, and 6.6 offers recommendations for further 
research. 
6.4. Alternatives and practical actions that need to be taken and monitored regularly to 
counter the impact of Boko Haram 
6.4.1. Alleviating unemployment and poverty in north-east Nigeria 
As long as the vast majority of the population in north-east Nigeria remain in poverty, it will be 
very difficult to fully mitigate the crisis of Boko Haram in the long run. The Nigerian government 
must initiate and implement projects that will create employment in north-east Nigeria to reduce 
the number of vulnerable youths. Chapter four indicated that the weak economy – evidenced by 
high levels of poverty, illiteracy, unavailability of jobs, and economic underdevelopment – has 
enhanced the rise of Boko Haram (Iyekekpolo, 2018:2-3). Economic reconstruction should be 
prioritised in north-east Nigeria. This will help to reduce the number of those who might support 
the militant group, not because they have terroristic motives but because they are seeking means 
for survival. 
More food aid programs must be launched by the government to support north-east citizens. 
Clashes between the government and Boko Haram militants have killed cattle and goats on which 
most of the humans depend for survival. If the government continues to be ignorant about 
supporting the north-east citizens with basic commodities, the opportunities for Boko Haram 
militants to gain support will remain widespread. The Nigerian government must act on its 
responsibility to cater to the needs of the public. For instance, chapter four argued that one of the 
reasons Boko Haram has managed to recruit many youths is that it replaced the state by providing 
daily meals, and by organising affordable marriages and loans for small commercial activities. To 
avoid this, the state has to come up with projects which support the north-east citizens so that 
they can have confidence in the government. Salihu (2015) argued that a huge amount of money 
was injected into the Nigerian defence budget, $2.4 billion in 2013 and $2.3 billion in 2014, which 
could have been used to develop the north-east Nigeria. This also indicates that Nigeria does 
have resources to alleviate poverty in north-east but lacks the will and commitment to allocate 




6.4.2. Boosting education in north-east Nigeria 
Lack of education and illiteracy have been major reasons why Boko Haram militants have 
managed to manipulate so many youths into joining them. The north-east region is populated with 
uneducated people due to educational inequalities. There is a need for the Nigerian government 
to begin treating the north-east just like Lagos or Abuja. The state needs to balance the extreme 
educational inequalities. The number of uneducated youths in north-east Nigeria is due to a lack 
of commitment by the federal government to making education a priority throughout the whole 
country. For instance, Giles (2019), mentioned that about 10.5 million youth in Nigeria between 
five and 14 were out of school, of which 69% reside in north-east Nigeria. More educational 
support is needed so that the youth will be empowered, and can learn about the dangers of joining 
militant groups and how in the long run these groups will harm them. 
6.4.3. Restoring law, order, and security in north-east Nigeria to boost trade  
There are widespread human rights infringements in north-east Nigeria. The government has to 
train its security personnel to avoid violating human rights. Conflict has instilled fear in thousands 
of people who might have abandoned their businesses to move to safer places. Some educated 
people have also migrated to other places and they have left a big economic gap. Without law, 
order and security, it will be very difficult for businesses to flourish. Therefore, it is strongly 
recommended that the Nigerian government restores law, order, and security to boost the 
confidence of those who are willing to make a change. The north-east will battle to have 
exchanges of goods and services unless security restored and people are guaranteed that their 
properties are safe and secure. A lack of security has caused many markets to close, and as long 
as the fear of insecurity exists, it will be very difficult to improve the economic conditions. Suppliers 
and traders will remain unwilling to risk their lives or goods and services due to a lack of security. 
6.4.4. Establishing a truth and reconciliation commission in north-east Nigeria  
A truth and reconciliation commission should be established. Many innocent people have been 
executed without trial. Properties and homes that have been destroyed by police and soldiers. 
People have been killed after merely being accused of being linked to Boko Haram militants. 
People require justice so that they can feel relieved. There is much anger and despair caused by 
the destruction of properties and the loss of innocent family members. In the long run, a well-
established program of reconciliation in the north-east is needed so that people can forgive each 




relieve those who have been victimised but will in the long run restore confidence and trust in the 
government. According to Meyerstein (2003:468), truth commissions serve to address the 
injustice endured by survivors; they are aimed at identifying victims and integrating them back 
into the public after they have been violently alienated and victimised.  
Chapter two argued that local populations affected by the crisis were not in favour of interacting 
with former Boko Haram members after the government established Operation Safe Corridor for 
repentant Boko Haram fighters in February 2018 (Ani & Mahmood, 2018:21). The Nigerian 
government should make sure that relief programs are set up and monitored regularly so that 
people can interact with those who have repented. Failure to maintain truth and reconciliation will 
in the long run risk further escalations of violence. Further, if repentant militants are not welcomed 
back into society and supported by the government there is a high risk of them re-joining the group 
to protect themselves. 
6.4.5. Abolishing bureaucratic corruption and brutality from the police and military 
through regular training and human rights workshops 
Corruption has been identified as one of the main problems that has enabled the rise of Boko 
Haram and has hindered the effectiveness of combating the terror attacks. The Nigerian 
government has to first eradicate corruption from all public officials, this will end the abuse of 
power and the security risks caused by corrupt officials. The abolition of corruption will help 
because resources and fund can then be utilised for the benefit of the public. For instance, Figure 
2.2 in chapter two has indicated the perceived corruption of public officials in 2017; 43% of 
respondents thought the president and officials in his office were corrupt and 69% thought the 
police were corrupt (Afrobarometer, 2019). 
There is a need for checks and balances within several departments of the government to ensure 
transparency and accountability. Dealing with corrupt officials will be useful for development and 
boosting the economy. Funds looted by the corrupt officials can be used to construct schools in 
north-east Nigeria and give handouts to impoverished citizens. Chapter two noted that between 
2015 to 2016 $4.6 billion was taken by the officials via bribes. Corruption has also been 
responsible for creating poverty and unemployment. As a result, there is a great need to address 
the root causes of the problem so that the solutions will be effective in the long run. More training 
is needed for officials dealing with a crisis. At times, guns used by terrorists were smuggled with 
the help of police. This means that there is much educational training required to restore the 




attack on the UN offices 2011 was enabled by an official who accepted a bribe at a checkpoint 
(Antony & Humphrey, 2017:649). Therefore, it is strongly recommended that strict laws are 
enforced to avoid future insecurity being enabled by those who are supposed to prevent it. 
The military department also needs to be revived. There is a need to ensure that the military is 
provided with sufficient resources when sent to fight against terrorism. At times the military has 
exchanged guns for food from terrorists, which has exacerbated the crisis. Corruption within the 
military has to be addressed from the top to the bottom. Concerted efforts are required, including 
efforts from those overseeing the defence budget and those making sure that arms are serviced, 
and that funds are spent responsibly and appropriately. Nigeria risks its army being the weakest 
on the continent if corruption within the defence department is left uncontrolled. The military will 
be ineffective against militant terrorists if corruption is not maintained.  
There is also a need to train all security agencies to consider human rights when responding to 
the crisis. The government has to set up workshops regularly to alert and remind the police and 
the military to respect human rights, and to refrain from brutality. Otherwise these security 
institutions will continue to create enemies. Human rights training can also prevent a situation in 
which the people seek security from the militants.  
Duke et al. (2017:5) contend that there is a need to strengthen the military by ensuring sufficient 
funds, ensuring the professionalisation of military personnel, specifically in non-conventional 
warfare, and in line with international best practices, boosting recruitment and morale, and 
increasing arms and ammunition, food, and medicine, while ramping up logistics capabilities. It, 
therefore, means that the Nigerian state has to prioritise the issue of security so that it is able to 
deal with terror attacks. Training military personnel will also enable them to perform their duties 
well. The availability of food and medicine will help to reduce the rate at which the military being 
bribed or corrupted by their enemies. 
6.4.6. Strengthening security at the borders; search, detect, and dismantling explosives 
One of the most challenging factors is the issue of insecurity at Nigeria’s borders. Boko Haram 
militants have used different types of weapons, including explosives and bombs, to attack the 
government’s security systems. The question whether there has been a thorough search of 
dangerous zones to detect the bombs and dismantle them remains. This has not happened at the 
border between Nigeria and Cameroon. For instance, according to DW News (2020), in January 




the Nigerian town Gambouri and Cameroon’s Fotokol. A young man mistakenly picked a bomb, 
thinking it was an iron. This is a clear indication that the Nigerian and Cameroonian governments 
have to enhance their security systems or develop bomb and explosives detection machines and 
then clear the explosives from such areas. 
Due to the porousness of borders, weapons have been smuggled unnoticed, and fighters have 
also been smuggled into Nigeria from neighbouring countries. To avoid these challenges, security 
at all Nigerian borders has to be effectively tightened. This demands cooperation and coordination 
among all Lake Chad basin countries. As long as the borders remain unsecured, there is a great 
danger that Boko Haram will continue exploiting the weakness of these borders, meaning that 
mitigating the crisis will remain a challenge in the long run. Tightening security also requires not 
just the availability of the security forces at the border posts but also advanced technology capable 
of detecting explosives and all sorts of ammunition in order to reduce the easy flow of weapons 
to Nigeria. Smuggling of weapons and human beings will only be stopped by tightening the 
security at the border entry points. This effort requires integration and cooperation between 
Nigeria and its neighbouring countries and should be strictly monitored on a regular basis. 
6.4.7. Advancing intelligence gathering mechanisms  
Intelligence gathering has to be extensively developed in north-east Nigeria. Boko Haram militants 
are continuously attacking important buildings and Nigerian security personnel are still unable to 
predict these threats. According to the Defence Post (2020), Boko Haram militants have fired 
grenades into a compound in which the aid agencies assisting in the region were staying. Busses 
transporting civilians have been ambushed in the presence of the military (Defence Post, 2020). 
Therefore, much security intelligence is required in north-east Nigeria. Recent attacks signify 
continued characteristics of failed or failing states in north-east Nigeria. Those who are willing to 
assist, but are vulnerable due to poor security, might make things worse because they may 
discontinue their efforts. 
In January 2020 there were more than three attacks in the north-east region, which is a clear 
indication of a continued threat. According to Crisis24 (2020), Boko Haram militants launched 
attacks at Kombun district in Plateau State and 12 people were reported dead between 8 and 9 
January 2020. In Borno State on 6 January 2020, two military officials were wounded after Boko 
Haram ambushed a military convoy, and on 2 January 2020 Boko Haram militants attacked the 
city of Adamawa in north-east Nigeria (Crisis24, 2020a, 2020b). The Nigerian government has to 




Haram strikes. The military is one of the most significant organs of the Nigerian state. The 
continued attacks on the military shows a great weakness in the Nigerian intelligence systems 
and is a vivid indication that more effort is needed to strengthen the Nigerian security 
mechanisms. 
6.4.8. Reinforcing regional synergy and coordination 
An absence of coordination and collaboration is one of the weaknesses hindering the 
effectiveness of regional organisations. Regional organisations have to be synergistic and work 
together to curb the ongoing crisis. Regional organisations must also take into consideration the 
root causes of the problem, and then allocate budgets for development, and embrace more social-
economic projects, rather than injecting all the money into military operations alone. More has to 
be done to integrate and address the social, political and economic problems in the troubled 
region. The exclusively military-based approach from the organisations involved in attempts to 
curb Boko Haram has been correctly condemned because of concomitant human rights violations 
and a lack of attention to primary causes of terrorism. 
The regional organisations should be adequately prepared and have sufficient resources 
available for when militants attack. Peace and security architecture should be enhanced to 
anticipate violent events on the continent. Both the ECOWAS and the AU should work together 
to address the root causes of the problem and keep their support teams in conflict zones until 
stability is guaranteed. The regional organisations should shift away from their comfort zone of 
having regular meetings and conferences without practically executing initiatives. They should 
also regularly monitor the movement of people and goods across Lake Chad Basin borders. Tight 
security is required to prevent the flow of weapons and human trafficking. This can be achieved 
by setting up long-term projects to enhance security. 
The regional and continental organisations should also get their financial budgets in order and 
stop relying on donor funding. They should also consider that delays in logistics and supplies give 
the enemy a great advantage. The above indicated challenges prevent these organisations from 
effectively weakening Boko Haram. 
6.4.9. Turning forests into industries 
 
The Nigerian government should use remote or dense areas for projects so that terrorists will not 




challenging because it is not possible for soldiers or security agencies to be always in the forests 
and the bush. As long as those areas remain unprotected or uncleared, Boko Haram members 
will keep on using those forests to prepare and launch attacks. There is a need for long-term plans 
as opposed to driving out terrorists from forests and then claiming victory. The main reason Boko 
Haram in the north-east is capable of ambushing the military is due to the fact they have enough 
space for hide. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that the Nigerian government make use of 
all ungoverned spaces, by creating projects in those areas. Land clearing might not be the best 
option but in the case of Nigeria using those areas for agricultural projects makes sense because 
terrorists will not be able to operate from within them. 
 6.5. Summarising key findings  
 
This research study assessed the factors that determined the emergence of Boko Haram in 
Nigeria, explored Boko Haram’s development, and evaluated the actions taken to mitigate the 
crisis and their effectiveness. The study argued that corruption and bad governance are the 
primary factors that help to explain the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The study argued that 
Nigeria as a whole cannot be described as a failed or failing state but the north-east part of 
Nigeria, in which Boko Haram's attacks have been rampant and continue, possess the 
characteristics of a failed or a failing state. If the Nigerian government did not ignore the 
grievances of the north-east citizens, if it exercised good governance and political accountability, 
ensured the rule of law, and possessed the will to alleviate poverty and unemployment in north-
east Nigeria, Boko Haram might still have emerged but it would not have been as powerful or 
impactful. 
Since Boko Haram has garnered much of its support from the disgruntled unemployed and 
impoverished youths, the study recommends more efforts to alleviate poverty and unemployment. 
Corruption was shown to have penetrated the military and the police. Thus, the study argued the 
government has to make concerted efforts to strengthen its intelligence-gathering mechanisms, 
subpoena leaders for misconduct, and apply checks and balances within the security agencies. 
Failure to do so weakens the possibility of fully curbing Boko Haram crisis. The study suggested 
that abolishing organised corruption via regular training and human rights violations workshops 
would make a significant difference towards resolving the crisis. 
The presence of education deficiencies in north-east Nigeria was identified as extremely 




that the Nigerian government must boost education opportunities in north-east Nigeria, to improve 
their market and economic prospects, and win the hearts and minds of the youth, including giving 
them insights into the dangers of joining terrorist organisations. Promoting recreational and 
sporting activities to the disgruntled youth and organising competitions with other youths in Nigeria 
can help to make them feel more at home. 
The study argued that state failure has not only been responsible for the emergence and rise of 
Boko Haram but also for hindering the effectiveness of responses. To be able to resolve the crisis, 
in the long run, a critical approach, to address the root causes of the problem was suggested as 
preferable. The heavy-handed military approach was critiqued because of its serious human 
rights violations. It is important for the government to prioritise the rule of law and revive its 
constitution to serve the interest of the citizens, so that people will not join the terrorist group to 
get revenge against government brutality or to air out grievances. The critical approach also aims 
to allow long-term solutions based on assessing inequalities, sufferings, and abuses of power by 
the state. It aims to produce long-term solutions which Nigeria and all the parties involved should 
execute. Thus, the study argued that a truth and reconciliation commission should be established. 
This would create a context in which people can forgive each other and those who deserve to be 
compensated can be compensated. It should be based on the idea that realised justice can heal 
wounds and reduce anger against the state and the repentant.  
Besides efforts to drive terrorist from some areas, the study argued that there should be efforts to 
conduct a thorough search for explosives in all hot spot areas and at Nigeria’s borders. 
Taking into consideration the efforts made by the regional and continental organisations, the study 
argued that both organisations lacked the capacity, resources and the common will to fully commit 
to resolving the Nigerian crisis. To be able to curb Boko Haram crisis in the long run, the study 
argued that more needs to be done to enhance regional synergy and cooperation, and that 
regional organisations should monitor human rights violations and continue supporting the 
troubled area until safety is guaranteed. The study contended that organisations should engage 
in determining the root causes of the crisis and try to implement soft approaches, as opposed to 
near exclusively resorting to military action. Working on tightening security at Lake Chad Basin 
borders has also been suggested as a way to stop the smuggling of small and light weapons and 
human trafficking, which can prevent terrorists or criminals from easily accessing weapons and 




Dense forest areas cannot be sustainably monitored for terrorist networks. To reduce terrorist 
hiding-spots and prevent them from using dense forests to prepare for ambushes or launching 
attacks, the study suggested that deforestation would help. Those areas could be used for 
agricultural activities, which would limit the coverage of the militants. 
6.6. Recommendations for further research 
The military approaches deployed by the Nigerian state, the regional organisation, and the 
continental organisation have been marred by human rights violations with little efforts to use soft 
approaches. The study thus recommends more analysis and research regarding the application 
of a critical approach that is focused on root causes and long-term solutions. Furthermore, case 
studies based on field research, which examine the legitimacy of democratic practices in Nigeria 
by comparing democratic processes in south-west Nigeria, north-east Nigeria, and other parts of 
Nigeria are recommended. 
This might help to understand whether the Nigerian government is only considering the north-
east region as part of its nation based on a territorial interpretation but not as part of its nation in 
terms of actual governance and service delivery. Such case studies could lead to the development 
of new initiatives to change the situation in north-east Nigeria. 
Furthermore, with regards to the many people who have lost their innocent families and the 
belongings they have worked for, a field study to practically engage with such people could be 
done by a group of social workers, human rights lawyers, experts, and regional and continental 
representatives to gather relevant information about their experiences and how they consider that 
their grievances could be resolved. 
The findings could be used by relevant stake holders and Nigerian government’s relevant 
departments to ensure that the state draws on the findings and respects the demands and 
experiences of the victims. This would demand serious political will and commitment by Nigerian 
elites and the government. 
Finally, in light of the humanitarian crisis caused by the Boko Haram attacks, a field study could 
be conducted whereby Nigerian government officials interact with those who have been 
displaced. This could help to think well about the 2.3 million people living as refugees in the Lake 
Chad Basin region, and enable active engagement with them, so that work can be done towards 




This might help in the long run to avoid or reduce the escalation of tensions or the logic of revenge. 
A revenge mentality might cause disaffected people to join militant groups, which would only 
exacerbate the crisis. Nigeria should use its abundant resources to fund practical programs for 
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